



Moral Responsibility and Types of Moral Responsibility

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Abstract: *The issue of "moral responsibility" is one of the most significant moral issues that has caught the attention of moral philosophers. In the course of history of moral discussions, many issues have been debated on the meaning of responsibility, its conditions and properties of the responsible man. The importance of this issue becomes understood when we pay attention to its relationship with some philosophic-theological discussions as well as the data of natural sciences and humanities. This issue from one perspective is intertwined with such issues as causality, determinism and volition. On other hand, it is interrelated with such vital theological issues as omniscience and omnipotence of God and divine providence. The despisers of moral responsibility struggle to prove through different proofs that human actions are contingent upon the conditions and modes that do not need any other reason. Moreover, they seek to demonstrate that human will has no role in their existence or absence. Determinists provide certain reasons in order to prove their claims in this regard. Some of these scholars deny human will and moral responsibility based on the law of causality. Some others have become bogged down in determinism due to their defected understanding of religious doctrines like Absolute Power (omnipotence), omniscience and divine providence. They deny moral responsibility and human actions. Some Asharite thinkers have resorted to the notions of "God's Omnipotence" in order to deny all types of influence and interference of other issues in the accomplishment of human actions.*

Keywords: *Moral Responsibility, Sphere of Moral Responsibility, Determinism and Volition, Free Will.*

INTRODUCTION

One of the significant notions that is taken into consideration by moral philosophers is the concept of "moral responsibility". Responsibility is one of the key and more effective philosophical, moral and legal issues. Suppose one evening when you return home you see a beautiful flower in the garden is broken. If somebody tells you that your little brother has broken it due to his negligence, what will be your judgment? And if you are told that a cat has broken it, what will be your reaction? Anyway, your reactions in these two cases will be different. As to the first case, you consider your brother to be responsible for the broken flower while in the second case there is no word of responsibility of cat. This is so because you believe that accountability and responsibility are significant features that distinguish man from other creatures.

As to responsibility many questions can be raised. When you say, e.g. "x is responsible before his action", whether you want to express just your personal view of the importance of that work or remind everyone of its importance? What do you mean by responsibility? If being responsible merely implies deserving to be encouraged or reproached in the society or there is a type of real relationship between the actions and their consequences? Where does the individual responsibility have its origin in?

In other words, why do we consider man to be a responsible creature? Before whom we are responsible? In which conditions someone is responsible? If someone acts out of compulsion or ignorance could we consider him responsible from moral point of view? How is the scope of responsibility determined? If man is merely

responsible before other human beings or before other creatures too? Should we merely restrict the realization of responsibility to the direct effect of the action or to its indirect effects either? Whether responsibility is a concept for the present time or for the past or for the future? Whether we consider the societies, groups, organizations, firms and the like responsible? Can man evade responsibility or assign it to another? Why some people despite all conditions are not responsible?

Deniers of moral responsibility struggle to prove that human actions are related to conditions that do not need any reason and human will does not have any role in their appearance or disappearance. Determinists have their own reasons to demonstrate this. Some scholars deny human free will and moral responsibility based on law of causation.

Some other scholars, based on a wrong interpretation of the religious doctrines like "Omnipotence", "Omniscience" and "Divine Providence", become bogged down in determinism and deny moral responsibility and human actions. Some Asharite thinkers using the idea of "Divine Omnipotence" deny any interference and effect of other issues in the accomplishment of human actions. To avoid the problems of determinism they take refuge in the weak theory of "Acquisition" and seek to clear a room for man in doing his actions.

The problem of determinism and free will and the idea that man is a free agent in his life or at least part of his volitional actions are truly done out of free will and there is no pressure and force behind them oppose the idea and issue of the existence of visible and invisible factors that lead man towards specific goals.

Greek philosophers and Islamic theosophers and theologians have approached this problem with their particular deep contemplation and discussed it and founded a number of schools and gradually the scope of these discussions has become wider and both parties (determinists and proponents of human free will) have developed some sub-schools and expanded their perspectives. In past there were only two main schools of determinism and free will and only the popular issues regarding "divine providence" were discussed. In our age the issue of man's being free or constrained has caught the attention of the thinkers and scholars and each one of the two schools of determinism and free will have emerged in new forms.

The background of the debate of moral responsibility can be traced back to the oldest discussions of "task and obligation". Socrates (470-399 BC) the Father of Moral Philosophy, at the beginning of *Crito* seeks to approach a crux via comparing human responsibility with laws. Cicero (106-43 BC), renowned Greek philosopher, in his last work entitled *On Duties* (107-117) struggles to provide a conceptual framework so that everyone could analyze his identity and obligations.

Some medieval philosophers including Augustine (354-430) in his *Catholic Church's Morals* and Aquinas (1225-1274) in his *Summa Theologica* have defended a form of deontology (ethics of duty) and discussed responsibility as compared to duties. For example, Aristotle considered volition and consciousness to be among the conditions of individual responsibility. Muslims have discussed the issues of determinism and free will in the middle of first century of Hijra.

Kant (1724-1804) the German philosopher believed that the constitution of moral judgments is secured on the absolute imperative of maxim. He insisted on responsibility and contended that man is addressed by the obligations of reason and is responsible before them. One of the followers of Kant has offered a new interpretation of his theory and defended it in a serious way. Muslim thinkers speak of the responsibility of man before God. According to some scholars, all responsibilities of man can only be justified based on his responsibility before God.

Accountability

Why man in some moments evades his responsibilities despite having all conditions of "moral responsibility"? In other words, why some people commit moral error out of knowledge and by intention? What should be done for human observation of moral principles? These are issues that have been noticed by the thinkers and answered via certain debates.

People are believed to evade ethics and responsibility due to the lack of moral motive. Thus, moral thinkers have always sought to understand the origin of moral motivation. Motivation is a factor that persuades man to do an action. Moral incentive can mobilize man for accomplishing moral action.

Some scholars are of the view that man can only have a motive for moral behavior if he is conscious of moral truth that persuades him for moral action. However, some other scholars do not consider the consciousness of moral truth enough for accomplishing moral action and believe that creation of motive for doing a moral action in man needs another persuasion in addition to the knowledge and consciousness (Hosseini, 2004).

According to some Muslim thinkers (Mesbah Yazdi, 1999), knowledge and consciousness alone does not mobilize man; because a man would know something but does not observe its requirements or due to habit leaves the certain knowledge and instead chooses the wrong path. The element of knowledge and consciousness in man only shows the path and until the time when the element of desire and will is not created in man no volitional action is seen in man. If man wants to have interest in moral behavior and follow it a number of philosophical requirements are required as follows: (Mesbah Yazdi, 2002)

1. He knows the moral judgment and goodness of its consequences.
2. He analyzes the consequences of moral action and affirms its effect on his own happiness.
3. By endorsing the profit of the action desire appears in him and he wills doing the task.

When the element of desire and will is not created in man volitional action is not seen in him. If man desires to have interest in moral behavior and if the tendency towards moral behavior becomes institutionalized in man human accountability will reach a stable mode. Accountability of man might serve as a factor of weakness or strength like other feelings in him. Religiously speaking, faith and righteous deed lead to the strengthening of accountability in man and his happiness (Khawas, 2009).

Meaning of Responsibility

The term "responsibility" refers to "duties and actions undertaken by a man" (Amid1994 .). When someone is considered to be responsible he is indeed accountable before his approaches, reactions and actions. The notion of "responsibility" implies asking a man to be accountable before his actions (Khawas, 2009).

Types of Responsibility

Individual or Personal Responsibility

Individual or personal responsibility is a responsibility that an individual has before his duties. This responsibility may refer to the past, present and future issues. When it is said that the life guard or pilot is responsible for the health of swimmers or passengers; but if we say that the pilot is responsible for the death of a number of the passengers we have indeed referred to his past responsibility. This is in fact called the special past responsibility (Khawas, 2009).

Group Responsibility

Group responsibility might refer to the responsibility of the groups before each other or before the individuals. This type of responsibility may also be concerned with present, future and past. Each one of the individual and group responsibilities which are concerned with the present, future or future might be divided into legal or moral responsibilities.

The subject-matter of law is a series of universal and binding social rules and these rules are often legislated by the decision making forces in every society and their implementation is guaranteed by the government and ruling power. The individuals or groups who have the citizenship of the society must observe the rules of that society; in other words, every individual or group that lives in a specific society is responsible before the laws of that society (Pincuffs, 2003). This type of responsibility is known as legal liability. According to some writers, application of moral responsibility in personal and legal contexts if is not identical at least is continuous.

Differences and similarities that exist between the relationship of law and ethics consist of:

1. Difference from the point of view of performance bond: performance bond of ethics is often internal while performance bond of law is external.
2. Difference from the point of view of objective: objective of ethics is considered to be the acquisition of virtues and staying away from the vices and provision of human prosperity while the goal of law is deemed to be creation of order and establishing harmony between the social relations of the people and provision of their rights (Mesbah Yazdi, 1998).

3. Difference from the point of view of intention and motivation: intention and motive play a key role in realization of the moral action but it has no role in the fulfillment of legal action.

Causal Responsibility:

Causal responsibility consists of the relationship between two phenomena first one of which is the efficient cause while the second phenomenon paves the ground; for example, when it is said that "electric problem has been responsible (cause) for the fire" this is indeed to say that an electric problem has caused the fire. This type of responsibility has no application in the discussion of moral responsibility.

If you return home one evening and see the crystal jar you love is broken and its fragments are spread over the dining room and you are told that this incident has happened due to an uninvited guest your judgment will be very different as compared to the time when you are told that the cat has broken the jar. Although both the cat and guest have causal responsibility it is only the latter that can be morally responsible (Khawas, 2009).

Moral Responsibility

Some scholars believe that responsibility is not merely related to the individuals; rather the groups, organizations, institutions, and firms are also responsible; in other words, a specific group or institution can be considered as accountable without taking the individuals and members in it responsible; for example, when it is said that "educational system of the country is responsible for training the experts" or "commercial firm X is responsible for importing luxurious products" or "government is responsible for preservation of national security" in all these cases responsibility is attributed to the groups, organizations and institutions as a whole.

Therefore, praise or criticism that is conducted as a result of doing one's responsibility or refusing to do it affect the "whole" not the persons one by one. Thus, one might criticize a member of the government and at the same time praise the "whole" due to accomplishment of its duties and responsibility. Here we need to note that:

If we intend that firms, institutions and organizations have an independent and objective existence in a way that we consider them to be responsible without taking the individuals and members into account, this would be unacceptable; because criticism and praise are secondary to the responsibility and the latter is secondary to the obligation and the latter is secondary to the will and the latter is one of human features and firms and organizations do not have any free will in any form.

Therefore, taking them as responsible does not have any rational and philosophical basis. If we intend that some rather many of the moral and legal responsibilities of the individuals inside the social organizations and institutions and due to their membership take form this is a correct and defensible claim (Khawas, 2009).

A teacher due to his organizational job has special responsibilities. A doctor due to his specific social function undertakes certain duties and as a result responsibilities. An employer and manager also have different responsibilities from the responsibilities of the employees. Of course, this is other than the organization's being taken as responsible regardless of its members.

Therefore, when an organization is applauded due to its function this is indeed to say that the members of the organization as a whole have accomplished their responsibility. On the other hand, if due to the failure of the members of the organization in accomplishing their duties the organization as a whole fails it is indeed the individuals who deserve to be blamed who have not accomplished their duties; the employee who does not do his duty in the best possible way is not morally criticized due to his inappropriate function. A morally committed employee is not responsible before the failure of his other colleagues (Mesbah Yazdi, 1993).

Definition of Moral Responsibility

Some scholars consider moral responsibility to be in the sense of social praise and criticism. Some others interpret moral responsibility as one's capability of explanation and interpretation of a behavior or an attribute. Some understand it as the accountability of an individual when he can choose his goals in a free way and behaves according to it and believe that the individual only in this case will be responsible before his action. Definition of moral responsibility and its distinction from other responsibilities of man is

possible given the origin and goal of moral responsibility. Moral responsibility like any other responsibility is based on the moral duties (Mesbah Yazdi, 2001).

Responsibility and duty are always equal. Origin of moral responsibilities or obligations is in the relationship of human action and the goal that is achieved via that action. Interdependence of responsibility and duty does not imply that moral behaviors are always associated with a type of hundred percent obligations; because duties are divided into binding and non-binding. To reach his desirable end man is obliged to do certain actions. If the realization of a desirable goal of man is restricted to the accomplishment of a moral behavior, doing this specific moral behavior will be part of the binding duties of man. Thus, if man fails to accomplish this task he will be responsible before it.

However, if realization of the desirable end is not restricted to the accomplishment of a special moral behavior and an alternative action can be replaced with the desirable end the intensity of binding-ness of a specific moral behavior will decrease to the same degree; in other words, the more is the number of the alternative actions for realization of the desirable end the less obligatory will be the specific behavior.

Complete distinction of extensions of obligatory duties from non-obligatory duties might be not easily possible but the differences that are seen among the types of duties prove the correctness of such distinction. Whether the duties of the parents in provision of food and clothes for the children are identical with their duties in provision of recreation facilities? In other words, if parents are obliged to take the children to recreation complexes or cinema once in a week for fun in addition to providing their primary needs? What about those parents who fail to do so? Should we blame them? If they do not provide the food and clothes what will be done to them?

If human moral duties have intensity and weakness his moral responsibility will be intense and weak in proportionate to his moral responsibility. Therefore, human moral responsibility is compared with his moral duties. Moral duties might be obligatory or non-obligatory and in any form may be intense and weak (Khawas, 2009).

If someone asks that where is the origin of moral duties and how are they achieved the answer will be different based on various foundations. According to the basis of some Muslim thinkers the necessary relationship between moral action and its consequence is the origin of moral obligation and human moral duty has its origin in it. However, according to Kant's theory, the origin of moral duties is the judgment of reason which is understood via one of the multiple formulations. Therefore, based on the theory of conventionalists, social agreement is the origin of moral obligation and moral duties are acquired through social contract.

Levels of Moral Responsibility:

Martin Fischer in his work entitled *Responsibility and Control* states that moral responsibility is not a matter of "all" or "none" rather depending on the preparation of the individual and social contexts, potency and conditions of individuals various degrees of moral responsibility is allocated to them.

For example, suppose someone is at the hands of several murderers and they have made his freedom conditional upon killing a man. Whether he can kill another man for his own freedom? If he does this will he stand accountable before it? Now if he is forced to insult a respected person in return of his freedom what will be his moral duty? Is there any difference between these two examples in view of moral responsibility? Where does the difference lie?

Another example: if a man of reason due to genetic problems or another natural problem does not have a normal level of understanding and commits moral error how will the scale of his responsibility be calculated? What about the person who commits a moral error with an understanding higher than the normal? Now if someone intentionally insists on an undesirable action will his moral responsibility be the same with that of the person who does not insist on his vicious action?

All these examples speak of the truth that human responsibility varies depending on different conditions. Moral responsibility of everyone should be evaluated based on his capabilities (Khawas, 2009).

Effective Factors of Moral Responsibility

Levels of human moral responsibility are directly related with a number of things which consist of:

Free Will and Power

Sometimes man due to internal or external conditions is not able to use all his capability to accomplish a task; in other words, his freedom and volition becomes restricted in certain conditions. In such conditions his moral responsibility will be calculated within the limits of his willpower and freedom.

For example, helping oppressed people in occupied countries is one of the moral duties of every liberated person which today due to specific political conditions would be done in restricted way. Naturally, moral duty of these people will be within the scope of their freedom of action.

Consciousness:

Man is morally responsible before his actions and their consequences in proportionate to his knowledge and consciousness. To put it otherwise, the more is one's knowledge the more will be his responsibility. In Islamic traditions it has been stated: "Before one sin of a scholar is forgiven seventy sins of the ignorant have been forgiven" (Mohammadi Reyshahri, 1983).

Human moral responsibility is directly related with the outcome of his volitional action. The moral responsibility of the person whose action has led to the misguidance of one person is not equal with the one who has led one nation astray. Man is not only responsible before his direct actions rather he is also liable before the indirect outcomes of his actions. Thus, consequences of human volitional actions even if have come to existence via numerous mediations will influence the scale of his moral responsibility. Actions of many history making men can be evaluated by this measure.

Scope of Moral Responsibility

How should we determine the scope of moral responsibility of man? To state the matter differently, if the conditions of moral responsibility are achieved before what man is responsible? (Khawas, 2009) In addition to the responsibility of man before God, himself and other humans should we consider him responsible before animals, plants and inanimate things? If man is responsible before the animals, plants and even inanimate things will these responsibilities be equal? Whether responsible man has the right to deprive himself of responsibility or assign it to another person?

Most philosophers have not explicitly referred to the object of moral responsibility but their discussions regarding the definition of scope of moral responsibility and origin of duties can relatively cast light on their ideas and views; for example, when Peter Strawson defines moral responsibility as capability of social praise and blame one can surely state that from his point of view, citizens of every society are morally responsible before animals, inanimate things, environment and so on and so forth. Or when Kant traces the origin of duties back into the individual rights and believes that the path to its identification is human reason (Mohammad Rezaei, 2000), one may not save an innocent man's life in special cases through this notion of moral responsibility! Some Muslim scholars inspired by teachings of Quran have suggested that the first object of human moral responsibility is God in whose hands are the whole existence of man and all creatures. God is the main owner of all creatures and has the right to interrogate them of their duties.

Other objects of responsibility have their origin indeed in human duty before God; for example, as to the moral duty of man in following the prophets and divine saints as the messengers of Allah they have the right to question people of the way of following them. Thus conceived, human responsibility before himself, other humans and creatures is depicted as follows under the shadow of human responsibility before God: (Mesbah Yazdi, 1993)

Responsibility before God

Man is responsible before God (Khawas, 2009). The true owner of all material and spiritual bounties of man even his will and volition is God. Then, God has the right to interrogate man before everything (Mesbah Yazdi, 1997). Man is also obliged to be accountable before divine bounties (Mesbah Yazdi, Teachings of Quran). Quran states: "What exists in the heavens and on earth belongs to Him".¹ In another verse God states: "Then in the same day they will be asked about the bounties on earth"².

Responsibility before Oneself

According to Quran, one of the other types of human responsibility is before oneself, (Teachings of Quran, 1995) the responsibility of guidance and misguidance of every human individual first of all returns to him

¹ Surah Al Baqarah, verse 255.

² Surah Al Takathor, verse 8.

as a person³. Each one of human external and internal body members will be interrogated⁴. In the Doomsday human body members will testify of his actions⁵.

Responsibility before Others

According to Islam, human moral responsibility before others is one of the aspects and branches of moral responsibility of man before God. Man not only should think of his own interests rather he must be responsible before other individuals in the society and his fellow human beings (Horre Ameli, 1996). The great task of promotion of good and prohibition of the vice which is of an equal status with prayer, fast, Hajj and Jihad shows the importance of this duty and responsibility well (Khawas, 2009)⁶.

Responsibility before Other Creatures

One of the other most important moral responsibilities of man which have been greatly emphasized in Islam is the responsibility of man before other creatures (plants and animals) (Helli, 1987). According to Islamic prophetic traditions, man is not allowed to exploit the nature the way he likes and even the animals have their own rights in relation their owners (Horre Ameli, 1996).

Determinism in the Age of Prophetic Traditions

Although the rule of Umawis played an effective role in the expansion of determinism among Muslims, the cause of the expansion of this mode of thought was not restricted to it rather another factor was also of a greater influence, i.e. prophetic traditions of Divine Pre-ordainment (fatum) which were very popular among the Muslims. In the second Islamic century prophetic traditions were disseminated. The traditions regarding Divine Pre-ordainment have no slight difference from the idea of "determinism".

Moslem in his work has noted: the angel who is responsible for the seeds in Mom's uterus asks God if this person is righteous or vicious then his destiny is written along with his actions and livelihood and the letter of the life is closed; nothing is added then or anything is subtracted. Moslem states: when God created man in the uterus of his mother made him righteous or vicious and no man is allowed to enter the paradise unless the one whose future is predestined so (Sabih, 1981).

This type of prophetic traditions in the works devoted to the traditions is so frequent that if we ascertain their content it will be nothing but determinism and predestination. Whenever man is one step away the hell or paradise and was becoming an inhabitant of one of them predestination as a decisive factor moved to change the destination and replace it with the one which is decided in the other world. Of course, these prophetic traditions must be compared with the content of Quranic verses so that if the content of traditions is in conflict with the Quran there will be no excuse for keeping them (Sobhani, 2008).

Whether we can say that these traditions are according to Quran while the latter describes man as responsible of his own destiny and likewise introduces God as the light that guides man through happiness and misery?

Western Thinkers on the Problem of Determinism in Islam

Most westerners have introduced Islam as the school of determinism and sometimes they have interpreted the advancement of Islam based on the belief of determinism that had constituted the mindset of the soldiers. The reason for such interpretation is the study of Asharite theological works which have been extensively available across the Islamic lands to the orientalist and in these books although the theory of determinism has been denied and instead the theory of acquisition has been raised the truth of acquisition is nothing but determinism (Al Hanafi Al Tahavi, 1978).

The renowned American writer called Washington Orange in a work that has published regarding the Holy Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him) writes: Mohammad made use of this principle for development of his war affairs because according to this principle every incident in this world has already been determined in Divine Knowledge even before its happening in the world and the destiny of every person is predestined and one can never change it.

Muslims who believed in this principle in the time of battle without any fear attacked the enemy. In their eyes death in the battle was equal to martyrdom and caused one to enter the paradise. For this reason

³ Al Baqarah, verse 285.

⁴ Surah Asra, verse 36.

⁵ Surah Yasin, verse 65.

⁶ cf. Surah Al Tawbah, verse 71.

they were sure that they will defeat the enemy at any case no matter if they overcome the enemy or are martyred (Heykal, 1991).

Circulation of prophetic traditions regarding predestination among Sunni Muslims led to the expansion of the idea of determinism in the second and third centuries but at the beginning of fourth century the idea of determinism became manifested in another form although it was presented under the title of volition. Sheikh Abu Al Hassan Ali Ibn Esmaeil Ashari (d. 260) who was one of the pupils of Abu Ali and Abu Hashem Jubaei once returned from the school of Etezal (Retreat-ism) and joined the school of traditionalism and Hanbalism and in one Friday went up the pulpit at the Mosque of Basra and addressed the people as follows: (Ibn Khalkan, 1943)

Anyone who has known me he knows me and the one who has failed to know let me introduce myself to him: I am Ali Ibn Esmaeil Ashari. I believed that Quran is a creature of God and the latter cannot be seen by eyes and the vicious things are done by the man himself. I have retreated now from all these beliefs. I will criticize the school of Etezalism and express its problems.

Ashari had breathed for a long while in the atmosphere of school of retreat-ism and couldn't accommodate himself with all beliefs of Hanbalism and traditionalism because his mentality was clearly different from them. He had worked for almost 30 years in the theological school of Etezalism and he couldn't neglect human power and willpower in his works once for all. On the other hand, for some reasons he had left Etezalism and announced his defense of Hanbalism and traditionalism.

In many cases he moderated the ideas of traditionalists and formally modified them and one of those cases was human actions and he accepted the principle of Hanbalism that God has created everything and wherever we speak of creation and effectiveness we have to refer to God even in those cases human actions are at stake. Then, God is the chief agent of human actions.

In order to observe the principle of monotheism in the field of creation he denied the system of causes and effects in this world and for all phenomena in this world he did not accept more than one efficient cause and he came to believe that God is the immediate cause of all terrestrial and celestial phenomena and the effects of the beings by no means (neither chiefly nor secondarily) are directly attributed to them rather they are directly created by God and in this case he has taken advantage of one specific and renowned term called "Habit of Allah":

God has ordained it so that, e.g. after the existence of fire he personally creates heat and the agent is him and fire is the only place where this effect takes place. This principle (Habit of Allah) works as regards all cosmic phenomena and therefore includes human actions. As to man, Ashari states, when he wills an action God creates that action and realizes it (Sobhani, 2008).

After assessment of this principle he found its outcomes to be in conflict with human nature and conscience as to his works because every healthy man in his nature can distinguish between the movement of the shaky hand and that of a healthy hand and in the second case he considers human will effective in the emergence of the movement while the aforementioned principle implies that all phenomena and movements and stops are related to God and both actions in man are equal.

Ashari used a new term in order to resolve the latter conflict. This term was "Acquisition". He stated that God is the creator of human actions and man "acquires" it and his responsibility is due to this act of acquisition. He thought that in this way he has solved the problem. This theory of "acquisition" is no more than a baseless delusion and in the field of human actions there is nothing like "acquisition" and the only thing that we have is creation. In other words, the theory of acquisition is nothing but the determinism of traditionalists even if it is presented under the deceptive title of acquisition. Some Asharite scholars have confessed to this reality (Al Hanafi Al Tahavi, 1978).

Ashari's school though couldn't find numerous proponents during his life it was gradually replaced with the school of traditionalism and considered to be the official school of Sunni Muslims and it became so popular that Maqrizi (d. 845) writes in his work: Ashari's beliefs are the official beliefs of the Muslims and anyone who speaks against them he would be killed (Taqi Al Din Maqrizi, 1853). Until fourteenth century the wave of determinism spread through Islamic environments and Ashari's school was endorsed by Sunni scholars.

Determinism according to Contemporary Muslim Thinkers

The first person who broke the dam and spoke of the school of free will in Sunni atmosphere and defended it was Professor Sheikh Mohammad Abduh (1266-1323 A. H.) who in his Treatise of Monotheism explicitly voiced his opposition of determinism and described the latter in sheer conflict with the call of conscience, reason and revealed religions. He states: "Man is mindful of his existence and in the same way he knows that he is free. He evaluates the consequences of his works and by his will plans them and by his power creates them and the denial of this issue is tantamount to the denial of his own existence.

Revealed rules and religious obligations are founded on the volition. The issue of inclusion of knowledge and will is a difficult problem and human reasons cannot reach this reality. We cannot neglect a self-evident principle, i.e. human volition, due to this difficult problem. Muslims and Christians have stated in this regard (Sobhani, 2008):

1. Those who consider man to be absolutely independent as regards his actions and this is a type of arrogance.
2. Those who defend determinism and consider Divine Will to govern everything;
3. Those who have turned to determinism but avoid using its name (i.e. Asharism). These theories lead to the destruction of Sharia and its rules that are in harmony with the reason.

The theory of Imam Al Haremeyn is expressed as follows: Theory of Imam Al Haremeyn among Ashari thinkers is in line with the theories of divine philosophers and endorses human volition. Professor Abduh due to his distance from Shia circles was not informed of Shia stance of human actions and for this reason he has restricted the beliefs of Muslims to the aforementioned three groups and if he was familiar with the traditions of Prophet's Household (peace be upon him) and Shia theological works he would have analyzed the issue better than this and he did not consider the inclusiveness of Divine Knowledge and Will to be a basis of determinism and the solution of the problems.

Intellectual development of Abduh has been due to his familiarity with Nahjulbalaghah which occurred during his exile to Beirut and until that day he did not know that such a work exists and he wrote a commentary about Nahjulbalaghah and if he did not have the opportunity to have access to this great source of Islamic teachings he couldn't free himself from the jail of determinism and think freely in the ideological problems (Abduh, 2007).

Western Philosophers on Determinism

After a short review of the development of the idea of determinism in east now we turn to the history of the idea of determinism among westerners: the idea of determinism emerged among them after Renaissance and its most remarkable form is historical determinism which can be found in Marx's philosophy, i.e. philosophy of dialectical materialism, which is grounded on quadruple principles:

1. Movement;
2. Contradiction;
3. Reciprocal effect;
4. Leap or change of quantity to quality (Sobhani, 2008);

This idea leads nowhere but determinism because these thinkers believe that these principles not only govern the whole gamut of existence rather human actions and social developments are exposed to it and the world and human actions are under these principles and seemingly free man is acting based on these laws.

Of course, idea of determinism in western world is not restricted to this school rather some have considered the personality triangle issue to be the basis of his being determined in life. This triangle is indeed composed of genetics, culture and life environment. In the same way that some of western philosophers who have had divine mindset adopted deterministic approach to human actions and their mentality as regards the law of causality is very similar to the Asharite ideas. In west we are faced with three types of determinism two types of which are material and one type is divine. In the same way that a divine man can side with one the two schools of determinism or free will a materialist would have one of the two positions (Furughi, 1984).

Demonstration of Volition from the Point of View of Reason and Prophetic Tradition

Human volition is not a complicated notion that would need to be explained by us. The reality of free will can be completely clarified by comparison of two motions of hand (movement of shaky hand and movement of healthy hand). For the theory of volition one cannot indicate any distinct historical origin because free will is a human idea which has its origin in man himself and in one sense is the call that man hears from inside and since the day that man has emerged on earth as a perceptive creature his primordial nature has continuously addressed him in this way.

Therefore, primordial nature and conscience are one of the factors of emergence of this idea in the minds of the thinkers. If we neglect conscience and primordial nature the man of ideas across the world have offered certain principles for human individual and social life based on the key notion of free will because without accepting the principle of volition all types of legislation, prosecution and punishment are baseless.

Basically the foundation of all divine religions is secured on the principle of volition and the ultimate goal of revealed religions is training and purifying human souls. If all aspects of human existence were predestined and he could not breach them no prophet would have been dispatched ever.

Divine grace which has emerged since the time of Noah and all prophets have sought to cultivate human soul is based on the veracity and acceptance of the principle that all humans can be trained and purified and by receiving divine teachings of prophets can lead themselves towards the highest stations.

Divine prophets believe that divine knowledge and will are all inclusive and eternal and everything is written in the Preserved Slate. However, despite their endorsement of such knowledge, they believe that human free will lies in his capability of choosing between the paths of truth and wrongness. Therefore, divine prophets who have emerged in the society in the form of waves of divine guidance are themselves the pioneers of volition and invite people to freedom. Among Muslims, Quran and prophetic traditions and Prophet's Household have insisted on volition and never forced him to choose any specific action out of compulsion (Sobhani, 2008).

Prophetic Traditions

- A. According to determinism, ordering man to leave sin is something that is beyond his capability. On the other hand, according to the idea of devolution, there are some human actions that cannot be undertaken by God. Imam denies both stances and argues: "God is nobler than forcing the people to undertake tasks and duties which are more than their capability and God is higher than letting an action around which is not willed by Him".
- B. Proponents of determinism believe that human submission is out of force and reluctance. The followers of the school of devolutionism state (Majlesi, 1983): human sin and revolt take place by his power and dominance as if his power overcomes Divine Power and Will. Imam Sadeq has denied these two incorrect ideas and states: God has not been obeyed out of compulsion and likewise He has not been disobeyed out of dominance of man".
- C. In another prophetic tradition, human freedom and volition have been described based on the moderate theory of third possibility: "For man the path of choice is open in order to do divine orders and avoid the vices and divine prohibitions".
- D. Since the belief in devolution results in nonsense and weakness of Divine Will and the belief in determinism requires the description of All Wise God in terms of oppression, Imam Baqer (peace be upon him) addresses Hassan Basri and states: "Avoid believing the idea of devolution because God is not weak and disabled so that he would devolve creation to the servants and likewise he has not forced his servants to sin" (Majlesi, 1983). Although we can delineate all decisive factors of moral responsibility in three aforementioned categories based on Quranic verses and prophetic traditions, the most significant factors that intensify moral responsibility consist of: (Deilami, 2003)

Repetition of Immoral Action and Insistence on It

In prophetic traditions it has been noted that in the time of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) a man robbed the graves after exhuming the dead. In one of these actions he dug the grave of a newly died Christian girl. When the man got the graveclothes of the dead girl he raped the dead girl due to the

satanic temptations. Then he got remorseful and came to the prophet and related the story. Prophe dispelled him.

He left prophet's house and started to pray God in the mountains near Medina; God accepted his repentance and the following verse was revealed: "An those who commit a sin or oppress someone pray for God and ask Him to accept their repentance and do not insist on their vicious action" (Tabatabaei, 2009). The phrase "... do not insist" is used to note the point that one's insistence on sin increases man's responsibility and causes a more dangerous destiny for him (Qarati, 1996). In another prophetic tradition it is reminded that one's insistence on his sin is a mortal sin by God (Mohammadi Reyshahri, 1983).

Underestimation of Immoral Action

Imam Ali (peace be upon him) has been quoted to have said: "The worst of all sins is the sin that is underestimated by the one who commits the sin" (Feyz Al Islam, 1982).

Manifest Sin

Once Luqman the Sage was asked: Who is the worst of people? He answered: the one who cares not about being seen by other while committing a sin (Majlesi, 1983).

Satisfaction with Sin

Imam Ali (peace be upon him) states: If you have committed an embarrassing action take care of your smile because this would cause you to face divine punishment (Koleini, Usul Kafi). In another place he states: being happy with the sins is worst than committing them (Amedi, 1994). Therefore, satisfaction with the sins and taking vices as virtues doubles the moral responsibility (Khawas, 2009).

Committing Evil and Pretending the Good

Imam Ali warns his disciples as follows: Beware not to pretend to be good by people while you are attending Divine Presence with your sins and if you do so your Lord will embarrass you (Saduq, 1979).

Devolutionism

We studied the roots of the idea of free will among Islamic nation. However, a group of Muslim theologians due to their excessive criticism of the idea of determinism and avoidance of its incorrect consequences have taken a radical stance and raised the issue of devolution. According to this idea, man is existentially dependent upon God but from the point of view of intellectual and physical activities he is independent and autonomous (Sobhani, 2008).

In this school, man turns to an independent agent in relation to his actions who expresses his own existence before the domination of Truth and he has the will of acitons and creation of things that are never attributed to God. Interpretation of voltion in this form is indeed a form of covert polytheism and man emerges in the form of an independent goddess.

Radical interpretation of human free will to this extent is a type of negligence and unconsciousness of the situation of human existence and his actions in the universe. In other words, it is a type of unconsciousness of the relationship of the world in its totality with Divine Presence in a systematic and organized manner. Given the philosophical principles that require every contingent being to be dependent upon God as the Cause of All Causes human action cannot be irrelevant to God and stay outside of the domination of Divine Will. The idea of free will in the form of devolution has its origin in Etezalism and Vasel Ibn Ata (d. 80-131) was one of the pioneers of this school in the second Islamic century.

Of course, one can never say that devolutionism a full-blown idea has its origin in the thought of Vasel the founder of Etezalism. We can just state that in the late second and third centuries the great figures of Etezalism discussed human free will in terms of devolution.

Free Will as a Middle Ground

Prophet's Houselhod have denied both radical stances of determinism and devolutionism and led the Muslims towards a middle ground. They believe that human actions are in fact simultaneously related to God and man and both are involved in their realization. Neither man can do anything outside the scope of Divine Will nor can God force man to do anything.

The issue of determinism, devolutionism and middle ground in the course of fourteen centuries has been widely discussed by Muslims. In Islamic theology hundreds of books, treatises and articles in independent or non-independent way have been authored in this regard. The axis of these writings has been three things:

- 1- Axis of determinism in the form of Divine Predestination (Ashari);
- 2- Devolution in the form of Mutazilite devolution;
- 3- Middle Ground in a way that philosophical arguments and Islamic traditions endorse it (Sobhani, 2008).

Asharites and Determinism

Asharism and its founder Abu Al Hassan Ashari believe that the idea of "creation of human actions" by God is associated with tragic consequences for those who believe in it including determinism as regards human actions which is in conflict with the principle of Divine purification of oppression as well as human conscience and primordial nature. Those who believe in this theory have coined a theory in order to evade such consequences and also exonerate themselves of the crime of determinism.

This theory consists of the issue of "acquisition" and "man's being an acquirer" in the sense that God is the creator of human actions while man is their acquirer. Therefore, God has a kingdom for himself and man has another. Creation is the kingdom of God while acquisition is the kingdom of man and none of these two impede one another and punishment and reward are related to the latter one.

This theory in theological works have been attributed to Abu Al Hassan Ashari but before him other theologians believed in it, e.g. Hossein Ibn Najjar, Zarar Ibn Amru and Hafas Ibn Fard all of whom lived before the fourth Islamic century (Mutazili, 1988). Abu Al Hassan Ashari who is considered to be one of the key theologians of fourth century, has referred to him as one of the founders of the theory of acquisition (Al Ashari, *Al Lumah fi Rad ala Ahl Al Zaygh va Al Bada*).

The quadruple stages although have not been temporally arranged in the same way since the emergence of this idea which dates back to more than ten centuries ago it has undergone through these stages each one of which can be studied independently. These stages consist of:

- 1- Its founders and inventors are Hossein Najjar, Zitar Ibn Amru, Hafas Ibn Fard and Abu Al Hassan Ashari;
- 2- Those who have explained this theory through similitude and allegory without creating any change in it consist of such scholars as Ghazali and Taftazani;
- 3- Those who have sought to pave the ground for its evolution; they consist of Qazi Abu Bakr Baqlani, Lisan Al Din Khatib and Kamal Ibn Humam the author of *Kitab Al Musayerah* (d. 861).
- 4- Deniers of the theory of "creation of actions" and "acquisition" as suggested by Ashari theologians and scholars like Imam Al Haremeyn in past and Sheikh Mohammad Abduh in modern times each one of whom have criticized the idea based on their own specific analyses (Sobhani, 2008);

Ashari in his work entitled *Al Lumah* states: "Reality of acquisition is the issuance of the action from the man who acquires it of course in the light of the power that in the moment of issuance occurs in him" (Al Ashari, *Al Lumah fi Rad ala Ahl Al Zaygh va Al Bada*). The inventor of the theory of acquisition has not explained it more than this and it is short and ambiguous because according to an axiom in Asharism the agent of human action is God and no one but Him has any role in its realization and human situation as compared to action is like the situation of the container to the contained. According to the scholars of this school, contingent power does not have any role in realization of the action. In this case, acquisition does not have any role in realization of the action and there is no other reality but the creation by God (Al Ashari, *Al Lumah fi Rad ala Ahl Al Zaygh va Al Bada*).

Qazi Baqlani in his interpretation of the notion of "acquisition" states: "Contingent power in man is not qualified enough to create action (creation is for God) but the attributes of action are not restricted to existence and occurrence of action rather human action has a series of attributes and titles that are imputed to contingent power (human power)".

After reminding a series of various titles but contingency he states: "Every man clearly distinguishes between the following phrases: "created" and "prayed, fasted, stood and sat). What deserves to be attributed to God is the phrase "created" but no one of the other titles can be attribute to God rather they belong to the servants" (Al Qushji, *A Commentary of Tajrid Al Eteqad*).

Therefore, contingent power (human power) is completely effective in the emergence of these titles and attributes and it is these titles that are the measure of reward and pleasure because there is no doubt that the existence purified of all titles is not the measure of reward and punishment unless it is already attributed by these titles (Al Shahrestani, 1989).

There are two problems as to this idea that we discuss them here:

- 1- Titles of prayer, fast and the like, have two states, i.e. they are either aspects and features of existence or mentally posited affairs. In the first case these titles are also the creatures of God because there is not Creator but Him. These aspects and titles are of existential nature and constitute levels of Being and according to monotheism and creativity of God (as interpreted by Asharites) they are related to the Creator of the world and will be outside human jurisdiction.
- 2- In the second case: since they are mentally posited and unreal they have not external reality in order to be documented to human power and in this case the problem of determinism will stay because there is no independent reality in the outside world for acquisition so that man could be involved in its emergence and as a result is considered to be responsible for good and evil and face the reward and punishment. Thus it becomes clear that acquisition does not have any independent reality along with creation and if it does the same reality is its action and existence. Therefore, if man is an acquirer he is certainly creator either (Sobhani, 2008).

After Baqlani, Ghazali in his theological works have provided an interpretation of the meaning of acquisition and taken the theory of the pioneer of the school and explained it. He states: "human action is born out of God's power and human power has no role in its realization but the existence of action is created concurrent with the power that is given to man and this concurrence is acquisition that Asharites have discussed it in addition to creation of the action.

The translation of his words is as follows: "God by his comprehensive power is able to create power in man and outside world and since the name of creator and inventor is attributed to the one who creates the action with his power and human power and his action have come to existence by divine power God has been called creator and inventor but since action has not been accomplished by power man cannot be called creator and inventor because the action has nothing to do with human power. Since the title "acquisition" has been attributed to human action in Quran we have used this title following Quran".

Then he raises the following objection against himself and states: "Whenever human power is not involved in his action what does such a power mean? Power without the object is like the knowledge with the known. Power owes its title to the role it plays in the creation of the object of power" (Al Ghazali, 1993);

Ghazali in the interpretation of acquisition has not reached any new meaning while in the theory of Baqlani one can find a new meaning in the interpretation of "acquisition". Despite the explanations that have been provided the objection of determinism still stands because his idea is nothing but the attribution of human actions to Divine Will that causes a power to emerge in man in the moment of action. However, action is the effect of Divine Power.

In other words, the relationship that is deemed by Ghazali to exist between human action and his power is nothing more than concurrence. In logic such propositions are called "accidental propositions". Like the simultaneity of human words and the rain that comes in a wilderness. Therefore, in the same way that rain does not have any role in human capability of speaking his action is not attributed to his power. Reason suggests that association and concurrence do not create responsibility.

He has thought about human power in terms of knowledge. While the belonging of knowledge is other than the reality of belonging of power because knowledge is secondary to object of knowledge; however, this is not the case as regards power in the sense that the reality of what is an object of power depends on power itself. The power that does not play any role in the realization of human action, should we insist on its existence! (Sobhani, 2008)

This type of contradictions and irrational facts indicate that the reality of issuance of action from man is not denied by Ghazali and the latter himself has confessed to this issue in his words. In other words, they have interpreted the reality of monotheism as the restriction of all types of creation to God and thus they refute the causal relation. Thus, they believe in just one Creator who represents all causes. In this way

these scholars have become bogged down in the swamp of determinism and found no way out of it (Al Ghazali, 1993).

The theory of acquisition in the course of centuries has caught the attention of many Sunni theologians though they have not managed to solve the problem of determinism. Meanwhile some Asharite free thinkers in fifth and fourteenth Islamic centuries have offered initiations and led themselves out of framework of Asharite thought and planned other design for human actions. One can refer to Abu Al Mali Imam Al Haremeyn Juveyni as one of the pioneers of this movement who has denied the theory of acquisition, according to Shahrestani, and come to believe in two vertically situated powers.

To put it in a nutshell, as Shahrestani summarizes it, the denial of the influence of human power is what human reason and sense refutes and the belief in a power that lacks any effect is equal to its absence. The correct stance is that human action to be attributed to his power but not in the sense of creation because the latter would suggest independence from the Creator and man in the same way that feels his own power will sense his existential dependence on God. Human action has its own origin in divinity and his power is dependent upon another cause. These causes lead to the thing that is called Cause of All Causes which is needless of other things (Sobhani, 2008).

Shahrestani after quoting the theory of Imam Al Haremeyn states: this is the theory of theosophers and Imam Al Haremeyn has presented it in the form of a theological theory. Based on the same method of Asharism he states: this is not correct because according to this principle, the causal relationship is not an exclusive property of human action rather it should govern all events in the world.

All the phenomena in the world including human actions and others should be considered as a series of causes and effects that come to their end in God. Natural phenomena affect each other but according to theosophers, no physical object emerges out of another physical object because physical object is composed of matter and form and since matter is associated with nothingness and absence if we believe that an object has emerged out of another object this implies that we believe in the existential effect of nothing (Al Shahrestani, 1989).

Objection of Shahrestani of Imam Al Haremeyn Juveyni

Objections that are raised by Shahrestani against Imam Al Haremeyn are based on the same idea that has been suggested by the proponents of "creation of actions" in relation to the principle of "unity in creativity" which denies all types of agency from other things but God and eliminates the principle of causality from the system of contingency and replaces the principle of "Habit of Allah" and we clarified its incorrectness. Therefore, attributing human actions to his power does not require him to be self-sufficient in agency.

Likewise the acceptance of the law of causality and causal relationship in material and immaterial phenomena in the univers is not in conflict with the principle of unity of creativity and the idea that no single phenomenon can ever emerge without being already destined by God, because based on the evident rational and traditional principles, all transformations that occur in the material phenomena and physical world are documented to immaterial phenomena (incorporeal entities) which all are managed by Divine Providence. In Quranic language, they are referred to as divine mediators and play their role in continuation of the world (Sobhani, 2008).

However, the idea of the impossibility of emergence of a physical body from another physical body is irrelevant here to the issue at hand because all transformations that occur in the domain of material phenomena are the emanation that is endowed upon them through "mediators of the physical world". The role of material phenomena in the effects and actions that are related to them is the role of acceptance of the form that is given by the Endower of Forms to them and they manage the matters that accept forms. Nevertheless, no one can deny the mediatory role of every group of the phenomenon in the realization of the other group of phenomena. Here one should distinguish between "what by which existence is possible" and "what from which existence comes" which are two aspects of Divine Presence.

The theory that has been attributed to Imam Al Haremeyn is in line with the rational and traditional principles and the objection raised by Shahrestani is baseless. However, Imam Al Haremeyn's refusal from using the word creator as regards the creatures other than God is not correct because God himself has referred to Christ as creator.

Taftazani from Imam Al Haremeyn's work entitled *Ershad* quotes another theory which is antithesis of the theory offered by Shahrestani regarding him and if both are correct we should say that he has invented two distinct theories regarding human actions in his life.

In *Sharh Al Maqased* Taftazani considers Ghazali's theory of acquisition valid and says: absolute determinism is invalid and it is also equally wrong to say that the servant of God is the creator of his own actions. Then we need to adopt a middle ground, i.e. human action is a product of Divine Will and meanwhile man acquires it through divine will (Taftazani, 1991).

This is not discussing the details and solves no problem. However, this thinker in another theological work has discussed acquisition in another form: the reality of acquisition consists of concentration of human will and power on certain action that leads to the creation of the action by Divine Will. Then here we have a reciprocal act of power even if we cannot correctly explain their interaction in rational terms.

What do we exactly mean by speaking of the concentration of man on a certain action and creation of the action? If human power and will has any effect on its existence? In the second case there will be absolute determinism and the one who is responsible for the action will be the creator not the man and in the first case a single action is an effect of two powers and wills each one of which is sufficient for creation. This hypothesis not only is not consistent with the restriction of creation to God rather it is impossible from the point of view of reason.

To put it otherwise, if human will and power has an effect on action this effect is either in existential aspect or in mentally posited aspect. The first hypothesis is not consistent with unity in creativity. Moreover, the effect of two powers in the action will be from one perspective and this is creation of action and in the second hypothesis no responsibility will be deemed for man because his will and power is not related to the existential aspect of the action rather it is related to a series of mentally posited affairs.

Taftazani who was himself one of the so called Asharite theologians has confessed to the unsolved state of the objections to the effect that by acceptance of the principle of unity of creativity there will be no need for the power of the contingent being (human power) and the theory of acquisition is merely designed to tackle this problem. He explains his objection first in this way: "The meaning of free agency of servant of God lies in the fact that the servant of God is a free agent and acts based on intention and willpower. However, on the other hand, they all say that God in creation of human actions is independent. Thus, how could a unique action belong to two independent power? (Sobhani, 2008)

As an answer to this objection he states: "There is no doubt of the veracity of this idea but what should we do when on the one hand, according to the rational proofs, there is no creator but God and on the other hand, we cannot deny human will and power in his action. Human free action is not comparable by vibrational action. Because of these two antithetical consequences we were forced to resort to the theory of acquisition and state: "God is the creator and the servant of God is the acquirer" (Sobhani, 2008).

Another theory that has been coined for solving the problem of determinism is the theory offered by the author of *Al Musayerah*, i.e. Kamal Al Din Mohammad Ibn Humam Al Din better known as Ibn Al Humam. He first outlines the problem of determinism. Then he quotes the theory of Ghazali as regards the resolution of this problem and states: this idea cannot tackle the problem of determinism because the maximum thing that can be said in this regard is that a specific type of relationship (relationship of power with the action which has no effect on it) is the basis of considering man to be an acquirer but if he has no influence on the occurrence of action in this case he is compelled and lacks free will and for this reason a group of Asharite scholars have stipulated that their ideas will ultimately lead to determinism.

He answers the objection and states: human reason sees no problem in taking part of our actions to be the result of our power as this can provide a basis for the reward and punishment that is expected from the Lord for humans. These actions lie outside the scope of Divine Will because human creation is in the light of a power that has been endowed to him by God (Al Hanafi Al Tahavi, 1978).

Nevertheless, since traditional reasons require every creation to be attributed to God we need still allocate some actions to man in order to avoid absolute determinism. Then, it is said that part of human actions have their origin in the intention that someone finds inside in the light of the power endowed to him by God and every other thing is within the domain of Divine Will. This amount of free will is thought to be enough for solving the problem of determinism.

This idea is merely supposed to open a path for avoiding determinism and is not acceptable based on rational proofs because the principle of unity of creativity despite its being a Quranic and traditional principle has its origin in reason and proofs require just one God to exist in all domains of universe and if the creator of the movement and action of man is God the creator of his intention is also God and we can never think of an exception to a rational principle just for proving free will and solving the problem of determinism. This is not indeed in line with the principle of "unity in creativity" (Sobhani, 2008).

This theory has been suggested by Lisan Al Din Khatib Mesri where he states: God creates human action in the same way that in him God creates power, will and knowledge and human action in view of its being a creature of God is called acquisition and the measure of obedience and revolt is the acquisition not creation.

The reason for attribution of creation to God and not man is that man can be effective if no impediment obstructs his power but human power despite its competence for influence is always faced with an impediment and it is its belonging to eternal divine power. In this case all actions will be eternal and not accidental (Khatib, Al Qaza va Al Qadar bayn Al Falsafah va Al Din). According to Ibn Al Khatib, human power has the potentiality to influence but the power of eternal being prevents him from influence and if there was not such impediment man could have created his action.

The problem of determinism does not have its origin in the issue of unity. Rather the problem originates in the principle of priority of divine power over human power and since human actions belong to the eternal power and human contingent will and power are subject to divine power human will does not change what has been predestined by God.

This analysis not only solves no problem regarding the issue of determinism it has its own clear problems:

1. Whenever human power is continuously is defeated by Divine Power in this case his role is being a platform for occurrence of divine will. Reason and primordial nature suggest that in this case no responsibility is attributed to man because he is not directly involved in the action.
2. Here contrary to Ashari's giving value and credit to human power there is still one problem. Divine Power prevents from its influence.

Here one may argue that two powers can collide if we think that divine will involved directly in all incidents. In this case God's power will overcome human power and leave no room for it.

However, if we consider the world to be a system of causes and effects and say that all these chains end up in God we will have the opportunity to speak of the direct and indirect causes. Then, a room is cleared for human will and power in the hierarchy of causes as all of them serve the same purpose, i.e. realization of Divine Will (Sobhani, 2008).

By offering various ideas regarding the interpretation of the notion of acquisition one truth becomes clear: "acquisition" is a wholly ambiguous theory and even its inventors have not succeeded to explain it well. As we showed, even the commentators have not made any substantial progress in this regard. This is why it has been said: "three theological ideas cannot be understood by anyone: Asharite acquisition, mode of Abu Hashem Jubaei and evasion system" (Khatib, Al Qaza va Al Qadar bayn Al Falsafah va Al Din).

Here the idea suggested by Qazi Abd Al Jabbar Mutazili is of relevance and intelligible. As to the theory of acquisition, he states that the key point here is that the incorrectness of a school or theory becomes revealed once through rational arguments once through expression of its ambiguity. Basically, theory of acquisition is not intelligible by which we could solve the problems related to the issue of determinism. If there is any correct understanding of the meaning of "acquisition" other scholars but Asharites would have known it. Furthermore, there is no linguistic basis in other languages in this regard and this is a further proof for letting it go (Mutazili, 1988).

Sheikh Mohammad Abduh in his treatise of monotheism which was authored during his exile in Beirut in 1882 has cultivated the theory of Abu Al Maali in his own way and at the end of his discussion has alluded to his name and criticized his critics and states: anyone who understands his own existence knows that he is the agent of some volitional actions. The witness for this lies in the fact that he evaluates the consequences of every action with his reason and realizes it with all his efforts and the duty of a servant of God is using divine bounties in palces for which they have been created.

This is also endorsed by revealed rules and obligations by God and anyone who denies this he is indeed denying reason. Although a group of Muslims side by the idea of determinism while some others defend the idea of free will, the nature of religion and Sharia requires the idea of determinism to be denied as baseless (Sobhani, 2008).

Those who think that attribution of power and action to man is the source of polytheism and dualism they do not pay enough attention to Holy Quran. Polytheism and infidelity consists of attributing divine power to God and worshipping him like God the thing that was done by the pagans and idolators (Abduh, 2007).

Summary and Conclusion:

In the current article, we showed that responsibility is intelligible where the responsible one has a duty and obligation. The notion of responsibility is expressed before the accomplishment or failure of a duty. If the obligated one accomplishes his duty he is cherished and rewarded otherwise he will be punished.

Moral responsibility is not restricted to human direct actions; rather, it can be expected from the indirect and unexpected outcomes of his actions; people cannot be morally considered to accountable before their actions and rewarded or punished due to them even if from legal point of view some penalties are required to be legislated for punishing those who violate the red lines.

The influence environment, natural and genetic factors in formation of human behavior is undeniable; but their influence is restricted to the preparation of ground and does not reach the state of determinism. Every instinct is triggered as a result of a special natural factor but couldn't man control his instincts? The story of Joseph and Zuleikha and also the faith of Pharaoh's wife and the infidelity of the wives of two great prophets, Noah and Lut, are all the signs of human independence of the environmental factors regardless of their power.

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