

Challenges of the Legal Basis of Political Financing in Nigeria: A Study of 2015 Presidential Election

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Abstract: The problem of unregulated use of money in politics did not begin today. There are antecedents in the history of modern Nigeria, beginning with the politics of nationalism in the 1950s, similar to rent-seeking behaviours of parties, politicians and voters. For example, the absence of strict legislation to regulate party finance made it possible for politicians and political parties to engage in illegal party financing and corruption in the Nigeria's First Republic. The electoral laws under which elections were conducted in the 1950s and 1960swere derived from the provision of the British Representation of the Peoples Act of 1948/9 and its regulations. The 1959 elections were conducted under the provision of the Nigeria (Electoral Provisions) Order-in-Council, LN 117 of 1958 enacted by the British Parliament. During this period, there was no clearly defined regulatory framework on party finance and political party funding was primarily carried out through private parties since candidates were responsible Granted that some efforts have been made to reform laws regulating political campaigns and party funding, campaign financing and their abuses thereof remain shrouded in mystery. It is in this connection that this chapter critically interrogates the challenges of political parties and election/campaign financing in Nigeria, with specific emphasis on the 2015 general elections. The chapter demonstrates that despite the existence of an enabling Act to sanitize campaign financing in Nigeria. the suspicious manner in which the presidential candidates of the two major political parties mobilized huge campaign funds in the wake of the 2015 general elections, reveals not just the contempt with which they hold this law, but also exposes the political corruption and commercialization of the electioneering process. The methodology made extensive use of secondary sources and employed the technique of content analysis to analyse both descriptive, narrative, and empirical data on election expenses. The chapter also argues that the commercialization of the electioneering process does not only disempower and dispossess citizens during the post-election period, but has other far reaching- implications for the nation's democratic trajectory. The chapter concludes by positing that there is the need, not just to strengthen institutions but, to make them more proactive in the discharge of their statutory responsibilities.

Keywords: Political Parties, Political Party Campaign & Funding, the Constitution, Electoral Acts and other Legal Frameworks, Political Corruption and Election

Introduction

Political Party Funding and Finance constitute an important aspect of the Electoral Process. The sources of funding and finance of Political Parties and the way and manner these funds are spent largely determine the quality and acceptability or otherwise of almost every election. Accordingly, the 1999 Constitution and the Electoral Act 2002 have made provisions, though not exhaustive, in respect of how Political Parties could source and/or receive their funds. Limitations have also been placed on sourcing of funds from certain areas and on the extent to which Political Parties could make electoral expenses. The Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Attahiru Jega recently posited that the Commission is barred by law from funding registered political parties. Jega stated this yesterday in Abuja, shortly after declaring open a three-day Train the Trainers workshop which focused on the role and responsibilities of political party agents on Election Day which was organised by INEC, in collaboration with the Democratic Governance for

Development Project (DGD) of the UNDP. Jega further stated that "The issue of funding political parties is a constitutional matter. As I speak with you, the constitution of Nigeria does not permit INEC to fund political parties. But in many other countries, their laws allaw for the funding of political parties" (Leadership Editorial, 2014: 8).

The clamour by political parties for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to take over the funding of their activities may have to wait until the constitution is amended. INEC chairman Professor Attahiru Jega said this much in a recent interaction with the media. He made it clear that the issue of funding political parties is a constitutional matter. Sections 225, 226 and 227 are clearly silent on that. He insisted that, until the National Assembly amends the Nigerian constitution to allaw for funding of political parties, INEC would not be able to do anything about it. Those pressurising INEC to fund the parties may be drawing from experiences in other countries such as the United States of America from where Nigeria borrowed its brand of democracy. In those countries, there is discipline as individuals and groups form parties based on very strong ideological framework and they go all out to talk to people and organisations who share their beliefs and passion and who, in turn, contribute financially to support their operations. When they field candidates in elections, they sell them to the electorate based on those beliefs, and, if the electorate buys them, all well and good. Otherwise, they move on with persistence and hope for a better luck next time.

He further said that until the National Assembly amends the Nigerian constitution to allaw for funding of political parties, INEC can't do anything about financing them, adding that the commission would continue to abide by the provisions of the constitution. According to him, "... Until our laws are changed, there is nothing we can do about funding political parties. Maybe our legislators would look into that possibility. We would abide by whatever is in the law." (Leadership Editorial, 2014: 8).

The opposite is the case here where parties are seen as investments bereft of any ideological foundation. As such, there must be returns if they are to stay in business. This profit motive has consistently given rise to the godfather syndrome where an individual or group bankrolls the party and claims ownership. There was an instance during the Babangida administration when the government actually decreed and funded two parties — National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) — because it believed that was the way to do away with claims by an individual or group pretending to own a party. That experiment became a cesspool of corruption and ended as an unmitigated disaster. That may explain why the makers of the succeeding constitution that midwifed the current democratic dispensation decided to keep the idea of government financing the parties silent. The suggestion that the government should consider wasting taxpayers' money on politicians who will end up feathering their own nests when they get into office is decidedly objectionable. For one reason, it will not stop some power-hungry individuals from ganging up to hijack the process. Also, it will not restrain them from looting our collective patrimony for themselves and their generations yet unborn.

Put differently, corruption related to political party financing poses a grave threat to democratic development worldwide. Covert party funding streams, influence peddling, and leveraging state resources for party purposes all compromise the single greatest asset of democracy: the faith and support of ordi¬nary citizens in the political process.

With multiparty systems less than two decade old, law levels of economic development, and traditional political constitu¬encies based on tribal, ethnic, and regional interests rather than on ideology, many African political systems remain fragile and weak. Still, political parties form the cornerstone of a democratic society, aggregating and representing the in¬terests of citizens to create public policy. Leaders of African political parties must find solutions, not only to the economic and social problems facing their nations, but to the negative influences of money, which affect key aspects of their orga¬nizational purpose. This paper seeks to add to the debate on the legal basis of political finance in Nigeria.

Conceptualizing Political Financing

According to Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (2008) while political party financing is a challenge worldwide, it can be especially difficult in countries in Africa. The reasons for this include:

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• law national and per capita income levels;

• poor party fund management in Africa, a symptom of more widespread problems with public financial management and accountability;

• weak enforcement of legislation and regulation governing party financing; and

• poor public perception of political parties, which inhibits both private fundraising and support for public funding.

According to Mathisen and Svåsand (2002) while funding of political parties is intrinsically understood to be crucial, it nevertheless is an ambiguous concept. With political funding we mean: the way that political parties and individual candidates running for political office raise funds for election campaigns and, in the case of political parties, for maintaining themselves as organisations. Political finance is a complex political phenomenon to understand. The topic itself is not very transparent. Even in countries that in general have great openness with regard to information from official and private sources, information about political finance is incomplete, across parties and across time, and it is hard to specify the impact of finance on political outcomes, for instance for election results.

In spite of the problems in estimating the precise impact of political finance there is little doubt that the actors themselves, parties and candidates, believe it is important. The very fact that such information is not easily available proves that it is considered important. Moreover, in most countries there is an acknowledged need to have some kind of regulation of political finance. Total absence of regulation, it is feared, will lead parties and candidates to be controlled by important donors. We can distinguish between four sources of political finance that in general are considered legitimate, although all of these forms may not be permitted in all countries:

a) resources mobilised by the political parties themselves, such as membership fees, taxes on representatives, income from property, publications and subsidiaries controlled by the party,

- b) Contributions from individuals,
- c) Contributions from collective actors; such as by unions and other organisations and corporations etc, and
- d) Subsidies from the state or other tiers of government.

In addition, some countries differentiate between financial support from domestic sources and international sources. Political finance refers generally to monetary contributions and normally excludes other forms of contributions, although these may have important financial implications. Examples of this kind of party support are free radio and TV time during election campaigns, support for the press or for organisations affiliated with parties. Political parties are complex organisations consisting of multiple levels (local, regional and national) and multiple units (the central party organisation, ancillary organisations for youth, women etc, or the group of elected officials) at each level. With regard to public funding of parties it is necessary to specify what unit in the party it is that receives contributions. Public subsidies also vary from being targeted to specific activities, as in Germany, to not coming with any strings attached, as in Norway.

The criteria that are used to allocate subsidies vary from a minimum share of the votes to a share of parliamentary seats. Finally, countries differ with respect to the obligation parties have to the state and the public in terms of financial accountability and transparency.

The Legal Framework for Funding of Political Parties in Nigeria

The sources of funding political parties in Nigeria between the Second, Third and the Fourth Republics were:

1. Statutory allocation

- 2. Fees and subscription and
- 3. Lawful donations and public collection respectively.

The methods of party financing used in Africa are primarily individual donations (membership fees and fundraising); private sector donations (corporate contributions); public funding (cash subsidies, in-kind or indirect assistance); and foreign donations (foreign governments, diaspora communities). There are advantages and disadvantages to each. Key points made in the literature and by experts include: Individual donations: Advantages

• Membership fees are considered essential, as they encourage parties to reach out to and involve the grassroots, promoting democratic participation.

Disadvantages

- Law personal income levels constrain the ability to pay membership fees; and
- The prominence of any one wealthy donor can produce a personality-based party.

Private sector donations:

Advantages

• They are essential to party development as public funding is relatively minimal in Africa and membership fees are insufficient.

Disadvantages

• The current absence of regulations for private donations, including no requirements for disclosure, has allawed for corrupt kickbacks and the disproportionate influence of special interests. This in turn can further erode public confidence in political parties. Public funding:

Advantages

- Regulated public funding to parties has been helpful in "levelling the playing field";
- It can also reduce reliance on illegal methods of funding and influence of special interests from private sector donations; and
- Its provision can be made conditional on political party reforms and improvements in accountability and transparency.

Disadvantages

- The availability of such funding can reduce incentives to reach out to the grassroots;
- Reliance on government funding may result in a loss of party independence;

• There may be a diversion of resources from important social sectors, such as health care and education;

• The public in some cases are unsupportive of public funding, in connection with their poor perception of political parties and concerns about state corruption;

 \cdot $% \$ Insufficiently regulated public funding, as in the case of private sector donations, has allawed for corruption; and

• The way in which such funds are distributed can reinforce the status quo and prevent the rise of new parties (i.e. by providing funding proportionate to a party's representation in Parliament).

Foreign funding:

Advantages

- Such donations can help to fill the funding gap; and
- They can keep diaspora communities involved in their home countries.

Disadvantages

• Some leaders are concerned about the possibility of national policies being influenced by external parties; and

• There may be greater difficulties with accountability with foreign sources of funding.

Provisions under the 1999 Constitution

A number of Constitutional provisions and legislative enactments relate to political finance. The Constitution of Nigeria provides the basic framework for the implementation and enactment of other laws in the polity. The supremacy of the constitution is further emphasized in section 1 (3), which provides "if any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution, this constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void" (The Constitution, 1999:1).

In other words, every other law in the country must be in line with the provisions of the constitution. It also follows that any inadequacy in the constitution will automatically taint the provisions of subsequent laws in the same subject matter. The 1999 Constitution in section 221 prohibits any association other than political parties from making political donations.

The Constitution confers general powers on the Commission under Part 1 of the third schedule to the Constitution particularly paragraph 15(c) thereof to monitor the Organisation and Operation of the Political Parties including their finances. Further down to paragraph 15(d), the Commission is also empowered to arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the Funds and Accounts of Political Parties and publish a REPORT on such examination and audit for public information. Finances of Political Parties are covered by Section 225 of the Constitution while Annual Report on finances is covered by Section 226.

Section 225(1) mandates every Political Party to at such times and in such manner as the Commission may require, submit to the Commission and publish a Statement of its Assets and Liabilities. Section 225(2) requires every Political Party to submit to the Commission a detailed Annual Statement and Analysis of its sources of funds and other assets together with a similar Statement of its Expenditure in such form as the Commission may require. Section 225(3) prohibits every Political Party from holding or possessing funds or other assets from outside Nigeria or retaining any such funds or assets remitted or sent from outside Nigeria. By Section 225(4) any such funds or assets remitted or sent to a Political Party must be paid over or transferred to the Commission within twenty-one (21) days of its receipt accompanied by such information as the Commission may require.

It is also the duty of the Commission under Section 225(5) to give directions to Political Parties regarding the Books or Records of Financial Transactions which they shall keep and, to examine all such Books and Records. Under Section 225(6) the Commission is empowered to delegate the powers conferred on it under subsection 4 to any member of staff or a qualified auditor who must not be a member of a Political Party.

The constitution in Section 225 provides as follaws:

(1) Every political party shall, at such times and in such manner as the Independent National Electoral Commission may require, submit to the Independent National Electoral Commission a statement of its assets and liabilities.

(2) Every political party shall submit to the Independent National Electoral Commission a detailed annual statement and analysis of its sources of funds and other assets together with similar statements of its expenditure in such form as the Commission may require.

(3) No political party shall – (a) hold or posses any funds or other assets outside Nigeria; or (b) be entitled to retain any funds or other assets outside Nigeria

(4) Any funds or other assets remitted or sent to a political party from outside Nigeria shall be paid over or transferred to the Commission within twenty-one days of its receipt with such information as the Commission may require.

(5) The Commission shall have power to give directions to political parties regarding the books or records of financial transactions which they shall keep and, to examine the all such books and rerecords.

The Commission was also empowered in subsection 6 of the above section to audit the account of political parties through its staff or professional auditors. The commission is further empowered by section 226 of the constitution to prepare and submit a report on the financial account of the political parties to the National Assembly and are authorized to have unlimited assess to the records of the political parties. The National Assembly is empowered in section 228 of the 1999 constitution to make laws for the punishment of any individual or party who fails foul of the above provisions and the disbursement of annual grants to political parties.

Section 81 provides that the National Assembly may make an annual grant to political parties and 30% of such grants should be shared among the political parties in proportion to number of seats won by each party in the National Assembly.

Section 82 provides as follaws:

No political party shall be eligible to receive a grant under section 93 unless it wins a minimum of 10 percent of the total votes cast in the local government election in at least two-thirds of the states of the federation. Section 93 which is referred to in the above provision has no such provisions. Section 83 empowers the Commission to place the limitation on the amount of money or other assets, which an individual or corporate body can contribute to a political party. Also it stipulates for a record of all contributions.

Section 80(1) empowers the National Assembly to approve a grant for disbursement to Political Parties contesting elections under the Act. By Section 80(2) such grant approved by the National Assembly shall be made to the Commission which shall distribute same to the Political Parties as follaws:

(a) 30% of the grant to be shared equally among the registered Political Parties participating in respect of a general election for which the grant has been made; and

(b) The outstanding 70% of the grant shall be shared proportionately among the Political Parties after the result of the elections having regard to the number of seats won by each party in the National Assembly.

It would appear that by the strict interpretation of this provision, a Political Party can only qualify for grant if such a party participates in a general election. It is a considered view that participation in this sense must be construed to mean sponsoring of one or more candidates at the election. It is not sufficient for the party to be merely registered or to have participated in the electoral campaign.

Section 81(1) also empowers the National Assembly to make an Annual Grant to the Commission for distribution to registered Political Parties to assist them in their operations. The ratio for distribution are as follaws:

(a) 30% of the grant shall be shared equally among all the registered Political

Parties; and

(b) The remaining 70% of the grant to be shared proportionately among the registered Political Parties according to the number of seats won by each party in the National Assembly.

Section 82 places what appears to be a stringent limitation to the eligibility or qualification of a Political Party to receive grant by requiring such a party to win at least ten (10) percent of the total votes cast in the local government election in at least two thirds of the states of the Federation. However, the wrong cross reference to Section 93 in the Act which deals totally on a different subject matter appears to have engendered confusion as to the true meaning and interpretation of Section 82. If one takes the safest option of assuming that reference to Section 93 means reference to Section 81, it leaves those "later day"

Political Parties who could not participate in the local government elections conducted prior to their registration at a great disadvantage. This exactly could have been the scenario in the last dispensation where those Political Parties registered after the local government elections in 1998 could have been excluded from any grant pending of course, the conduct of the last local government elections. Again, by the strict interpretation of the provision of Section 82, it appears that Area Councils do not form part of the calculation when computing what constitutes 10% of two-thirds of the states of the Federation although the general opinion is that the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) should in certain circumstances as this, be treated as a state.

Section 83(1) empowers the Commission to place limitation on the amount of money or other assets, which an individual or corporate body can contribute to a Political Party while Section 83 (2) makes it mandatory for every Political Party to maintain a record of all contributions and amounts contributed. From the tenor of the wordings of the provision of section 83(1) it seems that the Commission has discretion whether or not to place such limitation as envisaged by the Act and it appears that presently no such limitation exists.

Suffice it to submit that this is a very important provision which the Commission has not taken full advantage of. Until the limitation as envisaged by the Act is placed by the Commission, it would appear to be perfectly legal for an individual or corporate body to contribute any amount or asset to a Political Party. Again, it appears that the provision of Section 83(2) is made subject to Section 83(1). It follaws therefore that the Commission may not rightly insist that parties comply with the provision of Section 83 (2) if it has not placed the limitation in accordance with Section 83(1).

Section 84(1) explains election expenses to mean expenses incurred by a Political Party within the period from the date notice is given by the Commission to conduct an election up to, and including, the polling day in respect of the particular election. Section 84(2) limits the expenses to be incurred by a Political Party for the management or conduct of an election not exceeding in the aggregate the sum determined by multiplying N20 (twenty) naira by the number of names appearing in the final voters' list for each constituency where there is a candidate sponsored by the Political Party. It has been suggested that the limitation of election expenses to N20 (twenty) naira per voter is unrealistic having regard to inflationary trend.

Section 84(3) provides that election expenses of a Political Party shall be submitted to the Commission in a separate audited report duly signed by the party's auditors and counter-signed by the Chairman of the party as the case may be and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit by the signatories as to the correctness of its contents. The use of the expression "as the case may be" presupposes that the framers of the Act may have intended that another officer (probably the party secretary) could also countersign the audited REPORT in the absence of the chairman. However, since it is not explicit, it appears that it is only the Chairman of the party that is authorized to counter-sign the audited report/return.

Section 84(4) requires the return to show clearly the amount of money expended by or on behalf of the party on election expenses, including the items of expenditure and commercial value of goods and services received for election purposes. Section 84(5) makes it compulsory for the Political Party making the return to publish same in at least two National Newspapers. Section 84(6) prescribes a fine of N500,000.00 for a Political Party that incurs election expenses beyond the limit stipulated in the Act.

Section 84(7) makes it mandatory for the Commission to make available for public inspection during regular business hours at the national and state offices, the audited returns of Political Parties and the publication shall include the name, address, occupation and amount contributed by each contributor to a party. It is also pertinent to point out that Section 78 of the Act mandates the Commission to arrange for the annual examination and auditing of Funds and Accounts of Political Parties and publish the report of such examination and audit in three National Newspapers. The same section also prescribed the period to be covered by Annual Statement to be the period from 1st January to 31st December of each year. Finally, it is the considered view that the Act has made considerable provisions regarding Party Funding and Finance. There are, no doubt, areas that need to be fine tuned in order to bring them within the realm of present realities, like the ceiling on election expenses as provided for under Section 84(2). There is also the need to correct the wrong cross referencing that abound in the Act. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that quite a number of the provisions have not been exhaustively and religiously follawed. By the time they are fully follawed and implemented there would be a remarkable improvement in the electoral process. It would be advisable therefore for all Political Parties to follaw closely the provisions of the law as regards Political Party Finance and Funding.

The Electoral Act 2002

The provision of this law covers virtually every process of electoral activities in the country. Section 76 provides for the oversight function of the Electoral Commission over the activities of the political parties and also provides for a fine of N500, 000 for non-conformity by any individual to lawful directions by the Commission in carrying out its supervisory functions.

Section 77 makes provision for a fine of N500, 000 for the contravention of section 225 (3) (a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution relating to ownership of foreign asset by any political party and any donation from outside the country.

Section 78 provides for period of time, which the annual account of a political party should cover. It also empowered the Commission to audit the account of political parties periodically. Section 79 makes provision for a separate finance statement for election expenses as prescribed in section 100 of the act not latter than 90 days after the election. Surprisingly section 100 of the Electoral Act has no provision whatsoever that relates to party finances it rather talks about qualification of a person who can contest elections.

Section 77(a) provides for offences in respect of any Political Party that contravenes. Section 225(3) (a) of the Constitution which deals with prohibition of holding or possessing any funds or other assets outside Nigeria by a Political Party. Section 77(a) provides for offences in respect of any political party that contravenes. Section 225(3) (b) of the Constitution which deals with prohibition of retaining any fund or other asset remitted or sent to a political party from outside Nigeria. While Section.77 (a) prescribes for forfeiture of the funds or asset to the Commission in addition to a fine of not more than N500,000.00 upon conviction in respect of contravention of Section 225(3)(a) of the Constitution, Section 77(b) prescribes forfeiture of the funds or assets to the Commission in addition to a fine of not more than N500,000.00 upon conviction in respect of contravention of Section 225(3)(b) of the Constitution.

Section 79(1) requires a Political Party to submit to the Commission on a prescribed form, not later than 90 days from the date of the election a statement relating to its election expenses which shall be in a separate audited account. It is pertinent to note that reference to Section 100 of the Act in the provision is erroneous. The correct section ought to be Section 84 which deals in extensor with election expenses of Political Parties. Section 79(2) prescribes a fine of N100,000.00 payable jointly and severally by leaders of a Political Party upon conviction for contravention of the provisions of subsection (1) above. It is also instructive to observe that it would have been more appropriate if the provisions of Section 79 had come immediately after Section 84 and probably what seemed like a repetition of Section 76(1) in Section 84(3) should have been avoided.

Any political party that fails to submit the audited return of election expenses is guilty of an offense punishable on conviction with a fine of N100, 000.

Electoral Act 2006

Under the 2006 Electoral Act which was used in the conduct of the 2007 elections while the recommendations of the Uwais Panel was being debated, the National Assembly was empowered to approve a grant to be disbursed to political parties. The 2006 law also stipulates how the grant should be divided, 10 percent going to be shared equally among the registered political parties and the remaining 90 percent disbursed in proportion to the number of National Assembly seats won by each party. The law also gives INEC the power to place a limit on the amount of money or other assets an individual or group can contribute to a political

party. For a presidential candidate the sum is N500 million, governor N100 million, senator N20 million and a representative N10 million. A state assembly candidate, or chairman N5 million and a local councillorship, N500,000.

It is an open question whether this aspect of the electoral law has ever been paid attention to not to talk of being enforced. Some of the then 50 parties have not in any way justified the money they receive from government. It has been discovered that some of the parties only exist on the pages of newspapers and magazines. They only function when elections are coming or when funding is released by government. They collect the funds, share and go home to rest till another round of funding is available. A few of the parties are even run by close-knit family members. So what does a party exist for if it is only to share government funds?

As the nation moved towards 2011 elections, it became imperative to revisit

the issue of political financing in Nigeria. The Uwais Panel report recommended the continued funding of parties by government through INEC, but suggests a ceiling for individual donations for each category of office. These figures run from a limit of N20 million for individual donations for a presidential candidate to N15 million for a governor, N10 million for a senator, N3 million for a local government chairmanship candidate. It makes eminent sense for party members to fund their own organization. The Uwais panel recommends that only parties that score 2.5 percent of the votes in the 2011 elections should be eligible to receive funds from public grants, but this like many other issues where expunged in the 2010 Electoral Act.

Electoral Act 2010

The 2011 General Elections are over with local and international acclamation to the electoral commission. The elections were not flawless; however, Nigerians and foreign witnesses are unanimous that the just concluded polls were held in substantial compliance with the nation's electoral laws. It is too early to pre-empt the political parties on the veracity of the election expenses they will submit to INEC in the next 6 months. But then, is six months not too long? I should think three months after the polls is okay, more so as candidates, who spend the bulk of the campaign money, are not yet under obligation to submit election expenses report.

This post election period, two major things must happen. The first is for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to rise up to its constitutional duty to enforce political finance provisions as contained in the statutes viz. the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) as well as the Political Party Finance Manual and Handbook. The second matter of urgent national importance is the amendment of these laws to make them more enforceable. The current legal framework requested three reports from the political parties. The first, according to section 89 of the Electoral Act 2010, is the annual statement of assets and liabilities, analysis of their sources of funds and other assets as well as their statements of expenditure. INEC is mandated to publish the report in three national newspapers.

The other report which is of greater interest to campaign finance experts is stated in section 92 of the current electoral act. Sub-section 3 of the clause says "Election expenses of a political party shall be submitted to the Commission in a separate audited return within 6 months after an election and such return shall be signed by the party's auditors and counter signed by the chairman of the party and be supported by a sworn affidavit by the signatories as to the correctness of its contents". Sub-section 5 states that the return shall show the amount of money expended by or on behalf of the party on election expenses, the items of expenditure and the commercial value of goods and services received for election purpose. Sub section 6 mandated the political parties in section 93 (4) and it states that "A political party sponsoring the election of a candidate shall within 3 months after the announcement of the results of the election, file a report of the contributions made by individuals and entities to the Commission". Hitherto, these provisions have been violated with impunity. If the truth will be told, the last general election in Nigeria was the most expensive in the annals of our electoral democracy. Given the resources deployed by some of the wealthy candidates during the elections, there is no gainsaying the fact that the contestants showed scant regards for the provision of section 91 subsections 2 - 5 of the Electoral Act 2010 which placed a cap on the amount of money they are to spend on their campaigns.

Other Legal Frameworks

The Companies and Allied Matters Act forbids corporate organizations from making political donations. The above-mentioned provisions if properly applied will inject some semblance of sanity in our political environment but that does not mean that there are no rooms for improvement. Section 226 provides that the Commission shall prepare and submit the annual report on the accounts and balance sheet of every political party to the National Assembly. The National Assembly is made up of partisan members who may not be free from bias in considering the reports. An independent body made up of non-partisan members should be in a better position to review such reports. The peculiar inclination of our politicians to place selfish and party interest above common good must not be overlooked.

It is submitted that the penalty provided in section 76, 77 and 78 of the 2002 Electoral Act are not stiff enough to deter parties from flouting the provisions of the law. Mere imposition of fine without more cannot adequately serve as an effective deterrent. The law should be tightened to disqualify such a party from taking part in the general elections. Our environment is one riddled by corruption and fraud. Nigerians are notorious for trivializing the provisions of the law; it then becomes necessary that in other to save our democracy very stiff penalties must be prescribed for serious offenses. The penalties as applied presently have not been able to check the excesses of political parties and politicians.

The provision of section 80 of the Electoral Act which stipulates that the grant given to political parties should be shared before and after elections and on the latter instance in proportion to the seats the political parties have in the National Assembly destroys the sole aim of the grant which is to help the political parties especially the small ones contest election. Sharing 70% of the grant after election to successful parties empowers the bigger parties the more and does not promote fair and level plying ground. This argument also applies to the provisions of sections 81 and 82 of the Electoral Act.

The reference made to wrong provisions in section 79 and 82 portrays the carelessness and inefficiency of the draftsmen and the legislators who passed it into law. The Act in section 83 contradicts the provisions of section 308 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, which prohibits corporate bodies from making political donations. This provision of the Act amplifies the very careless attitude of the draftsmen and creates confusion in the political environment. Allawing corporate bodies to make political donation will open up ways for the sale of the seat of government. It creates room for money politics as seen in the last election. Till date INEC has not placed any limitation on the amount of money an individual or corporation can donate to political parties allawing room for money bags to hijack the political parties and even the government as seen in the drama which unfolded in Anambra , Ogun, Oyo and Imo States respectively.

To monitor expenses of candidates the Draft Bill (Political Finance Bill 2004) presented by INEC to National Assembly required every candidate to file a return under oath of his/her election expenses within 2 months after the result of the election, after which the commission is required to publish some within 10 days of receipt. Again for reasons which we are not privy to, the law makers refused to publish such statements (which fortunately is a Constitutional requirement under section 225 and 226 of the 1999 Constitution).

In general, it is considered that a combination of both private and public funding is beneficial. It is recommended that private funding also be regulated, with requirements for disclosure and potentially a cap on the amount. Some of the literature suggests the use of a general private fund to reduce the influence of special interests; private donations would be pooled together and distributed to all eligible parties. However, there may be little incentive for private donors to contribute to such a fund. Regarding public funding, some form of equitable allocation is desirable, as opposed to a purely proportional system that rewards parties for their current strength and representation in Parliament. In addition, in-kind assistance (e.g. free public radio and television time) and indirect assistance (e.g. tax benefits for individual donations) should be considered, in order to reduce the risk of corruption with cash subsidies. Indirect assistance in the form of tax benefits can also be beneficial in encouraging grassroots involvement. Another way to encourage parties to reach out to the grassroots is the use of matching funds, whereby the state agrees to match all private donations. The literature also recommends that more attention be paid to monitoring and enforcing existing and new regulations through special enforcement/ auditing agencies, the media and various civil society groups.

Government may fund political parties in an indirect way. Indirect public funding includes:

- 1. free broad casting time
- 2. State payment in the legislature
- 3. Use of government facilities and personnel
- 4. State grants to party foundations
- 5. Tax relief, tax credits and matching grants (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002 and Ujo, 2000:25).

Membership subscription is another source of political party funding. The size of such funds depends on the membership strength of the party. As observed by Ujo (2000:126) while quoting Pinto-Duschinsky (1998).

In most countries, membership levels have been falling. Income subscription is rarely a major constituent of our party income. A recent comparative study of political financing in European countries concluded that membership subscription play 'only a limited role" in present day party finances. Other sources of funding political parties include:

- 1. Institutions
- 2. Business Corporations
- 3. Trade Unions
- 4. Fund Raising Activities
- 5. In-kind Contributions
- 6. profit from party-owned business activities
- 7. foreign contribution
- 8. Interest groups (Ujo, 2000:126).

The fundamental objectives of regulating political financing as cited by Cross (2004:1430) includes:

1. Probity and transparency in order to preserve voters confidence that system is free from corruption and quid pro quo arrangements

2. equity to ensure a balanced playing field among parties and candidates, with name vastly outspending the others

3. Accessibility to electoral competition for all citizens regardless of their financial status.

Irrespective of the good intensions of the government, the above objectives are unattainable as a result of "corrupt" political financing. According to Pinto-Duschinsky (2001 and 2004), "corrupt" political financing usually refers to one of the following:

1. Political contributions that contravene existing laws on political financing

2. The use for campaign or party objectives of money that a political office holder has received from a corrupt transaction.

3. Unauthorized use of state resources for partisan political purposes.

4. Acceptance of money in return for an authorized favour or the promise of a favour in the event of election to an office.

5. Contributions from disrespectable sources and

6. Spending of money on banned purposes such as vote-buying (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2004:6-16).

A discussion of political party finance has to grapple with the origins of the money and accounting for their usage. That is what is the source of the funds and how are they used. Universally, corruption, bribery, vote buying and election related financial malpractices have necessitated calls for electoral reforms to address the anomalies. Generally there are three different sources of money that parties accrue their finances from. These are first, internal finances such as members' dues and membership fees, second private donations, and third state/public funding. The latter are the subsidies provided by the state to parties, candidates for campaigns in the form of direct payments, campaign reimbursements, and in other cases free media time. However public funding has its inherent dangers, which include over dependence on the state for funding which may hinder the independence of political parties; capitalization that primarily leads to concerns on the possibility of exchange of large donations for political favours. Commercialization that is, the increased use of political consultants that leads to political parties' decreased consultation as well as less reliance on members.

These problems inevitably lead to alienation of parties from their members and vice versa. But in spite of these shortfalls state financing has largely been supported on grounds that, since parties and electoral competition are essential for democracy, it is only fair that the state provides them some support. In addition, with the ever-increasing costs of elections, there may not be enough private financing for all parties. Therefore public funds are the only way to ensure equality. Skeptics have however faulted public funding on grounds that, funding may lead to state interference in the internal affairs of the parties or lead to ossification of the party system. In other words, the party system will not change and encourage new competition because parties that might have otherwise faded away continue to exist as a result of state funding. In addition parties will become less dependent on members dues, thus becoming coteries of the state, rather than articulating the interest of the people. As Von Beyme argues "public funding is a proof that parties have lost their social critical function and are ossifying in the arms of the state." In order to address these anomalies legislation should be designed legislation should be designed in a way that ensures that fundraising does not become the main preoccupation of parties. Likewise, funding should be designed to grant parties a degree of autonomy from private interest. To this end, legislation on contribution limits for instance can be enacted to ensure that one individual or group does not have a disproportional influence on parties, elections or the policy decisions of representatives. By limiting the number of big donors to each party it limits the possibility of one party having a large advantage over others. It can also be argued that contribution limits can enhance the autonomy of parties and lessen the commercialization of politics since parties would no longer rely on large contributors, which in turn would make them less susceptible to influence to contributors of large donations. This argument is however oblivious of the fact that these limits might actually increase the time spent on fundraising since the number of donors required to maintain current income levels would increase since instead of a few large donors many small donors would be needed.

Legal Challenges of Political Financing in Nigeria

Across the globe, there are no shortages of legislations governing campaign finance. It must interest us to note that most of these regulations were introduced as responses to the magnitude of political corruption and scandals witnessed in the countries concerned. The frequencies with which new laws regulating the injection of money into politics are introduced are a clear indications of the challenges of making workable and implementable laws by various countries. It should also be noted, however, that the range of issues relating to aspects of campaign and party financing are so comprehensive that some of the provisions relating to same are contained in broader laws about elections such as the constitution or electoral laws. Sometimes, they are also included in anti-corruption legislations, Companies and Allied Decrees or media laws contain laws about voluntary associations and organizations contributions on political financing. Given that there areplethora of laws on political financing, there are usually many laws in various countries that deal with this subject. The existence of multiplicity of laws often complicate the task of regulatory body or bodies responsible for enforcing these laws. Essentially, the main provisions of political/campaign financing are centered on the follawing areas as discussed previously. They include:

- i. Prohibition against corrupt and illegal practices (such as vote buying).
- ii. Financial deposits for candidates for public office

- iii. Disclosure rules
- iv. Spending limits
- v. Contribution limits

vi. Bans on certain types of contributions (such as foreign contributions, anonymous contributions, or contributions from business corporations).

- vii. Political broadcasting rules
- viii. Rules concerning the funding of internal party contest.
- ix. Rules concerning the declaration of assets by candidates for public office
- x. Measures to control the use of public resources for campaign purposes

In Nigeria, there are various constitutional and other legal instruments guiding the operation of political parties, especially as it relates to campaign financing. These include the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, the 2002 and 2006 Electoral Acts, and 2010 Electoral Act as amended. Others include the statutory rules of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other informal rules. These laws provide copious provisions of the extent and limitation of political parties with respect to campaign/political financing. The constitution, for instance, is the first grund-norm governing the activities of political parties in the country. Some studies have already made available detailed provisions of the rules and regulations governing the internal and external operations of political parties derived from Sections 222-229 of the 1999 Constitution.

For instance, section 225 sub- section 2 of the 1999 Constitution is unambiguous on the finances of political parties. This section states that: Every political party shall submit to the Independent National Electoral Commission a detailed annual statement and analysis of its sources of funds and other assets together with a similar statement of its expenditure is such form as the commission may require.

Sub sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the same provision are even more forthcoming on the roles of INEC in checking the financial dealings and status of political parties. For instance, sub-section 3 states that no political party shall -

(a) Hold or possess any funds or other assets outside Nigeria; or

(b) Be entitled to retain any funds or assets remitted or sent to it from outside Nigeria.

Sub-section 4 states that:

Any funds or other assets remitted or sent to a political party from outside Nigeria shall be paid over or transferred to the commission within twenty-one days of its receipt with such information as the commission may require.

Sub-section 5 further states that:

The Commission shall have power to give directions to political parties regarding the books or records of financial transactions which they shall keep and, to examine all such books and records.

Significantly, section 226 sub-section 1 permits INEC to mandatorily prepare and submit annually to the National Assembly a report of the accounts and balance sheet of every political party. In preparing its report, sub-section 2 of the same provision empowers INEC to: Carry out investigations as will enable it form an opinion as to whether proper books of account and proper records have been kept by any political party, and if the Commission is of the opinion that proper books and accounts have not been kept by a political party, the Commission shall so report. It is also important to examine the provisions of section 228 of the 1999 Constitution ,which specifically deals with public funding of political parties and punishment for those that contravene sections 221, 225 (3) and 227 of this constitution. To be specific section 228 states inter-alia:

The National Assembly may by law provide-

(a) for the punishment of any person involved in the management or control of any political party found after due inquiry to have contravened any of the provisions of sections 221, 225 (3) and 227;

(b) for the disqualification of any person from holding public office on the ground that he knowingly aids or abets a political party in contravening section 225 (3) of this constitution;

(c) for an annual grant to the Independent National Electoral Commission for disbursement to political parties on a fair and equitable basis to assist them in the discharge of their functions; and

(d) for the conferment on the Commission of other powers as may appear to the National Assembly to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of enabling the commission more effectively ensure that political parties observe the provisions of this part of the chapter.

These are constitutional provisions are aimed at closely monitoring and supervising the activities of the income and expenditure of political parties. There are, however, some gaps, especially in the implementation of these provisions. A close examination of the provisions of section 228 of the 1999 Constitution, it is clear that the framers of the 1999 Constitution bestowed on the National Assembly the powers to make laws to provide for the type of punishment that should be imposed on politicians and political parties that contravene the aforementioned provisions, but it has been difficult for INEC to enforce this section of the Constitution. Similarly, section 228 (c) is also unambiguous on the provision of public funding to political parties on equitable basis, to assist them in the discharge of their electoral functions. Also, the National Assembly had enacted relevant laws to give effect to this provision but the extent of implementation is difficult to ascertain. In the same vein, section 226 (1) requires INEC so report to the National Assembly when political parties fail to keep proper books and accounts. The fundamental issue that is left hanging is what is the National Assembly is expected to do when a political party contravene this provision. Their lack of proactiveness has been a bane in stamping their authority since 1999 on the issue.

One area where the National Assembly has given bite to the 1999 Constitution is in the area of the enactment of Electoral Acts. It is a statutory requirement in regulating the activities of political parties in Nigeria, particularly during general elections. The Electoral Act is enacted by the National Assembly based on recommendations of INEC. It is usually enacted before any general elections and provisions of the Electoral Act guide the conduct of such an election. Since the return of democratic governance in 1999, the National Assembly has passed several Electoral Acts. These includes the 2002, 2006 and 2010 (and some amendments) which guided the conduct of the 2003, 2007, 2011 and the 2015 general elections. It is important to note that there was no Electoral Act for the 2015 general elections, as INEC relied on the 2010 Electoral Act as amended to guide and regulate the conduct of that election. In this entire process, INEC is central because it is empowered by the 1999 Constitution to implement provisions of the Electoral Act.

Let us briefly examine some of the provisions of these Electoral Act, particularly the 2010 Act as amended, which guided and regulated the conduct of the 2015 elections, especially as it affected campaign financing. For example, the 2002 Electoral Act, which guided the conduct of the 2003 general elections, had an ambiguous provision, especially as it relates to election expenses. For instance, section 84(2) stated that:

Election expenses incurred by a Political Party for the management or the conduct of an election shall not exceed in the aggregate the sum determined by multiplying 20 naira by the number of names appearing in the final voters' list for each constituency where there is a candidate sponsored by the political party. This provision was not just ambiguous but also very confusing. For instance, it attempted to address campaign financing within respective constituencies but failed to address the finances for presidential and gubernatorial candidates. This is because presidential and gubernatorial candidates have the entire country or state as their constituencies.

Besides, a cursory interpretation of that provision would suggest that for constituency elections, candidates were not expected to spend monies in excess of the number of people registered by INEC within that constituency. What this meant is that if a state constituency had fifty thousand voters, this would be multiplied by N20, which would amount to N1 million only. Most state and federal constituencies did not have

up to that number of voters in their registers. In addition, section 79(2) required political parties to submit all campaign expenses to INEC, not later than 90 days from the date of the elections. More worrisome was the penalty to be imposed on political parties that flouted that provision. For example, political parties in breach of this provision were liable upon conviction to a fine of N100, 000, payable jointly or severally by the leaders of the political party. This penalty was so mild that it would have been more profitable to breach this provision, all things being equal.

To make the electioneering process relatively transparent, the 2006 Electoral Act tried to address the ambiguity in the 2002 Electoral Act by clearly stipulating the maximum limits of campaign expenses by candidates for respective political offices. For instance, section 93(1-12) of the 2006 Electoral Act clearly stipulates the ceiling of elections expenses. This is intended to curtail the influence of money in electioneering process. According to this Act, Presidential candidates had the highest spending limit of N500 million during electioneering campaigns, while governorship candidates had a ceiling of N100 million. Next in that order were candidates for Senate and House of Representatives who could not spend more than N20 million and N10 million respectively. Contestants into State Houses of Assembly had N5 million spending limits, while Local Government chairmanship and councillorship position spending ceiling were put at N5 million and N500, 000.00 respectively. The same Act (section 93(9) also limited individual and corporate donations to any contestant to N1 million. A novelty in this law is the limit of individual and corporate donations to any candidates put at not more than N1 million [see Section 93(9) of the 2006 Electoral Act].

The 2010 Electoral Act as amended had similar provisions to that of 2006. The major difference being that the spending limits during electioneering campaigns was reviewed upward in the Act. The 2010 Act does not only grant INEC the power to place a limit on the amount of money or other assets, which an individual or group of persons can contribute to a political party, it also stipulates spending limits to candidates [See section 90(1)]. For instance, section 91(2) of the same Act puts the spending limits for Presidential candidates at N1 billion, while candidates for Governorship election are required not to spend more than N200 million as shown in table 2 [section 91(3)]. Similarly, the maximum elections expenses to be incurred in respect of Senatorial and House of Representatives seat are N40 million and N20 million respectively. Furthermore, "in the case of State Assembly election, the maximum amount of election expenses to be incurred shall be N10 million.

The 2010 Act also requires all political parties to separately submit audited election expenses to INEC within 6 months after an election [section 92(3)]. A political party which contravenes the provisions of section 92(3) commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a maximum fine of N1 million. In the case of failure to submit an accurate audited report within the stipulated period, the court may impose a maximum penalty of N200, 000. 00 per day on any party for the period after the return was due until it is submitted to the commission. Specifically, section 92(7) clearly stipulates the penalty political parties shall face when they contravene section 93 (2-5) thus:

A political party that incurs election expenses beyond the limit stipulated in this Act commits an offence and is liable on conviction to maximum of N1, 000,000.00 and forfeiture to the Commission of the amount by which the expenses exceed the limits set by the Commission.

To further check the fund-raising activities of political parties, section 93 (3) of the 2010 Electoral Act stipulates that:

A political party shall not accept any monetary contribution exceeding N1, 000,000.00 unless it can identify the source of the money or other contribution to the Commission. The extent to which candidates of political parties, donors and INEC complied with these extant laws would be the focus of our analysis belaw.

Against this background, our analysis here would be restricted to campaign finances of the two major political parties - the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC), especially as it had to do with the presidential election. The expensive nature of the 2015 general elections, no doubt, puts Nigeria ahead of African states as the most vibrant political entity in the continent where huge sums of money are frittered by party candidates on electioneering. The major parties in the frenzy to wrest power at the various levels were more than busy dipping hands into bank accounts as they fret away resources in an unimaginable proportion to the chagrin of the electorate. The electoral umpire, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), was not left out in the burning of scarce resources in the prosecution of Africa's most expensive election. It is inarguable that the 2015 general elections consumed billions of naira going by the scale of advertorials seen and the strength of mobilisation carried out by the two major political parties, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC). Some election observers even alleged that one of the political parties spent almost equivalent of Nigeria's 2014 national budget of over N4 trillion. That remains to be argued as there are no clear up-to-date statistics on how much was actually expended by parties in the elections.

For instance, as soon as INEC gave the nod to political parties to commence electioneering activities, candidates commenced the process of raising funds and expending for their campaigns. Going by the scale of political campaigns by the two leading parties in the elections, where private jets fill the airspace as politicians shuttle between cities with passenger manifests of big wigs, the live coverage of political party rallies by national television stations running into several production hours, it could be argued that politicians spent billions of naira in achieving their dreams.

Contacts and mobilisation of party faithful cost more than can be imagined by any Nigerian. Getting the blessing of the people that matter in the society for candidates cost the parties lots of fortunes though some actually had nothing to do to sway the outcome of the elections. Suffice to say, the Nigerian Electoral Act 2010 put a peg at the limit to which a political party candidate spends or funds he receives in an election. In particular, Section 91 subsection (2-7) of the Act put a limit at the total amount expected to be expended by candidates. Subsection (2) for instance states therein: 'The maximum election expenses to be incurred by a candidate at a presidential election shall be N1, 000, 000, 000.'

It will be foolhardy to say that all the political parties in the 2015 general elections worked within the ambit of the provisions of the Act. None of the political parties have come out to clearly state the amount it expended in the 2015 elections.

For instance, the PDP organized a fund raising dinner for its presidential candidate, President Goodluck Jonathan, at which it raised more than N22 billion from a fund raising dinner, Jonathan breached the maximum limits prescribed by the 2010 Electoral Act. Though the donors attempted to dodge these laws claiming their donations were made on behalf of groups, the Nigerian electoral law in section 91 (2) and 91 (9) clearly stipulate that neither individual nor group/entity may donate over N1 million. After the fund raising dinner, condemnation across the segments of the polity calling for police investigation over the frivolous amount raised at the fund raising dinner. It took the Chairman of the organizing committee, Professor Jerry Gana, about two weeks to come up with a defense. According to him, the money realized from the dinner was not meant for Jonathan's campaign alone but that part of the money would also be used for building the party secretariat. The money raised at this launch justified President Jonathan's earlier rejection of the recommendations of electoral reforms headed by Senator Ken Nnamani, to strictly monitor/regulate election expenses, for the obvious reason that "it will be a booby trap for him". The truth of the matter is that the invitation to the campaign fund raising dinner which was publicized by the media did not indicate that it was a twin event – campaign and building of the party's secretariat as Gana would want Nigerians to believe. The table belaw captures the major contributors to Jonathan/Sambo ticket during 2015 presidential election.

Table 1: List of Donors to President Goodluck Jonathan 2015 Campaign

Contributors	Amount
Tunde Ayeni	N1 billion
Tunde and Group of friends	N2.6 billion
Jerry Gana and friends	N5 billion
National Automotive Council	N450 million

PDP Governors Forum (N50 million	NN1.05 billion
each x 21 governors	
Bala Shagaya Representing the Oil	N5 billion
and Gas sector	
Construction Sector	N310 million
Transport and Aviation Sector	N1 billion
represented by Didi Ndimou	
The Real Estate Sector represented by	N4 billion
Oluchi Okoye	
Food and Agric Sector represented by	N500 million
Chief Ominife Uzeogbu	
Cizally Limited	N250 million
Power sector represented by Tunde	N500 million
ayeni	
National association of Stevedores	N25 million
Mr. Sam Egwu	N1 million
Halima Jibril	N5 million
Ajuji Best Hotel	N1 million
TOTAL	N22.442 Billion

Source: Adopted and modified from ThisDayLive, 21st December, 2014.

The campaign finances of the APC presidential candidate, Muhammed Buhari are sketchy, but as at January 2015, the Buhari Support Group (BSO) claimed that it raised N54 million from Nigerians in support of his campaign (www.naij.com/348842-nigerians-donate-money-to-support-buhari-campaign-html). However, a study of the campaign expenditure of both Jonathan and Buhari indicated that they breached the spending limits encapsulated in the 2 Electoral Act of 2010. For instance, a coalition of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) under the aegis of the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) in conjunction with United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), raised an alarm over the threats posed to the growth of the Nigerian economy by election spending, contending that there is an inextricable link between election spending and the health of the economy. According to the consortium of CSOs: With attention shifted from governance and a lot of expenditure on campaign, the state of the economy in terms of depreciating exchange, inflation and reduced economic growth rate were bound to occur (Guardian Editorial, March 12, 2015).

The report put the total amount spent so far by the two major political parties - PDP and APC on advertisements in the print media alone at N1.382 billion. Specifically, the group said "the total up to February 14, 2015 for the APC presidential candidate is N332.583 million, while the total up to February 14, 2015 for the PDP presidential candidate is N1.049 billion." (Guardian Editorial, March 12, 2015). The group went further to list other campaign expenses of both candidates to justify the breach of the Act.

Purpose of Expenditure	PDP	APC
Campaign Rallies	N1.057 billion	N595,082 million
Bill Boards	N155.13 million	N99.23 million
Electronic Media	N508.35 million	N391.05 million
Campaign Coverage		
Electronic Media Advert	N7.339 million	N5.556 million
TOTAL	N2.5 billion	N1.091 billion

Table 2: Sub-heads of Campaign Expenditure by Presidential Candidates of the PDP and APC

As shown in Table 2, the PDP spent N1.057 billion on campaign rallies while the APC spent N595.082 million. On bill boards, the PDP expended N155.13 million as against the APCs N99.23 million. Others are electronic media campaign coverage which glued N508.35 million from the PDP and N391.05 million from the APC; while electronic media advert gulped N7.399 million and N5.556 million for the PDP and APC respectively as revealed in table 2. In all the PDP expended N2.5 billion while the APC spent N1.091 billion as captured in table 2. When you add this amount to the expenditure incurred in the print media, you will arrive at a total of N3.882 billion for the PDP and N1.433 billion for the APC. All these are conservative figures since they have not taken into account other expenditures like hotel accommodation, transportation cost (air, sea and road), security, feeding, to mention but a few.

The point being established here is that by our estimation, both candidates breached the income and expenditure limits set up in the 2010 Electoral Act. Despite spirited efforts by the PDP to cover up for the campaign funds it raised, their expenditure profile clearly shows that the two main political parties flagrantly flouted laid down laws on campaign financing since they both raised and spent more than N1 billion. The donation of N21 billion to the PDP during its fund raising dinner violated Nigeria's electoral laws. The individuals and groups who donated also breached the Act since it stipulates that neither individuals nor groups/entity may donate more than N1 million.

Recommendations

Existing Nigerian Laws do not regulate the campaign expenditures of the individual candidates who are contesting elections. However, the laws require the Commission to exercise control over political campaign expenditures. The Constitutional and other legal provisions envisage every political party to maintain proper accounts of its funds. Section 225 (2) of the Constitution specifically requires the political parties to disclose their sources of funds and their manner of expenditures. The political parties and their candidates draw campaign funds from diverse sources which may be beyond the capacity of the Commission to fully monitor. Also the Commission lacks any enabling authority to enforce strict obedience to the laws. As a first step, it therefore becomes imperative for the Commission to device ways and means of implementing the reporting, disclosure of all monies and assets received by the political parties in aid of their campaign effort.

In order to address the above challenges the paper shares the views of the National Conference of 2014 that recommends as follaws:

(i) The provisions of Section 225 of the Constitution and Sections 90 to 93 of the Electoral Act on donations to political parties as well as election expenses should be reviewed;

(ii) The Political Parties Regulation and Electoral Offences Commission (PPREOC) should be vested with the powers to review the ceiling of campaign and election-related expenses from time to time;

(iii) PPREOC should take necessary steps to implement the provisions, in order to ensure that the parties comply with the stipulations of the law and that campaign financing is properly monitored; and

(iv) with respect to foreign funding, existing provisions should be retained and be closely monitored by PPREOC.

Conclusion

Nigeria has often been cited by political finance experts as an example of a country with strong laws on political finance regulations. The country's statutes, viz: the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, as amended; the Electoral Act 2010, as amended; the constitutions of the political parties, the Political Finance Manual and Handbook, the Companies and Allied Matters Act and the Code of Conduct for political parties all contain provisions that aim at regulating political finance in Nigeria. Be that as it may, there are inherent problems with the laws, hence the need for further reform of the legislations. Good enough, Nigeria's National Assembly is in the process of altering the 1999 Constitution. Aside the weaknesses in the law, there is the challenge of law enforcement by the regulator. Some of the proposals are targeted at legislative reform; policy reform and institutional reform respectively. The clamour by political parties for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to take over the funding of their activities may have to wait until the

constitution is amended. INEC chairman Professor Attahiru Jega said this much in a recent interaction with the media. He made it clear that the issue of funding political parties is a constitutional matter. Sections 225, 226 and 227 are clearly silent on that. He insisted that, until the National Assembly amends the Nigerian constitution to allaw for funding of political parties, INEC would not be able to do anything about it.

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