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A Comparative Analysis of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Bahrain's February 14th Movement Based on Goldstone's Fourth Generation Theory

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Abstract: *The comparative analysis of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Bahrain's February 14th movement as two Islamic countries which have been highly affected by each other in various fields is of great importance. By adapting the most critical Western ideas about the Islamic Revolution of Iran and analyzing its similarities and differences with Bahrain's February 14th movement, some of their most significant similarities and differences can be found. The "Goldstone's fourth generation" theory, which was presented as one of the late theories in the cause of the revolution, was evaluated by some scholars of the Islamic revolution in Iran and is still under investigation. The present study aimed at explaining the similarities and differences between the two events and evaluate the influence Bahrain's movement from the Islamic Revolution of Iran through the comparative analysis of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Bahrain's February 14th movement based on Goldstone's fourth generation theory. The findings of this study which were obtained based on a descriptive-analytical method and collection of sources based on the library and interviews with elite indicated that the Bahrain's system in Bahrain's February 14th movement attempted to deny the effect of the Iranian revolution on Bahrain and introduce Bahrain's developments due to religious differences between Shiite and Sunni. However, the findings indicated that a significant portion of the spirit raised among the Bahraini Muslim people was affected by the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran which can be observed from the very similarities of Bahrain's February 14th movement with the Islamic Revolution of Iran.*

Keywords: *Revolution, Theories of The Revolution, Bahrain, House of Khalifa, Goldstone.*

INTRODUCTION

The victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 is one of the greatest events of the second half of the 20th century causing the amazement of observers, experts, and political activists in the world (Khosroshiri, 2010: 32). Such a revolution has been a challenging issue such as other significant and challenging events during the last century. The Islamic Revolution of Iran, in a changing world, has passed the natural boundaries of societies and made the fate of all societies united. This revolution changed not only the institutions and systems of a nation, but also changed its scope and moved beyond a country leading the nations to the formation of the New World while being a barrier for many governments and systems. The Islamic Revolution of Iran, with some specific characteristics, was introduced as a model for the people of some Islamic and non-Islamic countries. The fear from a revolution similar to the Islamic Revolution of Iran in the Western Asia and the Persian Gulf made the leaders and rulers of such countries to have no serious commitment to Islam. Bahrain was one of these countries. The popular movements of Bahrain after the 1970s were highly affected by the Islamic

Revolution of Iran. As a result, these movements, which have been derived from the 1950s in line with realizing the people's demands from the House of Khalifa, motivated the people to continue their activities more powerfully than the past. In fact, the Islamic Revolution of Iran was a catalyst in the popular movements of Bahrain.

Strengthening the Bahrain's movements made the House of Khalifa to introduce the differences between Shiite and Sunni as the reason of Bahrain's popular movements and indicate the reflection of the Islamic Revolution of Iran ineffective on the Bahrain's movements. Although the House of Khalifa considered the Islamic Republic of Iran ineffective on Bahrain's popular movements, it accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of interfering in Bahrain's movements in the early years of the victory of the revolution. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic of Iran had no direct role in the Bahraini people's issues and its internal affairs and affected only in terms of spirituality. Such an effectiveness can be found by explaining the differences and analyzing the similarities in some common issues of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Bahrain's contemporary movements.

The analysis of the similarities and distinctions of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Bahrain's social movements are of great importance in terms of political sociology and scientific research since the people of Bahrain and Iran were highly affected by each other due to the common historical, cultural and religious origins. The most important effects can be regarded in the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the effectiveness of Bahrain's movements especially the Bahrain's February 14th movement in 2011. The accuracy of this claim is obvious due to the high similarities and low differences between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Bahrain's movements.

Significance of Study

This research is aimed to study the comparative analysis of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Bahrain's February 14th Movement Based on Goldstone's Fourth Generation Theory and distinguishes the similarities and differences.

Research Questions

The following questions are the main question that this paper seeks to answer.

Do Islamic Revolution of Iran and Bahrain's February 14th Movement can be analyzed based on Goldstone's Fourth Generation theory?

To answer the proposed research questions, the contents and backgrounds of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Bahrain's February 14th Movement are studied meticulously.

Corpus

The principles and backgrounds of the Revolution of Islamic Republic of Iran and Bahrain's February 14th Movement and also Goldstone's Fourth Generation Theory made for us more understandable facts about the subject.

Conceptual framework

Various definitions were presented on the concept of revolution and the most important and most famous of these definitions are briefly explained in this study. Samuel Huntington 's definition is one of the most famous definitions of the revolution. Samuel Huntington considered revolution as a rapid, violent and fundamental change in the dominant values and myths of society, political institutions, social structure, leadership, government activities and policies (Eyvazi and Herati, 2010: 23). Crane Brincon believed that revolution is a massive extra-judicial mass movement leading to the overthrow of the regime and the fundamental and rapid transformation of the social origin of the political elite (Brinton, 1991: 113). Charles tile believed that revolution starts when more than one block of power, which is recognized by some people of the country, is recognized as legitimacy and sovereignty and ends only when one block of power remains (Tilly, 2006: 275). The definition of tile from revolution is a process definition which means that the process of revolutionary movement can be considered from the beginning of the collective revolutionary to its peak that is the overthrow of the ruling regime and gaining power by the revolutionaries. In his violent model of revolution, he emphasized the capacities of the central government to take advantage of the army, help of allies and territorial dominance in

confronting the revolution (Foran 1993: 3). Aristotle, known as the founder of revolutionary studies, argued about the various political systems and foundations of the uprisings and people against the government and believed that the root of revolutions is in social inequality and the feeling of oppression and injustice by people. According to Aristotle, revolution is formed in two ways:

- When people want to change the form of the government; for example, they want to change it from democracy to arrogance or vice versa.
- When people want to change a part of the government or its rulers (Kuhn, 1990: 58-61).

Karl Marx, known as the first serious theorist of the revolution, considered revolution as a collective violent mass movement causing the fast and fundamental transformation of class structure and political institutions. According to Marx, human societies are formed of the classes with conflicting interests competing with each other on increasing their own interests as hidden and obvious. Wilfred Pareto, the elitist Italian thinker, is one of the analysts addressing the subject of revolution. In his famous theory, "The Elite Circulation," he introduced revolution as one of the violent ways of elite circulation. According to Pareto, each society is composed of elites and masses. Elites are divided into political ruling elites and non-ruling elites. Ruling elites are divided into four categories of flexible elites and loyal elites the system's principles or conservative elites, real and competent elites, and unrealistic and formal elites occupying the political elite unjustly. According to Pareto, balance is established in society when there is a right combination of flexible and loyal elites at the head of the government; secondly, the majority of these elites are real and competent. Finally, he mentioned that the ultimate cause of the revolutions is that in the upper class of society, either due to the slowing elite circulation or due to other factors, the number of vicious agents who are not no longer worthy of governance is enhancing. Meanwhile, in the lower class of society, some qualified agents with appropriate characteristics for performing governmental tasks and enough tendency to apply force will be employed (Batamur, 1998: 65). Theda skachpol in his well-known book, "Governments and the Social Revolution," considered revolution as a fundamental change in the political system and class structure of society by the lower class rebellion. He focused on economic factors as the causes of revolution and believed that revolution takes place in peasant and agricultural societies (Goldstone, 1980: 444). The societies which are under international pressure to develop and put pressure on people for funding. Finally, these pressures lead to the dissatisfaction and riot of people and if the government fails at suppressing them, revolution will occur. In this regard, he believed that revolutions are inalienable, and economic issues beyond the will lead to a revolution (Eyvazi & Herati, 2010: 150). He considered revolution as a social phenomenon rather than a political phenomenon and distinguished between social revolution and political revolution.

At the time of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the most critical structuralist theory of revolution was Theda skachpol's theory. He studied the process of the Islamic Revolution and accordingly reformed his previous view of the revolution. He introduced the Islamic Revolution of Iran as a unique revolution having no match to any revolutionary point of view (Panahi, 2012: 176-177). After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, he confessed the exception of this Revolution in his article titled "The Rentier State and Shiite Islam in the Iranian Revolution" and created many changes in the theory of revolution. In addition, he considered cultural and religious elements as well as the role of religion.

Among the prominent revolutionary theorists, Jack Goldstone was considered as due to the special division made by various views on revolution. According to him, the meaning of revolution was changed after the new and important events which occurred in the history of the world. He believed that the world embraced several new revolutions which challenged the previous ideas about revolution during 1979 to 1990 (Goldstone, 2001: 140-141). He divided the various views on revolution initially into three categories, but when the Nicaraguan revolution and especially the Islamic Revolution in Iran occurred. He mentioned the fourth category claiming the views of the third generation. He distinguished the Islamic Revolution of Iran from other revolutions because of its special ideological and cultural characteristics leading to the views of the fourth generation (Foran, 1993: 2).

The present study considered the fourth generation theory of Jack Goldstone on revolutions as one of the late theories about the revolution as appropriate. In addition, this study applied this theory for the comparative analysis of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Bahrain's February 14th movement through the explanation of their differences and similarities.

Theoretical framework

Jack Goldstone, in his book "Revolutions, Theoretical, Comparative and Historical Studies" described the revolutionary theories in the 20th century in three generations and, with the advent of other revolutions at the end of the 20th century, he mentioned the fourth generation. All four generations are explained below.

- **First generation: natural history of revolution**

The first generation of revolutionary ideas presented by Jack Goldstone included the theories of revolutionary theorists and social scientists during 1900-1940. This series of studies, entitled "The Natural History of Revolutions," aimed at describing a real model in the process of revolutionary transformation (Goldstone, 1980: 425-426). The authors' analysis of this period, along with the lack of theoretical foundations, presented no clear claim on the cause and time of the emergence of a revolutionary situation. In general, they mentioned the causes of revolution as a scattered set from a range of factors without placing them in a certain theoretical framework. Le Bon, Elwood, Sorokin, Lefford Edwards, George Beatty, and Crane Brinton are among the most significant first-generation theorists focusing only on the description of famous past revolutions such as the French Revolution and made no effort to make a theoretical explanation of the revolution (Malakutiyan, 2015: 143). First-generation thinkers sought to describe and categorize the historical events of revolutionary and post-revolutionary societies and introduce a common model of their characteristics. For example, Crane Brinton tried to express the uniformities representing the natural process of a revolution in a comparative study of the four British, American, Russian and French revolutions. The first generation theorists sought to discover common models of these revolutions and succeeded in finding a significant confluence between major events in each of these revolutions (Nadarian, 2013). In general, the views of the first generation of revolution considered legitimacy on revolutions and examined various stages of this natural life (Manouchehri, 2001: 2-3).

- **Second generation: general theories of revolution**

The first-generation theorists are in contrast to the second-generation analysts. The second generation of revolutionary theorists emerging almost during 1940-1975 moved beyond the description of the revolutionary process and attempted to investigate the causes and times of the revolution. In fact, they sought to disseminate the ideas about the causes, reasons, and times of revolutionary conditions (Goldstone, 1980: 427). The authors of that time emphasized the theories of social behavior such as theories of psychology, sociology and political science, and used it to explain the revolutions. During the 1950s and 1960s, with the spread of political violence among developing countries, which was typically expanding, the attention of scholars such as Gar, Smelser, Chalmers Johnson, James Davis, Samuel Huntington and Charles Tilly was attracted to this issue (Malekutiyan et al., 2012: 336). In psychological analysis, the works of James Davies, Robert Ger, Feyerabend, Schwartz, Goshunder and Morrison sought the root of revolution in the mental state of the masses. In sociological analyses, the studies of Chalmers Johnson, Smelser, Jessap and Hart in the analysis of revolution emphasized the equilibrium of the social system due to the performance of the sub-systems while in the analysis of political science, the writings of Charles Tilly, Huntington, Amman and Stinkjumb considered revolution as a type of political conflict among the competitors (Goldstone, 1980: 433). In general, the third-generation theories focused on the major factors contributing to the occurrence of revolution such as psychological factors or systemic imbalances or the ability to mobilize resources to confront the dominant power by the opponents (Manouchehri, 2001: 2-3).

- **Third generation: structural theories**

The third generation of revolutionary ideas raised since the 1970s were often constructive and focused on international pressures, peasant societies, military forces, and elite behavior (Goldstone, 1980: 435). This generation included the people like Paige, Thrememberger, Eisenstadt and, most importantly, skachpol (Foran, 1993: 1). The general approach in analyzing these writers is various from the previous theorists in two ways. First, they are based entirely on historical evidence; second, the third-generation theorists are more holistic examining the causes of social revolutions and seeking to explain the various outcomes of revolutions. These authors believed that there should be special structural conditions prior to social and international pressures or changes for a revolution to occur. In fact, these theorists ignored the role of various types of structures, such as peasant construction in the occurrence of revolution and ignored the role of ideological factors and revolutionary leadership. The third-generation ideas are concerned with the characteristics of the established governments and their weaknesses along with the political elites' struggle and the objective evolution of their dissatisfaction (Manouchehri, 2001: 2-3). The structural theories of revolution argued that governments have various structures and thus are vulnerable to various types of revolution. This group of beliefs suggested that revolutions begin with a combination of government weaknesses, conflicts between the governments and elites, and popular uprisings (Malekutyian et al., 2012: 341). Before the Islamic Revolution, most revolutionary theorists had structuralist tendencies in the field of political sociology. In structuralist theory, the factors such as leadership, ideology, parties, and political and cultural organizations, intellectuals, and historians were underestimated while mostly the structural components such as social and political construction, the construction of international system, and the construction of government were considered (Nadarian, 2013).

- **Fourth generation**

With the advent of several various revolutions in the late 20th century, such as the Iranian Revolution and the Nicaraguan Revolution, the study of the causes of these revolutions and their analysis became various. According to Foran, the events of the two Revolutions of Iran and Nicaragua paved the way for the fourth generation of revolutionary theories; in other words, such revolutions lost the purely structuralist aspect and determinism while taking several factors into account such as the role of culture and ideology, resource mobilization, unbalanced development, etc. (Foran, 1993: 16). After the revolution of Iran and Nicaragua, the revolutionary theorists emphasized the unique features of these revolutions and talked the ineffectiveness of existing theories in explaining and analyzing them. In their view, some theory or theories should be presented based on the specific situation of the countries in order to explain the revolution. Consequently, the Third World Revolutions (such as the Iranian Revolution and the Nicaraguan Revolution) were the basis for criticizing the existing theories and attempting to present new analyzes. Accordingly, a new intellectual attitude was formed to design a new framework for analyzing social revolutions in these countries by criticizing the perspectives in explaining the Third World Revolutions (Malekutyian, Baqae, and Nayeri, 2012: 345).

In fact, with the occurrence of these events, the need for revising the theory of revolution was felt more because the first three generations of the revolution, which were also in difficulty in analyzing the previous revolutions, were not able to explain the angles of these revolutions (Malekutyian et al., 2012: 344). The problems of the third generation of revolutionary theories in analyzing the new revolutions paved the way for the fourth generation of theories that are now at the beginning of their path. Undoubtedly, the Islamic Revolution of Iran was the most important revolution challenging the third-generation theories because in the third generation of revolutions, the factors such as culture, ideology, leadership, revolutionary mobilization and class coalitions, communication networks were not regarded. Meanwhile, the obvious role of culture, leadership, and aspiration and alike in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution were among the issues raised in the last decade of the 20th century (Goldstone, 2001: 139). The unreliable role of Islamic culture and ideology in the Islamic Revolution of Iran has led revolutionary theorists to consider categories such as culture and ideology in their analysis while some people such as Theda Skachpol revised their views on the revolution. In the fourth generation of theories, Goldstone argued that careful attention should be paid to what happens during the emergence and expansion

of revolutionary conflicts. A careful look at revolutionary processes helps us understand what social scientists think of the features of "brokerage" and "conditional trajectory" in revolutions. "brokerage" implies that all aspects of a revolution are not predetermined by macro and structural social factors. The decisions of key actors or "brokers" influence the possibility of success and how revolutionary change occurs. Conditional trajectory shows that the actions taken during the revolutionary process affect the subsequent consequences (Goldstone, 2006: 28). In the fourth-generation views of the revolution, other important categories such as leadership, ideology, and communication networks, were particularly considered (Foran, 1993: 16).

Methodology

In the present study, the comparative analysis method was used. Therefore, some explanations were presented about this type of method. Comparative analysis means the recognition of a phenomenon or viewpoint in the light of comparison (understanding and explaining the similarities and differences). Comparative studies are a significant method in the field of human studies because it is accepted in various subjects and can be generalized to any subject. However, this kind of study varies widely in terms of the various levels. The first stage of a comparative study is to show the similarities and differences. Today, the method of comparative studies is of great importance, so that many scholars understand that this method of study reviews the important points. Many scholars and thinkers look for the highest levels of studying a knowledge in comparative studies.

There are various methods to get a framework and academic understanding of this event. Studying the process of occurrence of events with detailed description of the events with its details is a method. The recording of special events, the words of the influential opponents and advocates, collective action patterns of the people, the used slogans and symbols, the reactions of other effective states and governments, etc., are the details which can be used to gain further recognition.

Comparing the units of analysis has an important place in all sciences. The new social sciences emerging from Europe from used comparative approach as the most important method for understanding various cultures and social structures from the beginning. It should be noted that comparisons are not a distinct research technology, but a kind of approach and orientation that exists in many types of research. In comparative studies, the focus is on the similarities and differences between the units, and more importantly, the comparison is essential for understanding the topic under consideration (Seyed emami, 2011: 401).

In the new era, this method has maintained its pivotal position in the social sciences with the idea that comparative analysis forms the basis of many research methods. In a broad sense, all social science methods employed in various fields of social science are comparative. According to Charles Tilly, historical-comparative research is the child of the confluence of history and sociology. The necessity of transition from general theories to structural theories in the field of sociology of revolution and social transformation has doubled the attention to comparative method and analysis. According to Goldstone, the general theories of revolution could not understand the differences. Therefore, the researchers focused on the roots of revolutions from the general theories of political violence to comparative and historical studies on the structure of various types of government and agricultural relations (Goldstone, 2006: 20).

In this study, the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Bahrain's February 14th movement were briefly explained in order to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of these two phenomena and explain their similarities and differences. Then, the most important categories of the fourth-generation views shared by the Islamic Revolution in Iran and Bahrain's February 14th movement were investigated.

The nature of the Islamic Revolution of Iran

Each movement or revolution is various in nature from other movements or revolutions which is due to differences in their goals and peripheral differences. Contrary to the view of some schools believing that the forms of revolutions are various, but their nature is the same, and this nature is materiality and economics. In

addition, it should be considered that not all revolutions have material origins. The origins of some revolutions may be the bipolarity of the society from an economic and material point of view, but many revolutions have a political, social, ideological and ideological nature (Malekutyian, 2008: 69). The French Revolution has a nature called "bourgeois-democratic". The Russian revolution has another nature, called "Bolshevik". The nature of the Chinese revolution differs from other revolutions because it is "Maoist or peasant". The Islamic Revolution of Iran has its own nature, which if it is not properly identified, it may be considered as the second revolution in the world. Therefore, the effects and consequences of other revolutions may occur in the Iranian revolution (Shafieefar, 2012: 81). In order to explain the nature of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the components of Iran's position before the revolution in the international system, the status and level of development of societies, and the extent of the concentration of political power in Iran should be analyzed. The complexity and inaccuracy of the Islamic Revolution led theorists and experts of the world to provide a variety of explanations for it. According to Michel Foucault, a French theorist, the Islamic Revolution of Iran took place in a period when there was a need to weapon, command, logistics, and military support. In his view, what is happening in Iran is a source of confusion for today's observers because there are people from any social class fighting with empty hands against a fully armed regime (Foucault, 1998: 43). Some leaders of other revolutions in the world called the Islamic Revolution of Iran as the first revolution in the world based on culture because they believed that this revolution could remain in hearts especially in the hearts of the youth of the Arab world. Some politicians who closely observed the process of this revolution called it "proof of the emergence of religion as an important political force" creating another type of revolution by interconnecting the divine government (Stample, 1999: 435) seeking to publish the Islamic Revolution Culture.

Theda Skachpol, as a theorist and expert in the revolution, believed that the Islamic Revolution of Iran was a social revolution that was not brought up like the Russian and French revolutions, but was made by people and through equipping all facilities of the entire country, all social classes, strong leadership, and huge cost (Foran, 1993: 3; Skachpol, 1980: 286). This revolution was made inside Iran and exported to other regions and countries. The transboundary nature of this revolution led the Islamic Revolution not only to transform the values and traditions existing in the internal relations of its own society, but also to have a profound impact on the foundations and the value system governing international relations because of the design of new ideological values. In regard to the influence of the Islamic Revolution on the world order, Michel Foucault believed that the Islamic Revolution of Iran introduced the element of Islam into the equations, transactions and interactions of the international system (Foucault, 1998: 64). The Islamic Revolution of Iran, with the emphasis on the components of religion, social power, and stubbornness of society, emerged and showed that it has a global goal. This revolution brought about a number of religious, cultural, social and political components. The multi-nature aspect of the Islamic Revolution of Iran made the movements outside of this country, in accordance with their nature, seek to interact with it and adopt its own patterns. Some people look at this revolution from the cultural point of view, some from the religious point of view, some from the social point of view, some from the political point of view, and so on. According to Nikki Keddie, the Islamic Revolution of Iran proved that ideology, culture and religion have played a major role in this revolution which is considered as its nature (Panahi, 2012: 177).

The origin of Bahrain's popular movements

Bahrain's popular movements began with the arrival of colonialism in the archipelago. The arrival of colonialism into Bahrain not only did not have any objection from the House of Khalifa, but also led they established a context for the permanent colonial presence in the country. This act of the House of Khalifa did not satisfied the hearts of Bahrain's independent and libertarian people and brought them movements and protests (Beigi, 2016: 11). The arrival of colonists in Bahrain and their engagement in the internal and external affairs of the country brought displeasure and protests from the people of the country, many of whom subsequently became the uprising and intifada. The first popular uprising took place in March 1895 against

the Shiite Sheikh "Isa bin Ali al-Khalifa", the Bahraini ruler. The next uprising occurred in 1919, known as the "The uprising of divers," was that pearl merchants played an active role that one of its reasons was the cruelty of the House of Khalifa on divers and the usurpation of pearls that the divers carried out from the depths of the sea in exchange for their little cost (Nowruzi, 2016). The next movement was called the "Intifada of crises" in 1922 in objection to the population change policies of the House of Khalifa for the majority of the Shiite. The House of Khalifa sought to reduce the number of Shiites, equalize the size of the Shiite population and Sunni people, and thus reduce the size and intensity of the demonstration via the forced exile and forced displacement of the Shiites and the introduction of illiterate Sunni from other countries and granting them Bahraini citizenship because a large percentage of the protesters from Shiites who were oppressed by the House of Khalifa during two centuries (Momen, 2002: 2). The next widespread protests of the Bahraini people were held in 1938 with the help of the Shiites and Sunnis to request a constitution and a parliamentary assembly (Al-Alam, 2017). The widespread gatherings and protests of Sunni and Shiite leaders during 1954-1956 prompted the recognition of the first Bahraini Sassy Party called "National Unity Board" by the House of Khalifa and Britain. This party was the first successful political movement in Bahrain's history gathering all tribes and people. National Unity Board, with its insistence on the demands of people, was able to fulfill many of the demands of people which was not much desirable to the House of Khalifa and the British representatives in Bahrain. Thus, in 1956 when people came to the streets of Bahrain on the request of the National Unity Board to support Egypt in the Suez Canal War, Britain took advantage of this opportunity and suppressed the party and expelled its leaders to Saint Helen (Al-Bassam, 2006: 10-12). In 1965, some protests were formed against the oppression of the House of Khalifa leading to some conflicts between the protesters and the House of Khalifa forces as well as the martyrdom, arrest, and displacement of hundreds of Bahraini people. After a few years, Britain left Bahrain in 1971. The first major incident that occurred after the departure of Britain from Bahrain was developing the first Bahraini constitution and the formation of a national council and advisory council. Following the creation of a popular assembly by people, the House of Khalifa encountered some restrictions and barriers to approving some laws. The House of Khalifa considered such a situation to be harmful to them, so in 1975 they canceled the constitutional provisions associated with the selected parliament. As a result, the parliament was dissolved resulting in widespread protests. The protests and subsequent movements in Bahrain took place after the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

According to the advocates and even the opponents of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, this revolution has had the greatest impact in the Islamic and Arab world (Mohammadi, 2015: 25). The most influence was accepted by the popular movements of the southern countries in the Persian Gulf especially Bahrain. The House of Khalifa considered the triumph of the Islamic Revolution of Iran ineffective in Bahrain's movements and introduced such movements as tribal differences while the popular movements in Bahrain especially Shiite movements were highly affected by Imam Khomeini's thoughts called "Imam's line" due to the attractiveness of Imam Khomeini and the uniqueness of the Islamic Revolution of Iran (Al-Jamri, 2008). This raised Arab concerns and led to the formation of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council.

After the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council on August 13, 1981 by the order of Saudi Arabia, the Bahraini government attributed the events of the past and subsequent events in Bahrain to the Islamic Republic of Iran accusing it of interfering in the internal affairs of the country (Al-Sandi, 2017: 214, 236; Bina, 2012: 24; Bina, B 2012: 68). The most significant accusation of Bahrain to the Islamic Republic of Iran relates to the failed coup of the Bahrain Islamic Liberation Front which was launched on December 31, 1981 by one of the opponent groups. This accusation was denied by the Islamic Republic of Iran when the Bahrain Islamic Liberation Front had introduced its independence-seeking measures under the influence of the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran before this coup.

The worst event was the approval of "National Security Act", according to which the Bahraini regime could arrest everyone who was considered to be a threat due to national security interests. Bahraini people were very angry at these measures taken by the House of Khalifa while the Islamic Revolution in Iran occurred in 1979.

This incident strengthened the Bahraini people's popular movements and caused the people of this country, especially the Shiites, to hold widespread protests against the ruling system. Following the martyrdom of Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Sadr by Saddam's regime on August 20, 1980, these protests reached the peak and resulted in the martyrdom of a Bahraini citizen (Al -Alam, 2017). At that time, the Islamic Republic broadcasted the tapes, lectures, pamphlets and revolutionary radio messages in Arabic language for spiritual supports from Muslims and Shiite (Mohammadi, 2015: 203). In 1995, following the arrest of several leaders of Bahrain's movements by the House of Khalifa, the people of this country held massive protests in support of these people after which 5,000 people were arrested and handed over to the military and civil courts. (Al-alam, 2017). These protests lasted until 1998 (Al-Alavi, 2014: 52). In 1999, Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa, a former Bahraini Amir, died suddenly. His son, Hamad bin Isa, the current king of Bahrain talks about the reform promises raised in the framework of "National Covenant of Peace". According to this covenant, there should be reforms in the country, but eventually he cancelled all his promises and approved new laws in 2002 in which the Bahraini government became the kingdom of the Emirate and the Emir of Bahrain, as the king of this country, took all the power. In the same year, the new rules of the king were published and caused the anger of people. Some of the country's political and social activists have founded the Bahrain Center for Human Rights. By continuing the anti-popular policies of the House of Khalifa to deprive them of their true rights and the dispossession of many citizens of the archipelago by 2010. In the beginning of 2010, the Bahraini people created mass protests for several months faced by the suppression and attack of the House of Khalifa. following the events of the Middle East and the victory of the Tunisian revolution on January 14, 2011 and the Egyptian revolution on February 11, the people of Bahrain in the second half of the same year (Al-Alam, 2017). from the village of El Nouidrat, on the island of Seto to Lulu Square, demonstrated peaceful demonstrations aimed at reforming the system on February 14. Due to the violent clash with the people on February 17 the reformist nature of the movement was turned into a revolutionary nature. Some conservative Sunni people seeing the large crowd of this movement imagined that the Islamic Republic of Iran directly managed the demonstrations. As a result, they organized some protests marches to support the House of Khalifa due to the fear of Shiite domination and some of them, along with the House of Khalifa's military forces, attacked the protesters (Qinaqlar, 2015: 73 and 29). This movement ultimately disappeared with the military intervention of the countries of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar but continues to this day. The reasons of the protests of the Bahraini people to the House of Khalifa can be highlighted as:

Political tyranny, interference of foreigners in the affairs of the country, the moral corruption of the ruling family, especially the two last rulers, the plundering of natural resources and the widespread use of rents and the lack of distribution among the people, the allocation of some islands to the Gulf states, long-term plans for changing population ratio, political and economic weakening of the majority of Bahraini people, especially the Shiites, establishing strategic ties with the United States and turning Bahrain into the fourth alliance outside of the US, establishing open relations with the Zionist regime, violating religious principles and disrespecting religious symbols and religious rituals, non-reformation of the constitution, non-formation of the independent parliament selected by people, converting Manama into the eighth corrupted city in the world, etc. (Al-Alavi, 2014: 40-45).

The similarities and differences between the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Bahrain's February 14th movement

The Bahraini people attempted to step in the same direction that the Iranian people have taken to win the revolution. Many of the actions of the Bahraini people and the current leaders of the popular movements of this country are similar to the actions of people and leaders of Iran before the revolution; The invitation to reform the regime peacefully, as well as holding meetings with the people, especially the youth in the mosques and Husseiniyas, the continuous presence among the people and being in the forefront of the movements, stability in the course of the movements, even in the case of arrest and torture and even their exile, national alliance,

shutting down of shops and markets to create economic pressure for the system, etc. are some parts of the similarities that can be explained by these two events. Here are the most prominent features that Goldstone has expressed in his fourth generation theory.

- **Ideology**

From Goldstone's point of view, ideology was an element that clearly emerged in the 20th-century revolutions. He called the revolutions that ideology has played a significant role as radical revolutions. In his view, various opposition groups can form a coalition ideology and deny the legitimacy of the ruling power (Goldstone, 2009: 19.31). From a religious aspect, transformed the Islamic Republic of Iran into a transnational ideology from the beginning when two Western and the Eastern materialism ideologies raised. All the revolutions reviewed by the revolutionary experts to this day were inspired or affiliated with one of these two poles but the Islamic Revolution of Iran was distinguished from them by virtue of religious ideology. The first major feature of the Islamic Republic of Iran was its religious and Islamic nature. Despite the widespread nature of the Islamic Revolution and the participation of many religious tribes and groups especially Sunni (the secretariat of the Council for the Planning of Sunni Religious Sciences Schools, 2016), the Islamic Revolution of Iran is recognized as a religious revolution rooted in Shia religion (Jamalzadeh 2012: 72). The Shiite religion based on Ahl al-Bayt's school has always denied oppression and fought against it. In Bahrain, the democratic movements had always a religious origin that can be said to originate in the Shia school because of the oppression of the House of Khalifa and their allies on all Bahraini people, especially the Shiites. Shiites were the first group in Bahrain to fight domestic tyranny and foreign oppression in Bahrain because of their belief in fight against oppression. In recent decades, these movements have become very similar to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, in which many of the religious components of the Islamic Revolution are observed, such as the selection of mosques and such as the selection of mosques and Husseiniyas as popular bases and the destruction of these bases by the House of Khalifa. Since the establishment of the National Unity Board, mosques were considered as the centers of popular gathering, so that the dominance of the mosques was considered as one of the factors of victory in the movements (Khalaf, 2003: 30). Today, mosques and Husseiniyas are considered as the main centers of popular movements in Bahrain. Demonstrations and movements of the people in Bahrain began either from mosques and Husseiniyas or led to these places. Mosques and Husseiniyas as the centers of planning and mourning were the base for unity for the Bahraini people. Mosques and Husseiniyas have been defeated by the House of Khalifa in the past due to their role in advancing the demands of the Bahraini demanding people, especially during the movements of the 1990s. The House of Khalifa forces began to shut down mosques in Shiite areas since the 1950s. In many cases, they besieged the mosques and did not allow the Shiites to hold religious ceremonies such as the Mid-Sha'ban. The specific task of the mosque's social base has been highlighted since the establishment of the National Unity Board in Bahrain. Today, the mosques are being destroyed by the House of Khalifa for the central role they play in the course of the popular movement. The Bahraini people protested due to the negligence of the House of Khalifa to religious concepts and values, and the transformation of Manama into the eighth corrupted city in terms of corruption and immoral activities in 2003 (Smart Travel, 2017) as well as becoming the second corrupted city in the world in 2014 (Pujani, 2014). These protests highlighted the element of religion and religious values in the contemporary movements of the Bahraini people.

- **Leadership**

Leadership is one of Goldstone's most important categories in the fourth-generation views of the revolution. According to Goldstone, leadership and guidance are considered as an advantage in all revolutions but its type and quality differ from revolution to revolution. Although there may be obvious differences between the revolutions in the type of leadership, all revolutions have their specific leaders. Goldstone argued that leaders should be supported by the elites such as military officers, religious leaders, noblemen, politicians, intellectuals, government executives, as well as legal, engineering, and managerial experts to apply more influence (Goldstone, 2009: 20). As the leader of the revolution and movement is more united and more original culturally and historically and as he is more connected with ordinary people in everyday life, he will be more successful

and effective in advancing the revolutionary movement. In some revolutions, leadership has been at the service of one person while in some others, which have undergone various and even conflicting stages, a special person may apply leadership at each stage. In examining the role of leadership in various movements and revolutions, the leadership strategies should be approved in advance of the revolutionary movement. The person who leads a movement or revolution should have certain traits and attributes for taking the movement to its destination by using its various tactics and strategies.

➤ **Leadership in the Islamic Revolution of Iran**

Imam Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution, was a perfect person at that time because he was at a high level of awareness in all aspects that a leader should be aware of. In other words, he was a philosopher, Islamic jurist, mystic, politician, and the professor of ethics and always at the forefront of all these stages, so that he was knowledgeable in all these fields. In terms of familiarity with the Quran, tradition and Islamic jurisprudence, he has taught in all these fields because he was a commentator of the Qur'an and Islamic jurist. Goldstone mentioned the leaders of the Islamic Revolution of Iran as those who enjoyed the support of deprived urban and peasant groups and were able to support them (Goldstone, 2009: 32).

➤ **Leadership in Bahrain**

In the 1950s, when the first Bahraini political party was established, two factors contributed greatly to the advancement of popular protests including the role of clerics and scholars as the leaders of the movement and the role of mosques and Husseiniyas as the base of movements (Al-Shahabi, 1996: 215). Bahrain's February 14th movement was in charge of Ayatollah Shaykh Isa Qassim in 2011. He has entered politics from a young age and was considered as the religious leader of all Bahraini people. In the political arena, the majority of the Bahraini community and many of their political leaders and political movements have accepted Ayatollah Shaykh Isa Qassim as the leader of the Bahrain's February 14th movement. Ayatollah Shaykh Isa Qassim raised his thoughts and opinions about various political and social issues of the country through the sermons of Friday prayers. In fact, the sermons of his Friday prayers were so important that many believed that the Bahrain's February 14th movement was guided and administered through his sermons during Friday prayers. A large number of Bahraini elites believe that Ayatollah Shaykh Isa Qassim enjoyed political, analytical and strategic power and considered such actions in terms of wisdom and consciousness. They identify Ayatollah Shaykh Isa Qassim as a person with a strategic vision and analysis that has led him to be trusted by the elites both inside and outside of Bahrain and has led the system in Bahrain and the United States to not subordinate his actions (Al-Daqaq, 2015: 264). Ayatollah Shaykh Isa Qassim along with other professionals such as Professor Abdolwahhab Hussein, Hassan Mushaima, Sheikh Ali Salman, Ayatollah Muhammad Ali Al-Mahfuz, Dr. Saeed al-Shahabi, and Dr. Ebrahim Sharif led the Bahrain's February 14th movement.

• **Being peaceful**

The method of Bahraini people to fight was like the method of Iranians in the Islamic Revolution because Bahraini people did not commit violent measures and emphasized the peacefulness of their movements despite confronting with six military allied armies together with the British intelligence system (Al-Morshed, 2012: 5). The Bahraini movements were often completely peaceful. Such a peaceful presence is obvious in the Bahrain's February 14th movement and even the people and leaders of these movements have frequently expressed the peacefulness of the movement (Al-AKri, 2012: 9). One of the disadvantages of the Bahrain's February 14th movement was that its peacefulness led to a prolonged process of concluding; while Bahraini people and leaders still emphasize the peacefulness of this movement despite the military confrontation between some groups and the system. The House of Khalifa abused the peaceful attitudes of the Bahraini people even in their legitimate and completely peaceful methods. However, according to Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the peaceful demonstration by a people in a country is not a problem and should not be violated except in democratic countries, in order to maintain national security and public health. One of Bahrain's peaceful and fully legitimate methods of advancing its demands is to work in legal human rights organizations but the House of Khalifa defeated them in this direction and in 2004, two of these centers, called the Bahrain

Centre for Human Rights Bahrain Youth's Human Rights Association were deprived of working (Men-Zemat Al-Afv Al-Doliyat, 2011:16).

- **Social origin**

The massive presence of people in realization of the Islamic Revolution highlights the reflection of such revolution. The amount of people attending each revolution reflects the depth and popularity of the revolution. The unprecedented presence of people in the Iranian revolution adds to the magnitude of this revolution and its reflection in the world as compared with other world revolutions (Muhammadi, 2015: 42). In this revolution, with the exception of some limited minorities, all classes of people from all social groups and across the country, including towns and villages, workers, farmers and all other classes participated in the regime's change. The leaders of the Bahrain's February 14th movement who were arrested by the House of Khalifa a few days after the beginning of the movement were from various tribes and groups of society with a various level of thinking. Many of them were Shiite and some of them were Sunni. Some were jurist while some were traditional. In addition, some had been living in the West while some were academic professors and others were seminary professors. In March 2012, all of these individuals denied the feature of tribe-orientation and ethnic-orientation of the Bahrain's February 14th movement in the military courts of the House of Khalifa (Beigi, 2016: 58). The universality of the Bahrain's February 14th movement, like the Islamic Revolution of Iran, made the courts of the House of Khalifa encounter the individuals from high levels such as physicians, nurses, lawyers, clerics, university professors, head of center of human rights, poets, media activists, athletes, etc. during the trial of the arrested persons. These people, many of whom were prominent political activists, were tried by the court and transferred to jail. This trial became known as the "Ghaziat Al-Romuz" (Al-Shahabi, 2013: 48).

- **Transboundary effects**

Ideological reflection is the basic religious difference between Iran and the Persian Gulf countries affecting the acceptance of these Sunni countries in the Persian Gulf states. The intellectual reflection and teachings of the Islamic Revolution of Iran over the Sunnis of the Persian Gulf countries were almost nothing. Islamic fundamentalism among Sunnis comes from a completely various tradition. Consequently, the ideological attraction of progressivism in the Persian Gulf countries was generally among the Shi'a communities, often considered as minorities and dominated by Sunnis in the political systems (Esposito, 2003: 113).

The irresponsible effect of the Islamic Revolution of Iran on the region was to issue a sense of anti-imperialism and independence-seeking to the movements of the Persian Gulf countries and Bahrain. One of the famous Iranianologists, Bernard Horkard, considered the Islamic Revolution of Iran highly effective in terms of external influences and believed that the Iranian revolution has given the world a second life (Muhammadi, 2015: 43). Bahrain plays a vital role in regional equations where none of its allies want to lose. The strategic properties of the archipelago of Bahrain, its closeness to the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia, proximity to the region's powers, located on the oil transfer path along with some other social features and economic capacities have become a factor for its allies to keep this country as their ally in their best efforts. The countries around the archipelago of Bahrain are the rentier states which could provide a fairly decent livelihood for many citizens and keep them away from politics by using energy rents and distributing their revenues (Al-Morshed, 2012: 5). The ruling dynasty in Bahrain was at the risk of overthrowing their government and realized that if there was a slight negligence in suppressing the movements Bahrain, like Tunisia and Libya, would witness a revolution. Thus, it immediately destroyed the Pearl Roundabout as a symbol and a base for gathering of people to unite in order to advance the movement. The House of khalifa knew that if they did not destroy the Pearl Roundabout, it would be the same as the Tahrir Square of Cairo the exporter of revolution (Difidson, 2014: 357). If the Bahrain's February 14th movement wins in in Bahrain, it will be released rapidly to other areas causing instability in the region and threatening the energy security. If this revolution is of an Islamic type, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf states will become Muslim countries which are hostile to the West which means losing the commodity market. Thus, they tried to maintain these two benefits in the Persian Gulf in any way, even by killing people (Al-Lami, 2011: 58).

- **The relevance of Palestinian cause**

From the beginning of its victory, the Islamic Republic of Iran has obviously indicated its place on the Palestinian issue and called for the liberation of Quds to be its cause, which has been various from other Islamic countries in the region, especially the Persian Gulf states. The relationship between the Arab states around the Persian Gulf and the Zionist regime has been hidden in some cases while sometimes it was apparent after the release of documents. Bahrain's relationship with the Zionist regime dates back to the occupation of Palestine by this regime. The severity and weakness of the relations between the Bahraini system and the Zionist regime have undergone changes in line with developments in the West Asian region. The people of the Arab countries around the Persian Gulf suffered from the difficulty of communicating with the Zionist regime by their own government, except for the Bahraini people (Adel al-Anis, 2012: 4). The issue of Quds and relations with the Zionist regime is regarded as the red line of most Bahraini people, but these lines have now been raped by the House of Khalifa. Bahrain's popular movements have always been the supporters of Palestinians and have taken the Quds as one of the most important issues in the Muslim world that should be addressed by Muslims (Al-Bassam, 2005: 30).

- **Anti-imperialism**

The Bahraini people have always demanded the shortage of imperialism from Bahrain's internal affairs. Until 1971, they had protests and movements to leave Britain from Bahrain. The history of the relations between the House of Khalifa and Britain dates back to 1805. Britain and the House of Khalifa needed each other to stay in Bahrain's archipelago. Therefore, in many sensitive times that the House of Khalifa and interests of Britain were threatened by the Bahraini people, they helped each other including the repression of Bahrain's movements since the 1979 revolution in Iran and the martyrdom of many Bahrainis by the British (Al-Mujaher al-Siasi, 2017: 7 and 36)., Britain conducted many interferences in the internal affairs and foreign policy causing widespread popular protests during the time of presence in Bahrain. One of the requests of the protests, movements, and demonstrations was the withdrawal of colonialism from Bahrain (Al- Bassam, 2006: 10). The broad similarities existing between the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the recent movements in Bahrain, especially the Bahrain's February 14th movement have made some oppressors to take advantage of tribal conflicts. By referring to the Bahrain's February 14th movement as the Shiite movement, many of the Shiite in Bahrain were regarded as those who were played by Iran's geopolitical activities following directly from Qom, Najaf and Tehran (Qinaqlar, 2015: 135).

- **Networks**

Undoubtedly, there are many differences between the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Bahrain's February 14th movement while this study aimed at examining the most critical differences in the theory of the fourth generation of Goldstone. Thus, the most significant difference between the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Bahrain's February 14th movement was related to communication networks.

Networks play a significant role in communicating between various levels of revolutionaries. Goldstone mentioned how the revolutionaries are connected with the leadership, how the elites communicate with prominent protestors, how to revolutionize a specific location, how the leaders and groups in the revolution appear, and how to handle the revolution and issues of networks and communication networks (Goldstone, 2001: 152). Paying attention to the networks playing a crucial role in revolutionary mobilization and establishment of a relationship between leadership and the structure of revolution are among the features of the later revolutions theory. The elites communicate with the movement via the social network with the protest movement. The role and importance of networks in recent revolutions in the Middle East has been approved (Malekutyian et al., 2012: 345-346). However, the importance of online social networks should be emphasized due to the development of new communication facilities creating a desirable atmosphere for forming the protests and collective actions. In the Islamic Revolution of Iran, communication networks were mostly carried out in

traditional ways. Face-to-face meetings, presence in predetermined places for cooperation and synchronization, the transmission of the leader's message to the body of the revolution (people) by the trusted elite, the transmission of the message of the Imam to the body of the revolution by newspapers, radio or audio tapes, etc., included the communication networks between leaders and people. However, today, traditional communication networks are replaced by more innovative methods such as social networking and, more generally, cyberspace. Bahrain, as the country among the Arab countries, has been ranked first in the advancement of communications technology and has been influenced by the Internet communication networks. The Bahraini youth have been specially trained in the use of technology and internet due to the opening of the Bahrain system in the field of technology from 2000 to 2010. In fact, it should be noted that, before the developments in the Western Asia region in 2011, Bahrain had snatched technology from other southern Persian Gulf states due to the elimination of all obstacles to the development of electronic communications by the system for ease of exchange of banking and electronic services. This has made Bahrain the first place in the field of communication technology, especially software related to social networking among Arab countries (Hosseini, 2015). The Bahraini people's special attention to technology and communication networks is due to the new social structure of the country, with a literacy rate of 95.7% and young people with high academic degrees (IndexMundi, 2017). All of these factors have led digital social networks to be of great importance to the people of this country, especially the youth, because of the facilitation of communication. The Bahraini youth did not limit the use of the Internet and social digital networks to establish social communication and cultural exchanges and used it in the political area. They benefited from the huge use of social media and could invite people to social movements in 2011 through this potential.

Conclusion

Until the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the popular movements in the Persian Gulf region, especially the Shiites of that region, had no experience of serious militant struggles with their tyrannical states while their activities were limited to just a few protests and short-term popular protests. Such movements always felt that they were on the margin and their activities were not useful. Thus, they did not make their dissatisfaction and protests into an uprising against the regime. Some of them responded through protest movements to internal tyranny and foreign influences within the country. In this situation, the Islamic Revolution of Iran has occurred and strengthened the spirituality of the movements of the region, especially the popular movements of Bahrain leading the Bahraini people to move toward victory in their uprisings along with the lines of the Iranian people's move to the revolution. In fact, many people in Bahrain have chosen the Islamic Revolution of Iran as a model for the victory of their movements. The modeling of the Islamic Revolution of Iran led to significant similarities between the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Bahrain's contemporary movements especially the Bahrain's February 14th movement. With the comparative analysis of the Iranian revolution and the February 14th movement with the approach of Goldstone's fourth generation theory, it became obvious that there were some significant similarities between the Iranian revolution and the February 14th movement in terms of ideological, cultural, value, social and leadership contexts. In terms of networks, there was a general similarity between the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the February 14th movement but there were differences in instrumentation and communications due to the advancement of technology and the transformation of communication devices.

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