



BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: AN IMPEDIMENT TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract: Nigeria is beset with ethno-religious conflicts, communal riots and agitation for resource control since the return of civil rule in 1999 which have resulted in massive loss of lives and properties. But the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in the country has created widespread violence across Northern Nigeria. The menace of this conservative element called Boko Haram has complicated development challenges in Nigeria. Therefore, the essence of this paper is to examine the incidence of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and determine its implication for national development. The study adopts qualitative approach to data analysis which relies on secondary data as its source of information for the investigation of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The paper reveals that Boko Haram insurgency militates against foreign investments in Nigeria and threaten corporate existence of Nigerian sovereignty. This paper recommends that convicted Boko Haram sponsors and sources of funding should not be allowed to occupy public office in Nigeria and government at all levels should address the problem of youth unemployment.

Key words: Boko Haram, Insurgency, National Development, Development

INTRODUCTION

Insecurity has been a serious challenge to the Nigerian government in the contemporary times. Since the return of Nigeria to democratic rule in 1999, the country is beset with series of security challenges such as ethno-religious conflicts, communal riots and agitation for resource control. All these problems have various implications for national development. The climax of these security threats is the emergence of deadly group known as Boko Haram which has assumed dangerous dimension since 2009. The inhuman activities of the Islamist sect have unsettled the Nigerian nation to the extent that ample time and socio-economic cum political resources that ought to have been channeled to the development of the entire country is being wasted on various efforts geared towards checkmating and possibly annihilating the insurgency in the North-East geopolitical zone (Awortu, 2015, p. 213).

According to reports, multiple explosions went one after the other in places like Kano, Maiduguri, Damaturu, Postiskum, Gombe, Abuja and Madalla in Niger State in the usual manner of attacks by the members of Boko Haram sect (Okponga, Ugwu & Eme, 2012, p. 77). Government institutions were attacked by the members of this sect which later spread to churches, thereby destroying lives and properties of the people. Suicide bombing of the United Nations Secretariat in Abuja on August, 26, 2011 did not happen long after a similar attack on Nigerian Police Force Headquarters on June, 16 (Ovaga, 2013, p. 20). It is true that North East is the epicentre of Boko Haram attacks but its impact has affected the whole country which poses a serious challenge to national development.

Therefore, the basic thrust of this paper is to examine the incidence of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria and determine its implication for national development. The paper also suggests appropriate strategies to reduce the menace of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The study is based on qualitative analysis which relies on secondary data as its source of information. These include: books, newspapers, journals, among others. The paper is

divided into six sections. Section A deals with the introduction. Section B focuses on conceptual clarification. Section C is concerned with theoretical framework and Section D dwells on incidence of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria. Section E deals with implication of Boko Haram attacks for national development. Finally, Section F focuses on conclusion and recommendations.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Insurgency

Insurgency is an organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict to achieve its aims. Insurgencies normally seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country. They may also seek to (1) overthrow an established government without a follow-on social revolution. (2) Establish an autonomous national territory within the borders of a state. (3) Cause the withdrawal of an occupying power. (4) Extract political concessions that are unattainable through less violent means (insurgents vs guerrillas, n.d). An insurgency is a rebellion against authority (for example, an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents (Oxford Dictionary cited in Insurgency, 2016). According to Hayden (2007) “insurgency is best defined as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow or destruction of a constituted government through the use of subversion, espionage, terrorism and armed conflict”.

The ultimate goal of an insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control of all or a portion of its territory or force political concessions in sharing political power. Insurgencies require the active or tacit support of some portion of the population involved. External support, recognition or approval from other countries or political elites can be useful to insurgents, but is not required (Terrorism Research, n.d).

Development

Scholars have defined development in various ways. Hahn-Been Lee (1970, p.8) defines development as a process of acquiring a sustained growth of a system’s capability to cope with new, continuous changes toward the achievement of progressive political, economic and social objectives. In the opinion of Akanji and Akosile (2001) “it means the attainment of self governance, to others it signifies the provision of essential infrastructure that create a healthy atmosphere, proper provision of education, communication and ability to evolve an amiable business environment for its citizenry while some even sees it as achievement in technological advancement”. According to Sapru (1997, p.5), development is a process of improving the well being of the people. It is about raising the standard of living of the people, improving their education and health and also opening out to them new and equal opportunities for richer and more varied life. Naomi (1995, p. 67) believes that development is usually taken to involve not only economic growth but also some notion of equitable distribution, provision of health care, education, housing and other essential services all with a view to improving the individual and collective quality of life. Chisman (cited in Lawal & Abe 2001, p. 237) views development “as a process of societal advancement, where improvement in the well being of the people are generated through strong partnerships between all sectors, corporate bodies and other groups in the society. It is reasonable to know that development is not only economic exercise, but also involves both socio-economic and political issues and pervades all aspects of societal life.”

National Development

Evolving from the meaning of development, national development can be explained to mean totality of improvement in collective and concrete terms across socio-economic, political, technology as well as religion and is best achieved through strategies mapped out by government as contained in the nation development plans (Akindele, Ogini & Agada, 2013; p. 171).

In the opinion of Oluwatoyin and Lawal (2011, p. 237) national development can be defined as “the overall development of collective socio-economic, political as well as religious advancement of a country or a nation. This is best achieved through development planning, which can be described as the countries collection of strategies mapped out by government.”

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is posing a serious threat to national development. A number of theories could be used to explain Boko Haram menace in Nigeria. Some of these theories are system theory, relational vengeance theory, frustration aggression theory and Islamic theory. Each of these theories could be used to explain Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria properly. Therefore, the paper adopts system theory as guiding principle for the study.

The concept of system theory can be traced back to the writings of Ludwig Von Bertalanffy. He invented this concept for the study of biology. David Easton in 1953 adopted the same theory to explain what happens in a political system but later elaborated his conception in 1965 in his two works: *A Framework for Political Analysis* and *A System Analysis of Political Life*. Proper Understanding of system theory as developed by David Easton may demand the following steps.

1. Changes in the social or physical environment surrounding a political system produce “demands” and supports for action or status quo directed as “inputs” towards the political system through political behaviour.
2. These demands and supporting groups stimulate competition in the political system, leading to decisions or “outputs” directed at some aspect of the surrounding social or physical environment.
3. After a decision or output is made (e.g specific policy), it interacts with its environment and if it produces change in the environment, there is “outcome”.
4. When a new policy interacts with its environment, “outcomes” may generate new demands or supports and groups in support or against the policy (feedback) or a new policy on some related matter.
5. Feedback leads back to step 1, forming a never-ending cycle.

Accordingly, if the system functions as described, then we have a “stable political system”. If the system breaks down, then we have a “dysfunctional political system” (System Theory in Political Science, 2016).

In applying this theory, the social insecurity caused by Boko Haram attacks has created instability in the political system. The inability of the political system to address Boko Haram insurgency has adversely affected the economic and social transformation of the country whereby business and commercial activities and schools are closed down, foreign direct investments reduced and unemployment level increasing. All these problems have negatively affected national development in Nigeria.

THE INCIDENCE OF BOKO HARAM ATTACKS IN NIGERIA

Boko Haram is a militant group mainly based in North-Eastern Nigeria. The group was founded in 2007 largely to preach an Islamist ideology based on the doctrine of the Taliban as well as groups such as al-Qaeda. The aim of the group include the desire to create an Islamic state in Nigeria and achieve its anti-western education target by stopping all regular schools (Anumudu, *et al*, 2015, p. 3). Since the “gradual incarnation” of Boko Haram sect into a terrorist group, Nigeria is witnessing massive loss of lives and properties. The menace of this group has attracted international attention and condemnation. The country has on daily basis wasted the blood of innocent citizens through either bomb blast or exchange of gun fires between Boko Haram and security forces.

The activities of the group came to limelight when students, particularly those of higher institutions in Borno and Yobe States, “withdrew from schools, tore up their certificates and joined the group”. On September 21, 2004, members attacked the Bama and Gworze police stations in Borno State, killing several policemen and stealing arms and ammunition (Anumudu, *et al*, 2015, p. 4). The group did not stop with their “intermittent and hit-and-run” attacks on the security personnel in some parts Borno and Yobe until the July 2009 anti-government revolt in Nigeria. The main cause of the July 2009 uprising is as a result of killing of sect members on June, 11 2009 by the security forces who were involved in operation flush 13. This happened because the sect members were not wearing crash helmet while riding their motorbikes for a funeral procession. In retaliation, the members attacked and destroyed the Dustsen Tanshi Police Station on July 26. This raised the curtain for a wave of unrest that swept through Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Kastina and Yobe States (Anumudu, *et al*, 2015, p. 5). The revolt ended on July 30, following the arrest of Mohammed Yusuf in his residence. After a few hours in police custody, the police killed Yusuf extra-judicially: police officials claimed that he was trying to escape. Over eight hundred people, mainly sect members, were killed

during the revolt, and hundreds more were arrested (Onuoha cited in Anumudu *et al*, 2015& Eme, et.al, 2016).

After the 2009 crackdown, Boko Haram became disorganized and went underground for a year before resurfacing in 2010 as a full-blown terrorist group, with attacks on police, their stations and military barracks to avenge the supposed killings of Yusuf and other comrades (Awortu, 2015, p. 215). Furthermore, the group carried out jailbreaks to free members and demanded prosecution of Yusuf killers, release of detained colleagues, restoration of its destroyed mosque and compensation of members killed by troops (Awortu, 2015). Previously, the attacks were directed only at the security personnel and government officials but later, the attacks were widened to include innocent commuters, schools, bars traditional rulers, suspected collaborators against the sect and U. N. Agencies.

On new year eve of 2010, a bomb was detonated in a popular open-air fish restaurant and market, inside the grounds of the Mogadishu barracks, just outside Abuja killing ten people (Anyadike, 2013). In September 2010, Boko Haram attacked a prison and killed about five guards and freed over seven hundred (700) inmates including former sect members (Ogege, 2013, p. 84). On Christmas eve of the same year, six bombs were detonated near churches and markets in two districts of Jos Plateau State killing scores of people. In the early months of 2011, the Boko Haram's areas of operations widened beyond the original focus of police and other authorities. In February 2011, a pharmacist in Maiduguri not believed to have had any previous connection to the group's treatment by the police was murdered and large amount of cash and medical supplies were taken from the shop (Awortu, 2015, p. 216). Since financial resources and other commodities were needed for its nefarious activities, the sect did not spare to rob the banks, cash-in-transit convoys, and flourishing businesses not only in Maiduguri but also in Bauchi. In April 2011, Boko Haram exploded four bombs in Maiduguri, killing at least three persons (Ogege, 2013). In June 2011, Boko Haram bombed the National Police Headquarters in Abuja: a car laden with explosives drove into the compound of Louis Edet House, a block of offices and was detonated killing dozens of people (Awortu, 2015). In August 2011, a man drove a car into the United Nations Compound in Abuja and denoted a massive bomb, killing twenty three people and wounding scores of other people (Anyadike, 2013). In order to spread its campaign in 2011, Boko Haram also attacked churches. The bombing of St. Theresa's Catholic Church, Madalla outside Abuja on Christmas eve was the deadliest in that year.

According to Ogege (2013) Boko Haram attacked some southerners in Mubi, killing about thirteen Igbos on 6th January, 2012. In January, 2012 three groups of gunmen and suicide bombers coordinated attacks on three government buildings in Kano – the police headquarters, the office of the immigration services and state security service, more than two hundred people were killed (Awortu, 2015). In February, 2012, a bomb blast hit St. Finbars Church Rayfied in Jos near the government house and 19 people were killed. Others include: office of this Day Newspaper in Abuja and Kaduna, the Catholic Chapel in Bayero University, Kano and Cattle market in Yobe State killing dozens of people (Awortu, 2015).

The incidence of Boko Haram attacks continued unabated in 2013. On January 20, Boko Haram ambushed a Nigerian Army Convoy in Kogi State killing 2 officers and injuring 8 others (Ogege, 2013, p. 84). In the same month, at least 8 civilians were killed in Maiduguri on January 23, as gunfire was reported from parts of the city. On March 18, 2013, a suicide bomber suspected to be Boko Haram attacked a bus station in predominantly Christian area of Kano, killing 41 passengers and injuring dozens more. Again, on June 16, 2013, a team of suspected Islamist militants attacked a school in Damaturu, killing 13 people including students and teachers. Three days later a similar attack in the city of Maiduguri left nine students dead (Ogege, 2013).

There have been increased incidence of Boko Haram attacks and abductions in various states of Northern Nigeria in 2014. On Monday April 14, there was a bomb blast in Nyanya District of Abuja killing about 75 people and leaving not less than 215 others injured. On the same day, specifically, on the night of 14 – 15 April, 2014, over 250 school girls were abducted by the Boko Haram group from a Government Girls Secondary in Chibok, Bornu State (Gilbert 2014, p. 151 – 152). In addition, on May 5, 2014, about 300 people were killed in the night, and 11 more girls abducted in Gamboru Ngala border town with Cameroun (Obamwonyi & Owenvbiugie 2015, p. 40). On June 3, 2014 100 people were killed in three villages of Attagara, Agapa Lawa and Aganjara in Gworza local government area of Borno State. Similarly, on July 4, 2014, 45 people were killed by the sect and many injured in Bargari village in Konduga Local Government Area of the same state (Obamwonyi & Ownevbiugie, 2015). The incidence of Boko Haram attacks took a dangerous dimension in 2015 and even extended up to 2016. See Table 1.

Table 1: Boko Haram attacks from 2015 to 2016

S/N	Date	Place of Attack	Nature of Attack	Number of Casualties
1.	2/1/2015	Waza, Cameroon	Shooting	11 people died
2.	10/1/2015	Northern Eastern city of Maiduguri	Suicide bombing	19 people killed
3.	11/1/2015	Market in Northeastern city of Potiskum	Suicide bombing	3 people killed
4.	12/1/2015	Kolofala, Cameroon	Shooting	1 people (military) killed while 143-300 Boko Haram killed
5.	18/1/2015	North Cameroon (village)	Kidnapping and shooting	80 people kidnapped and 3 people killed
6.	24/1/2015	Village of Kambari near Maiduguri	Shooting and burning	15 people killed
7.	25/1/2015	Maiduguri	Offensive attack on Nigerian forces (but failed)	8 civilians, 53 Boko Haram and unknown soldiers killed
8.	28/1/2015	Adamawa State	Shooting	40 people killed
9.	1/2/2015	Maiduguri, Borno State, Yobe and Gombe	Shooting, suicide bombing	13 people killed
10.	2/2/2015	City of Gombe	Suicide bombing	1 person died and 18 people injured
11.	4/2/2015	Fotokol, Cameroon	Shooting	-----
12.	6/2/2015	Bosso and Diffa town in Niger Republic	-----	5 people killed and 109 Boko Haram killed
13.	9/2/2015	Diffa, Niger Republic	Prison break	-----
14.	12/2/2015	Northeastern of Maiduguri Biu	Suicide bombing	8 people killed
15.	13/2/2015	Ngouboua village	Shooting with	-----
		Chad	motor boats	
16.	14/2/2015	Gombe	-----	-----
17.	15/2/2015	Damaturu	Suicide bombing	16 people killed and 30 injured
18.	20/2/2015	Chibok, Borno state	-----	34 people killed
19.	22/2/15	Postiskum (market)	Suicide bombing	5 people killed & many injured
20.	24/2/2015	Bus station in Potiskum and kano	Suicide bombing	At least 27 people killed
21.	26/2/2015	Biu and Jos	Bombing	35 people killed
22.	7/3/2015	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing	54 people killed and 143 injured
23.	28/2/2015	Damaturu	Suicide bombing	Up to 4 people killed

24.	15/5/2015	Marte Local government, Borno State	Shooting	12 people killed
25.	16/5/2015	Damaturu	Suicide bombing	7 persons died and 30 injured
26.	21/5/2015	Uba L.G.A and Gatamwarwa Village of Chibok L.G.A	Shooting	20 people killed
27.	29/5/2015	-----	-----	6 people killed
28.	2/6/2015	Market in Maiduguri Borno State	Bombing	27 people killed and more than 30 people injured
29.	5/6/2015	Yola Adamawa State and Maiduguri, Borno State	Suicide bombing	27 people killed and 3 injured
30.	15/6/2015	Damaturu Potiskmn. Yobe State	Suicide Bombing	10 people killed and 12 injured
31.	28/6/2015	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing	3 people killed and 16 injured
32.	30/6/2015	Musarram Village, Borno State	Shooting	48 people killed and 17 injured
33.	1/7/2015	Molai, Borno State	Suicide bombing	2 people injured
34.	1/7/2015	Kukawa, Borno State	Shooting	97 people killed
35.	2/07/2015	-----	Bomb blast	12 killed
36.	3/07/2015	Borno	Shooting	29 killed
37.	3/07/2015	Maiduguri		61 killed
38.	5/07/2015		Suicide bombing	6 killed
39.	5/07/2015	Jos, Plateau	Shooting	51 killed
40.	6/07/2015	Kano	Suicide bombing	1 killed
41.	7/07/2015	-----	Suicide bombing	4 killed
42.	7/07/2015	Zaria, Kaduna	Bomb blast	25 killed
43.	7/07/2015	Kaduna	Bomb blast	41 killed
44.	10/07/2015		Shooting	8 killed
45.	10/07/2015	Mongino, Borno		45 killed
46.	11/07/2015	Borno	Bomb explosion	4 killed
47.	11/07/2015	Borno		1 1 killed

48.	13/07/2015	Maiduguri	Bomb blast	1 killed
49.	13/07/2015	Borno		30 killed
50.	14/07/2015	Borno		15 killed
51.	14/07/2015	Ngamdu		20 killed
52.	16/07/2015	Gombe		50 killed
53.	17/07/2015	Damatoru		50 killed
54.	20/07/2015	Damaturu		8 killed
55.	21/07/2015			2 killed
56.	21/07/2015			8 killed
57.	22/07/2015	Gombe	Bomb blast	37 killed
58.	24/07/2015	Borno	Burning	18 killed
59.	24/07/2015			25 killed
60.	26/07/2015		Suicide bombing	22 killed
61.	27/07/2015	Borno		29 killed
62.	30/07/2015			7 killed
63.	31/07/2015	Maiduguri		13 killed
64.	1/08/2015	Borno		13 killed
65.	2/08/2015	Maiduguri		8 killed
66.	4/08/2015	Baga		10 killed
67.	6/08/2015	Yobe village		9 killed
68.	9/08/2015	Borno		4 killed
69.	11/08/2015	Maiduguri		8 killed
70.	11/08/2015	Borno	Bomb blast	47 killed
71.	15/08/2015	Borno	Suicide bomb	5 killed
72.	17/08/2015	Borno		7 killed

73.	18/08/2015	Yobe	Drown	160 killed
74.	21/08/2015	Borno	Explosion	2 killed
75.	23/08/2015		Shooting	11 killed
76.	25/08/2015	Maiduguri	Suicide bomb	2 killed
77.	25/08/2015	Yobe	Suicide bomb	8 killed & 20 injured
78.	25/08/2015			24 killed
79.	27/08/2015			4 killed
80.	28/08/2015	Borno		68 killed
81.	29/08/2015			24 killed
82.	30/08/2015	Yobe		10 killed
83.	31/08/2015	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing	26 killed & 28 injured
84.	31/08/2015			4 killed
85.	2/09/2015			5 killed
86.	3/09/2015	Borno		53 killed
87.	4/09/2015	Borno		30 killed
88.	11/09/2015	Adamawa	Suicide bomb	5 killed
89.	11/09/2015	Yola IDp camp	Bomb blast	10 killed
90.	20/09/2015	Mongun		27 killed
91.	20/09/2015	Maiduguri	Bombing	117 killed
92.	24/09/2015	Monguna, Baga		20 killed
93.	27/09/2015			20 killed
94.	1/10/2015	Adamawa		11 killed
95.	1/10/2015	Maiduguri	Suicide bomb	15 killed
96.	2/10/2015	Gwoza		20 killed
97.	6/10/2015	Gubio mosque	Bomb explosion	20 killed
98.	7/10/2015	Yobe	Multiple blast	18 killed
99.	10/10/2015	Borno		3 killed
100.	12/10/2015			14 killed
101.	13/10/2015	Maiduguri	Blasts	7 killed

102 .	15/10/2015	Maiduguri	Bombs	35 killed
103 .	16/10/2015	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing	30 killed
104 .	17/10/2015	Adamawa		12 killed
105 .	21/10/2015			20 killed
106 .	23/10/2015	Maiduguri		28 killed
107 .	23/10/2015	Yola	Bombing	50 killed
108 .	24/10/2015	Borno	Suicide bomb	5 killed
109 .	25/10/2015		Suicide bombing	4 killed
110 .	28/10/2015	Yobe		20 killed
111 .	7/11/2015	Yola	Blast	34 killed & 80 injured
112 .	18/11/2015	Kano	Twin suicide bombing	19 killed
113 .	20/11/2015	Fika village		7 killed
114 .	27/11/2015			21 killed
115 .	12/12/2015			30 killed
116 .	15/12/2015			2 killed
117 .	25/12/2015	Borno		14 killed
118 .	30/01/2016	Dalori, Borno State	Shooting, burning	86 killed and about 100 injured
119 .	14/03/2016	Village of Mussa, Askira/Uba LGA Borno State	Explosion	15 dead and 6 injured
120 .	16/03/2016	Umunari area of Maiduguri	Suicide Bombers	25 killed and 17

Source: Timeline of Boko Haram (2015); Boko Haram (2015); Nurudeen (2015); Idegu (2015); Nyam *et al* (2015); Soriwu *et al* (2015); Olanrewaju (2015); Miringa (2015); Duku (2015); New Telegraphy (2015); Idowu (2015) and Olanrewaju (2015); Odinaka (2016); Metro list (2015); Oni, Adetayo and Idowu (2016).

BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY: ITS IMPLICATION FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria have adversely affected all sectors of national development. It militates against economic, social and political development of the country. Boko Haram insurgency undermines foreign investments in Nigeria. Investors from various countries are not confident to invest in Nigeria because of security challenges. Many countries discourage their nationals from doing business in Nigeria. This is detrimental to economic and social transformation. According to the (UNCTAD) report, Foreign

Direct Investment (FDI) flows to Nigeria fell to \$6.1 billion (N933.3 billion) in 2010, a decline of about 29 percent from the \$8.65 billion (N1.33 trillion) realized in 2009 fiscal year. Also statistics obtained from the 2010 annual report by the Central Bank of Nigeria showed that the total foreign capital inflow into the Nigerian economy in 2010 was \$5.99 billion. The record showed that FDI represented about 78.1 percent drop from \$3.31 billion in 2009 (Okereoha, 2012). Therefore, the objective of vision 20:2020 which projects Nigeria to be world economic power by 2020 cannot be achieved due to Boko Haram insurgency.

Boko Haram insurgency has destroyed economic and commercial activities in the affected northern states. For example, in Maduguri, Borno State, where the sect originated, the frequent bombings and clashes between Boko Haram and security agents have weighed down seriously on commercial and business activities in the city as many businesses have reportedly crumbled, while many people have fled the state (Anumudu *et al* 2015, p. 7). The Maduguri Monday market is the most affected as hundreds of shop owners mainly southerners have closed their businesses. About half of the 10, 000 shops and stalls in the market were said to have been abandoned by traders who have fled the city (Anumudu *et al*, 2015). In Kano, many Indians and Lebanese expatriates who established businesses have relocated to Abuja and southern Nigeria and a good number of them have left the country. It is estimated 126 industries have recently closed down (Anumudu *et al*, 2015). The story is not quite different from Jos, the plateau state capital. Before the advent of Boko Haram, the city was booming in commercial and business activities but because of persistent attacks of Boko Haram and other ethno-religious crisis, the city has witnessed so much carnage that businesses are no more thriving. Many business concerns have abandoned the city and moved out their investments. Though, the city is not reputed as an industrial city, it is noted for its tourism potentials which have contributed to national economy (Eric, *et al*, 2008). Today, Jos has been abandoned as tourist destination in Nigeria. Boko Haram fundamentalists have also affected the working hours of the banks in northern parts of this country. According to Mohammed (2012, p. 2) “commercial banks have been forced to review their operational hours to begin from 9.am to 12.00 noon as against the normal operational period of 8.00am to 4.00pm. It is beyond doubt that Boko Haram insurgency has crippled business and commercial activities in the affected northern states in Nigeria.

Boko Haram insurgency has also caused serious setbacks to government efforts in provision of infrastructural facilities, employment generation, improved workers welfare etc. This is because huge amount of funds are needed to fight the menace of Boko Haram. A situation where funds allocated to security alone is almost equal to funds allocated to education, health and critical infrastructure combined in a fiscal year as in case with Nigeria is detrimental to national development (Adebayo, 2013).

Education is the corner stone of national development in all parts of the world. Every society gives adequate attention to her educational growth and development. It is a sad commentary that Boko Haram attack on schools, kidnapping of school girls and killing of students and teachers will definitely undermine present and future development of this country. Boko Haram insurgency will also increase the rate of illiteracy in the country, thereby facilitating the rise in poverty. According to Awortu (2013, p. 217) “Boko Haram attacks on educational sector will impoverish Nigeria in the near future”.

It is worthy to note that Boko Haram activities have also adversely affected the political level of governance. It militates against the effective functioning of government institutions and also results in lack of trust and suspicion among the Nigerian political leaders. This is a serious threat to our new found democracy. The menace of Boko Haram has also undermined the corporate existence of Nigerian’s sovereignty. According to Awortu (2015, p. 218) “Boko Haram’s attacks have deepened religious and regional fault lines reversing some of the country’s hard won gains in building national unity and stability.” The assaults on Christians and churches and its perceived goal of Islamizing northern Nigeria and even the whole country is a serious threat to national integration. If the Boko Haram insurgency is not tackled effectively, it could result in disintegration of the country.

The activities of Boko Haram have strained the relationship between Nigeria and other countries of the world. Due to killings, bombing, kidnapping and hostage taking of foreigners, other nations particularly the United States of America and other European countries warn their citizens to stay away from the affected zones in Nigeria. Based on the above mentioned analysis, it can be deduced that Boko Haram insurgency is a serious challenge to national development in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We have examined Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and determine its implication for national development. The insecurity challenge posed by Boko Haram attacks militates against foreign investments, cripple business and commercial activities in the Northern Nigeria, undermines corporate existence of Nigeria's sovereignty and retards educational development and provision of infrastructural facilities. The following recommendations would help to address the menace of Boko Haram and consequently fasten socio-economic and political development of the country.

1. Convicted sponsors and sources of funding of Boko Haram insurgency should not be allowed to hold any public office in Nigeria.
2. Political leaders at all level of governance should spread the message of national integration. They should strive to inculcate the spirit of patriotism among the people instead of making statements that would arouse religious sentiments.
3. Since Nigeria is a secular state where there is no state religion, the government should endeavour to make the policies that would guarantee the secular nature of the country.
4. The government should introduce those policies that will facilitate poverty alleviation. The government at all levels should give adequate attention to employment generation for the teeming population.
5. The government should empower the security forces with modern weapons and other necessary logistics to curb Boko Haram insurgency.

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