



The Qarabagh Crisis and Its Consequences on the Foreign Policy of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan

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Abstract: *The present issue well known as the Qarabagh crisis was unbiasedly from 1988 to 1994, followed by military conflicts that in the long run prompted the occupation of 20 percent of the land of the Republic of Azerbaijan by Armenia. This occurrence was even more heightened and aggregated in the 1980s. Despite that in 1994, with the mediation of countries such as Iran, Russia, Turkey and the Minsk Group, cease-fire was approved by the two countries involved in, namely Azerbaijan and Armenia, and even the United Nations recognized the occupation of Qarabagh by Armenia and condemned this occupation. Still up to this date, no solution is offered. No need to elucidate the fact that the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has not been capable of resolving the territorial issues of the two countries along the lines of our national interests because it concludes to the divergence of Azerbaijan from Iran and also the solid presence and strong role of the opponent and opposing states like Israel and the United States in the internal equations and international relations of this country don't permits Iran to determine or resolve aforementioned conflict. Regarding constructivism and taking into account the ideology perspective, back up for Qarabagh Muslims is additionally anticipated.*

Keywords: *Qarabagh Crisis, Foreign Policy of Iran, Azerbaijan.*

INTRODUCTION

The Qarabagh crisis, in addition to the incidents that engendered the control of 20 percent of the total kingdom of the Republic of Azerbaijan by Armenia, displaced a population of approximately one million and killed more than 30 thousand people, had a profound effect on the structure, security, economics, politics, convergence and divergence of the area and the unique geopolitical and strategic position of the Caucasus region have also been exposed to an extreme crisis since the autonomy of the Caucasian republics after the dismantle of the former Soviet Union. A crisis that has profound impact not only over the countries involved in the conflict (Azerbaijan and Armenia), but also the bordering countries, such as Turkey, Iran, Georgia and Russia, and exerted influence over all aspects of the foreign policy of the two countries. Also, this crisis has promoted the involvement of powers outside the region, such as the United States, the Minsk Group and Israel, which, in turn, makes it difficult to be resolved. The developments in the region have become even more intense. In the meantime, it should be accentuated that the Qarabagh crisis has exacerbated the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran very extensively. Hence, despite the accentuation of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic on the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the sentence "Qarabagh is the Soil of Islam," in a speech between the people of Tabriz in 1992 and the upcoming several years as well in a meeting with Heydar Aliyev, the head of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Region of Nakhchivan.

Although the policies adopted by the political and governmental men of I. R.I not only couldn't fulfill the supreme leader's recommendation but also couldn't get approval of the two opposite sides of the Aras river's parties and simultaneously was not even capable to resolve the conflicts and even couldn't persuade the critiques. This has, to a certain degree, been an outcome of Iran's lack of dynamism, which can be examined in terms of economically, politically, military, security, religious, cultural and social aspects.

The roots of the crisis Qarabagh

Each crisis is deeply caused and shaped by various and different factors that have been engendered over a wide span of time and have survived and come to the forefront. The conflict or the occupation of the Qarabagh is no exception. The crisis that has appered from 1988 to 1994 as a military conflict between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia, which led to the control of 20% of the Azerbaijani lands by Armenia, is still ongoing conflict. It has deep roots in history, identity, racial and religious beliefs, and in order to better understand the crisis, there is a necessity to clarify a number of its roots. We will briefly mention it below and will touch upon some. The Qarabagh crisis is one of the initial and prolonged ethnic conflicts in the Soviet Union. The crisis is one of the few post-Cold War disputes that have wide range and is of high complexity. The contradiction inherent in the nature of this autonomous region has prompted a conflict, if not considered inevitable, pave the way for the pressure of the external factor. The situation in the Qarabagh Autonomous Region has been aggregated by a number of external issues. These factors contributed to the possibility of a conflict and were at the center of the conflict. The long-standing compelling cause of the crisis follow-up in the Qarabagh is the continuity and complexity of this conflict, which sometimes remains confused with the clap, implies the roots of the controversy. The Qarabagh conflict in itself and in its nature is an ethnic conflict enjoying historical and political backgrounds (Vaezi, 2008: 158-157).

Consequences of Iran's Foreign Policy in the Qarabagh Crisis

At a time when politicians of the security and foreign policy based their judgements upon the time and place conditions and acted in accordance with the national interests of Iran and as well, adopt a policy of neutrality of the crisis and mediation on the aforementioned crisis, they set national security conditions at the top of their agenda.

But as the developments of this crisis brought about a steady flow accompanied with the cease-fire, the consequences of the Qarabagh policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran became more transparent and presented itself on a more diverse scale.

More specifically, Iran's performance in the area of Qarabagh has been endorsed by Armenia and Azerbaijan's sharp criticism, which has had a negative influence over the scope of relations between the two neighboring Shia Muslims and has profoundly affected the relations between the two countries.

Along with the negative impacts of Iran's Qarabagh policy on Iran-Azerbaijan relations, there are other negative effects in various fields for the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the expansion of the political and military presence of Israel and the United States, particularly Israel along the Northern borders of Iran and the Caspian Sea, loss of huge economic capacity of Azerbaijan, as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia, political tension with the Republic of Azerbaijan, and as a result the lack of proper political-ideological and cultural influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, severe criticism of Iran's dual ideological behavior in not supporting the Muslims of Azerbaijan in the Karabakh war and the destruction of the religious aspect of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the increase of Turkish nationalism on the two sides of the Aras between Azerbaijanis, in particular, Azerbaijani Iran, and the split of the two-Azerbaijani alliance, plus other factors and issues that will be discussed in detail below.

It is a prerequisite to acknowledge that some part negative impacts of this crisis were completely natural. Iran's regional and foreign policy toward the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Qarabagh conflict have not been highly overshadowed by Iran, and Iran has also been under the influence of these incidents, and the components of the crisis have played a determining role in shaping these developments. But the fractious part of these consequences, which has somehow exacerbated the regional and even domestic policies of the Islamic Republic

of Iran and creating problems; security and military problems, creating and giving hard time for the legal regime of the Caspian Sea and other problems and other consequences which altogether are induced as a result of Iran's Qarebagh performance and approach at the level of relations with Azerbaijan.

Security Consequences and Military

The notion of security in the ongoing world has been subject to a tremendous modification. In the current era, only external security is not interpreted as security and there is a wider scope of hazards. For a long time, the construct of security was relied upon the power relations between countries, and more particularly as a defense against foreign invasion. Although economic and political plans are crucial considering their impacts on military capabilities as a result nowadays, one-dimensional definitions of security are becoming less important and discarded

Consequently, the concept of security enjoys several national values and consists of several interconnected values. Threats are not identifiable, but they can be defined (Vosoughi, 2009: p. 1). Accordingly, if we look at the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Caucasus, apart from military components, it should also political, economic, ethnic-identity and ideological issues be considered and understood that national security is reliant on regional security. As a result of which, the Qarebagh crisis per se is a security threat for both Iran and the entire region. Meanwhile, the adaptation of regional and international powers from this identity crisis has caused additional security risks for the Islamic Republic of Iran. For instance, Turkey's efforts and influence on the Republic of Azerbaijan and the spread of ideas of Pan-Turkism are of the same ilk. Another factor is the threat of tensions made by state-building in the area and the displacement of government officials in the Caucasus countries, which, due to lack of a rational and legal process, has caused economic and social and political crises or even a coup (Vosoghi, 2009: p. 8). In addition to aforementioned factors and variables, the political, political and economic presence of Iran's opponent countries such as the United States, Israel and NATO's security services in the area, particularly in Azerbaijan, is the biggest security challenge encountering Iran beyond its northern borders. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the regaining its autonomy in 1991, the Republic of Azerbaijan, due to potential threats from Russia, Iran and Armenia, put its foreign policy closer to European countries, the United States, Turkey and the Israeli regime. And in fact, transcendent relations to ensure its security. In the same vein, cooperation with NATO and the United States was on the agenda of Baku. In a way, the officials of the country clearly talked about the willingness of the Republic of Azerbaijan to join NATO and the hosting of the military base of the organization on the territory of the country.

Relations of NATO with the Republic of Azerbaijan grew after the September 11 terrorist attacks, and military cooperation between the two sides entered the operational phase. In fact, the Republic of Azerbaijan is pursuing two important goals in expanding its relations with NATO and the United States. First, the recapture of their occupied lands from Armenia through NATO's political and military support, and the other for NATO support in the event of possible military threats from Russia, Armenia and Iran. In the meantime, the presence of NATO in the region directly threatens the security of the borders of Iran. This presence, which was launched in the wake of the Qarabagh conflict, is one of the main security concerns of Iran and its challenges. So that the two countries of Iran and Azerbaijan are facing each other in a row. The United States has been resuming a military presence in the region and in the immediate vicinity of Iran. In the summer of 1998-1997, the United States conducted joint military exercises in the Caspian region with the participation of US military units, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. According to the "Rasha" News website, even US advisers have considered two regions, one near Baku, and one in the south of the country near the Iranian border to deploy US forces in the Republic of Azerbaijan, in fact part of the military bases Americans are moving near the borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan with Iran.

The United States intends to create an air defense system in the Republic of Azerbaijan to prevent a possible missile attack on Iran, a threat to Iran. In this way, the United States will be moving away from Iran with excessive proximity to the Republic of Azerbaijan. US military cooperation with the Azerbaijani Republic, the possible US use of the country to attack Iran and Iran's susceptibility to their military relations have been

among other influences of US influence in the political relations between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, although the Baku-Washington relations have a particular complexity due to the strong Armenian lobby in the US Congress, this relationship is important for the United States, which gives Washington power over its influence in Baku to A region for pressure on Iran and Russia. In this regard, the United States has declared Caspian to be of vital interest since 1997, for example, the Caspian Guard, which was proposed by the Pentagon in 2003, and the US embassy in Baku was tasked with implementing it. The implementation of this plan was the best excuse for the United States to consider the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran by deploying a military base in the region (Abbasi, Mousavi, 2013: p. 15).

Political implications

The Republic of Azerbaijan is deemed a Shia country, and considering its geographical neighborhood and the historical and cultural ties of its population with Iranians, relations between the two countries are close, while evidence suggests that relations with time gradually grew to be cold and with distrust and distress. Azerbaijan among the policies of Iran in the Caucasus region plays a central and decisive role. Though Iran and Azerbaijan have common historical, cultural and religious links, the relations between Tehran and Baku are often under the influence of the strategic relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey and the United States, and the two countries' differences in the legal regime of the Caspian Sea has prevented the expansion of relations. The loyalty of the political system of Azerbaijan and its tendency to nationalism, along with its foreign policy, has also been of concern to Iran. From the point of view of Iran, the important position of the West in Azerbaijan's foreign policy, especially Baku's relations with the United States and Israel, is giving rise to Iran's concerns.

Also, Iran's points of view on Caspian Sea issues and its energy lines are divergent from those of Azerbaijan (islamtimes.org). In opposition, on the part of the Azerbaijani Republic, the policy of not joining Iran with Azerbaijan in the Qarebagh war, and against cordial relations with Armenia, Iran's support for the Islamists of Azerbaijan and the denial of teaching in their mother tongue to Azerbaijani Iran are among the factors that, from the point of view of the Republic of Azerbaijan, has caused cold political relations between the two countries. The coolness of the relations between Iran and Azerbaijan, especially since the Qarebagh War, and the keen criticism of the heads of state of Azerbaijan, especially Ilchibe (Ellichi Bei), began with Iran's policies toward the Qarebagh conflict and channeled its relations with Iran.

Another issue that undermines the relations between the two countries is the religious activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Azerbaijan, a secular state. Iran's leaders in their relationship with the Republic of Azerbaijan clearly emphasize Islam and religion. After the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, it is widely claimed that Iran has been trying to export its Islamic revolution and has spent millions of dollars for this purpose in Azerbaijan. Iran is engaged in religious propaganda in the Republic of Azerbaijan from clerics who Iran is trained. Azerbaijan, which considers itself as a secular system, Iran's propaganda and activities on the Shiites of Azerbaijan are a threat to their sovereignty, and they often discontented once and for all. There are numerous examples of Iran's influence in Azerbaijan. For instance, the Voice of Islam, published and distributed in Azerbaijan, is sponsored by Iran, or the Sahar Network, which plans for the Taliban areas of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The network speaks in close proximity to Iran in the areas of Talesh. The Iranian TV program, which is available in Azerbaijan, is full of Iranian religious values. In addition to the Sahar TV network, the Iranian government has launched the Sahar 2 Network, which operates in English and Russian in Azerbaijan. Opponents of the network's activity say that the network has just been broadcasting clerical (religious) programs. In this network, the veil is advertised for women (Javadi Arjmand, 1993: p. 5).

Among the other issues that led to tension between the two countries, is accusing Iran of supporting radical Islamic groups in the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan believes that the Iranian government has been declared illegal by the Islamic Party in 1996 and that it supports the secret circles of Hezbollah and Azerbaijan's jihad. Hezbollah and Jaysallah are secret currents established in Azerbaijan in 1993 and 1995. Their goal was to attack the interests of the West, including the United States in Baku and the Republic of Adjara. Officials in Baku state that the group's activities have been prohibited since 1996, but their members

continue to receive financial assistance from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course, in the late 1990s, Heydar Aliyev banned the activities of Iranian clerics in mosques.

In 2001, the Azerbaijani government shutdown 22 religious schools sponsored by Iran (Javadi Arjmand, 1993: p. 5-6).

The overall framework of foreign policy of Azerbaijan has been framed by Heydar Aliyev according to regional and global requirements (the new structural realism approach), and this framework is still acting as the dominant paradigm. Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan states the principles of foreign policy of the country. In this article the formation of Azerbaijan's relations with other countries is rested upon particular international principles that are in line with international rules. In the official statement of the Azerbaijani government, which centralized upon the priority of foreign policy in the country, it can be mentioned in some cases that they are in essence one of the foundations. These include:

- ✓ 1. Promoting the principles of democracy based on free market economics and legality.
- ✓ 2. The independence of foreign policy with the aim of independence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.
- ✓ 3. The development of better neighborly relations based on mutual benefits with neighboring countries.
- ✓ 4. Creation Security and stability in the region. But at the head of all foreign policy approaches and programs, the restoration of territorial integrity and the removal of Armenian occupation.

Against that is the principles of Iranian foreign policy based on the components of the Islamic Revolution and based on the Islamic law. That is, it is based on three Islamic, revolutionary and national approaches (Fala'ah, 2016: p. 7).

If we analyze the Qarabagh policy or the Caucasus foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran built on the components of revolution and Islamic ideology, we will encounter a fundamental contradiction. On the basis of these components, Iran should, in principle, strongly support Azerbaijan in the Qarabagh war, which was not the case, and if we consider the basis of analysis based on realism and nationalism in Iran's foreign policy, there is again a fundamental objection that Tehran Has not been able to balance the relationship with the Caucasus, and the material benefits have not been well considered in this regard, and this policy has had serious negative consequences in the South Caucasus region, especially in relation to Azerbaijan.

Regardless of the fact that Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan have faced many ups and downs in the past two decades, despite the many obstacles and challenges in the path of the two countries, the extent of interactions between the two countries has always been at a low level. Most of the differences between the two countries are rooted in the nature of political systems and their competition within the regional and international categories. The formation of the political system of Azerbaijan based on the separation of religion from politics and the pattern of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not based on the relation between religion and politics (Abbasi Mousavi et al., 2013: p. 17). Two opposing government systems from two Shiite and neighboring Muslim countries have contradicted bilateral relations. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which is the supporter of Shiite Muslims in the world, is in the middle of the second-largest Shiite world in deep conflict, which has called into question the authority of Iran's religious ideology. This is while the main regional rivals of Iran in the ideological and religious domain, namely, Saudi Arabia, and, to a certain extent, Turkey as the three most important countries of the world of Islam and Sunni religion, which have a large population, both military and religiously owned. There is a lot of credibility, they do not recognize the existence of Armenia because of the occupation of Islam (20% of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan) and have broken ties with this country, and despite the fact that Azerbaijan has a Shiite religion, they stand completely alongside the country. In the same vein, Saudi ex-ambassador to Azerbaijan Fahd bin Ali al-Dussari said during a meeting with Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, Foreign Minister Elmar Mohammad Yarab that Saudi Arabia has not been restored until the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is restored and the interests of the Baku government are not resolved in the Qarabagh conflict, Armenia does not hold diplomatic relations (fa. trent.az). Also, the former president of Pakistan, Mamnoon Hussein, pointing out that his country was one of the first countries to recognize the independence

of the Republic of Azerbaijan, stated that Pakistan has had very good relations with the Azerbaijani government and people from the outset. He added that the Islamabad government has always supported the positions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and will support the Muslim country in Qarabagh conflict zone (news, irib.ir). And Turkey has taken a clear position in favor of Azerbaijan. In contrast to the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is the flagship of Shiite Islam, contrary to these Sunni countries, Armenia has adopted a different and friendly approach. It has criticized the political dimension of Islamic-Shi'ite discourse and Iran's foreign policy performance strongly among the public opinion of the Islamic world and has been at the top of the crisis for Tehran's rivals.

In this vein, one of the aims of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to extend a consensus in between the Islamic countries to confront Israel and back up Palestine. But this has not been totally accomplished, because many Muslim countries with Israel have political-economic ties and one of which is Azerbaijan. After the autonomy and control of its kingdom by the Armenians, Azerbaijan did not attain efficient support from Iran, and, against the blockade of Russia, Armenia, Iran, turned its own into the West, particularly Israel, which could take advantage of the Jewish lobby, Israeli military technology and its potent economy.

And with the creation of the Azerbaijani-Turkish bloc, Israel established a balance of power in the Caucasus area, which has had a devastating impact on Iran, along with its military and economic aspects. The other political implications of the Qarabagh crisis and Tehran's performance in Iran's dispute with Iran were the lack of back up and support of Azerbaijan from Iran in international forums and nuclear issues and sanctions against Iran. Due to the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not been able to draw Azerbaijan's confidence, it has not gained international support from the international community, and this has also led to a cooling relationship between the two countries. For instance, at the zenith of the nuclear crisis between Iran and the West and Iran's restriction of focussing Iran's nuclear power plants charged Tehran with accusing Baku of putting Israel on its domain to aim Iran's nuclear power plants and military limitation. Other political influences can be mentioned is the idea of the unification of Azerbaijan. The unity of the two Azerbaijanis is commonplace with the Soviet period, and, for example, the ideas and speeches of Heydar Aliyev, the man of the first issue of Azerbaijan in the Brezhnev era, and a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, noted in 1981 against a group of foreign diplomats expressing his sympathy for Azerbaijan in Azerbaijan speaks of the dreams of the Azerbaijani people for the unification of the two Azerbaijanis. Also, in the winter of 1989, the groups of the excited people of Nakhchivan moved to the Iranian border in the coast of Aras. And by removing the signs and frontiers of the border tried to erode their promise (the wall of Azerbaijan) as the wall of Berlin and to cross the Azerbaijan beyond the border.

Demonstrators had chanted the slogan of Azerbaijan's unification by assigning Tabriz as a capital of new Azerbaijan. Ilchibek, proudly speaking, was overjoyed to have played an active role in the demonstration near the Aras River and opening the border. Ilchibek also said on state television that "I see Tabriz every night, and I wish to go to Tabriz someday even crawling on my knees. After the independence of Azerbaijan, we are looking for an alliance with Azerbaijan in Iran. "This way of thinking intensified after the 1991 independence (1370s) and at the time of Ilchibek. In this context, the expansion of activities (unification of Azerbaijan as one) can be named. The main objective of this union is to "communicate the truth about the national and human rights of the 34 million Azerbaijani people living in Iran to the international community and their freedom." Today, Iran's most intense fear arise from the idea of "Torkchulugh" coming from the north of the Aras River (Abazari et al., 2012: p. 15). The Qarabagh crisis indirectly affected the idea of a united Azerbaijani alliance. So that with the coming of the Azerbaijani People's Front, which had a tendency towards Turkish nationalism, this idea was widely used both in the Azerbaijani society and among the public opinion and intellectuals of Azerbaijan in Iran, and to reach it the efforts and endeavors may be done.

The dearth of Iran's attachment to Azerbaijan in the Qarabagh War was also one of the other factors that made this kind of thinking more intense. In fact, the issue of the unification of Azerbaijan is one of the most important

political and even security challenges of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which takes on more complex issues every day and spreads through the Azerbaijani community of Iran.

Social Impacts

Foreign policy is the rest of the domestic and state policy or even better said it's the continuation of that. When a foreign policy is being designed and discourse is promoted and implemented outside the borders of the country, the internal factors and its positive and negative effects alongside the national borders should be carefully considered in the country as well. In some cases, because of the internal context, we see that a regional or international policy poses a severe negative impact on the territorial boundaries of the outside world. The Qarabagh crisis itself has had strong impacts on the structure of the South Caucasus region, which has benefited all the countries of the region, among which the Islamic Republic of Iran, for dearth of cooperation with the Muslim and Shia area of Azerbaijan, against Christian Armenia and the adoption of A policy different from the expectations of the Azerbaijani and Azerbaijani countries of Iran, has led to the impact of the external borders within the territorial boundaries affected by this type of performance. This social impact can be analyzed both racially and in the context of the struggles of nationalism, as well as the religious dimension that has deepened the gap between the state and the nation and the gap between centrality and ethnicity, one of the reasons for this kind of performance Tehran's policy toward.

Farahnaz meyal-al-Askar expresses in her article that: "Islamic Iran is among the countries that have a diverse ethnic group in their demographic structure." With this particular difference that in most polygyny countries, such as Canada, the United States and European countries, ethnic diversity is a product of different ethnic groups to these countries, but Iran is one of the few countries in which different ethnic groups are native to the land. One of the most important and problematic issues in the Middle East is the lack of coherence of political borders with ethnic and cultural boundaries. The political borders of our country are in the same way as the Turk, Kurdish, Arab, Baluch and Turkmen communities are located on both sides. And some of these tribes have spread in two, three, and even four countries. The extension of the political borders has always provided grounds for the interactions of these ethnic groups with transboundary developments and sometimes large and transnational powers also jeopardize the security of nations (Maelfashar, 2012: p. 2).

In the meantime, there are a lot of Persepolis in the Turks, which are mostly Azerbaijani Turks from different Turkic peoples in Iran - the Azerbaijani, Qashqai, Khalaji, Turk and Turkmen Turks. One of the vague issues in the demographic structure of Iran is the issue of the population of different ethnic groups, which is more ambiguous than the rest of the population. Azerbaijani nationalist activists consider the Turkish Turk population to be between 35 and 40 million, compared with 15-20 million centro-centric activists.

Here is the source of the news about the Iranian Turks. According to DurtaNews, so far, despite numerous requests by activists related to different linguistic communities in Iran to include language options in population censuses, so far, there has not been any official survey on this issue. As a result, there are no official statistics on the number of different linguistic populations in Iran. In the case of the Turkish Turks, Mr. Salehi, who served as the Foreign Minister for official visits to Turkey in 2012, pointed at the Snebugh airport, in response to the reporters' questions and to emphasize the depth of the relations between Iran and Turkey, which we have low and we have more common language, more than 40% of Iranian people speak Turkish, and this can be a very positive point in the relationship between the two countries .Even if we consider that the population of the Azerbaijani Turks is lower than this figure, it is necessary for decision makers in the field of domestic and foreign policy to pay special attention to the interests, demands, demands and ties of Azerbaijani people on both sides of Aras.

In this respect, it is essential to refer the Turkish nationalism in Iran. The origins of Turkish nationalism in Iran dates back to the era of the collapse of the Qajar Dynasty, the last Turkish monarchy in Iran. With the grasping of power by Reza Khan Pahlavi, who had an attitude of Persian aristocracy, and with the implementation of ethnic unification initiatives, Iranian Turks, especially Azerbaijanis, were in severe ethnic-economic-cultural constraints. Morteza Abazari and their colleagues believe that: The events of Azerbaijan's

Azerbaijan in 1945, when the Soviet government and the internal affairs of this event, constitute the most important attempt to independence of Azerbaijan.

The head of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Mirjafar Baghraf, writes in a report on Stalin to Iran's Azerbaijan, that the people of Azerbaijan in Iran during the Reza Shah era not only did not go to high authorities, but also prevented from reaching small and medium-sized positions. The Shah's government, having declared the Persian language as the official language, has imposed it on the Azerbaijani government agencies. The extreme nationalism of Reza Shah has caused the use of Turkish as the language of Turkish language schools, theaters and the media in the Turkish Turks, to be strictly prohibited.

Additionally, using some of the intellectuals of Azerbaijan, the Turks of Iran read the bastards, who were abandoned after the Mongols invaded and forced to distort history. The Pahlavi era for Turkish nationalism and Turkish is the darkest and most violent era. Discrimination against Reza Shah against Azerbaijan for their support of Sheikh Mohammad Khaybani uprising in 1920. (Abazari et al., 2012: 13).

In 1937, Azerbaijan was divided into two provinces. And some historical regions of Azerbaijan were added to other provinces. The continuation of Reza Shah's centralized policies and the discrimination against Azerbaijan and the commonality of business relations with the Soviet Union led to the migration of many Azerbaijani people to Tehran. World War II, a large number of middle-class Azerbaijanis came to Tehran to find job opportunities, and the ban on travel to the Soviet Union of Azerbaijan eliminated the employment of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the seasonal jobs, which was the most important source of Azerbaijani Iranians. Azerbaijani migration to Tehran led to the *asymilia* (getting away from the main identity), some of them in the people of Fars, revealing the differences between the Azerbaijanis and Persians, as well as the expansion of the separate Azerbaijani identity.

Despite the restrictions imposed by the Pahlavi regime, many Azerbaijani people were still inclined to establish ties with their ethnic groups in the Republic of Azerbaijan, which led to their Azerbaijani identity. One of the most important events in this period was the establishment of the state administration of Azerbaijan in 1945-1946. The establishment of this government and its subsequent implications have had a major impact on the development of Azerbaijani identity in Iran. In a statement by the state government, the leaders of the cult declared that Azerbaijan is a single nation. They did not demand separation from Iran and put forward three major demands: The use of Azerbaijani Turkish language in local schools and government departments led to the return of tax revenue to the region for development in different parts of the country and the establishment of a state constitution in accordance with the Constitution. The leader of the cult condemned Tehran for not paying attention to local demands and declared that the language, culture and history of this region gave the Azerbaijani nation a distinct national identity (Branda Schiffer, 2006: 73-78).

It is obvious that the climax of Azerbaijani nationalism during the Pahlavi regime came back to the events of the Free Movement led by Sheikh Mohammad Khaybani and the era of the Azerbaijani Democratic Party. However, after the Islamic Revolution, the emergence of a various Islamic militant system from the Pahlavi regime, which had an extreme nationalist tendency, grew again due to the favorable atmosphere after the Turkish nationalist revolution, which was suppressed after 1946.

In his book "Borders and Brotherhood," Branda Schiffer demonstrated that two professors of the University of Tabriz, after the revolution in Iran, have resembled Renaissance in the literature of Azerbaijan. Based upon Javad Heyat, director of the Varligh administration during 1979-1983, over 150 volumes of books were published in Azerbaijan, most of which were in literary, religious, linguistic, linguistic, and folklore areas. The new version of the Quran was translated into Azerbaijani Turkish by the Azerbaijani scholars of Qom Seminary in this period.

But it sought to suppress and dissolve the Muslim People's Party and the war, and after that, the nationalism of Azerbaijan was plagued. As long as the war broke out in the Qarabagh region, the identity of Azerbaijan was re-launched vastly in the wake of the killing of racial and religious groups alongside Aras and the controversial

policies of Tehran. So that the main motive that led to the strengthening of the national movement of Azerbaijan (according to the identities of Azerbaijan) or the Azerbaijani national movement.

In this respect, Abazi adds: Following these actions, on April 20, 1993, Azeri and non-Azari students at the University of Tabriz announced their protests against the Armenian and French (as one of the main sponsors of Armenia) and Called on the Iranian government to adopt a tougher stance against the Armenian government. Also, on April 24, 1991, Azeri students gathered at the Tehran University mosque, expressing their sympathy with the Azerbaijani people, called for the end of the Qarabagh War from Armenia.

At the recent gathering, which was held at the presence of Javad Hayat, director of the Turkish language magazine "Warliq" at the University of Law and Political Science of Tehran University, explicitly discussed the unification of Azerbaijan and Turkey. There were many announcements in this regard in Tehran and Tabriz, and some of these letters contained intense nationalist notions. As an example, announcements were made in Ardebil in September of 1993 by the Free Organization of the South Section, which emphasized history, culture, language, nationality, common national identity, and shared destiny (Abazari, 2012: p. 19). One of the eyewitnesses and the one who himself on the same day between the protesters at the University of Tehran and the mosque of Ahwaz district said that the present people, who were about 300-400 and went out of the mosque by slogging against Armenia and its supporters to the main gate of the university to exit from it, which was joined by 100 to 200 others. Despite the fact that the security and security forces prevented university students from leaving the students, protesting students could break the door to the Armenian embassy by dropping the door. They point out that with the withdrawal of protesters from the university and on the route, about 4-5 thousand Turkish and non-Turkish citizens joined the gathering and went to the Armenian embassy to express their solidarity with the people of Qarabagh.

This type of protests and demonstrations, which were undertaken not only in Tehran but also in Tabriz, Urmia and Ardebil, led to the consolidation and rebellion of the people of of Azerbaijan of Iran. Alongside nationalists, ordinary people and the intellectual circle of the protesters, along with identities, expressed their protests against the occupation of Qarabagh and the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran through demonstrations, statements, speeches and speeches. Even the demonstrations were not limited to that time alone, and protest events were organized by the Armenians of Tabriz on the anniversary of the Khojaly genocide. The demonstration took place on the anniversary of the killing of people of the Khojali area of the Qarabagh Republic of Azerbaijan by Armenians. It was accompanied by slogans calling for the abolition of Armenia, or the death of Azerbaijan, and ended with the involvement of police forces and throwing tear gas. Some people were arrested in this regard. The protests of thousands of Tabrizi in support of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which were unprecedented in their kind, could have a detrimental effect on Tehran's relations with Armenia (aftabnews.ir). The rise and growth of Azerbaijan's national movement in the wake of the developments in the Qarabagh led not only to the spread of nationalism within Iran, but also to an important factor in the announcement of the Azerbaijani politicians to officially declare their support to the Azerbaijani people of Azerbaijan. Ellichi Beag was one of the most prominent politicians who unequivocally declared his open support to the Azerbaijani people of Iran and to the nationalism of Azerbaijan. The creation of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in northern Azerbaijan in the part of the Azerbaijani monarchies in 1921-1918 (1909-1921 AD) and the re-establishment of it as the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1991 (1991) does not imply that the Azerbaijani National Liberation Movement has ended. The new phase will conclude with the redeployment of a single Azerbaijani state, the defeats we have suffered in our battles with Armenia in the 1980s and 90s (60-70 CE), due to the division of Azerbaijan, the remaining question is how to handle the Armenians, this is our destiny as a nation. If we want to make Qarabagh, we must release Tabriz (Abazari et al., 2012: p. 21). At a time when protests protested and led by Azerbaijani national activists in Tehran and Tehran University and in front of the embassy of Tehran, and with the spread of these tricks and protests to Tabriz, Urmia and Ardebil, Professor Javad Hayat, the director of the Turkish-Persian and Varligh magazine, conducted some diplomatic efforts in this vein. They stated that he would meet with Ellichi Beag in coordination with Akbar Velayati, the Minister of Foreign Affairs

of the time, to establish a Qarabagh Committee for the delivery of material and food aid, and to write a letter to Turkish President Solomon Demirel to help the people of Azerbaijan and Qarabagh. The text below is part of his memoirs about the actions that have been taken to help the people of Qarabagh, which has been gathered in my memoir and my father's book, by Hasan Rashedi and Akbar Azad:

When I came back from one of my trips from Baku to Tehran, Kalobraj failed, I was too upset, and I thought to speak to the Turkish ambassador and ask them for help from Azerbaijan. Via telephone from the Ambassador of the Times, I booked the time to Mr. Ghoraghmah, and I went to visit him the same day. I said, "You are the ambassador of the Turkish government, and you see that the Russians, the French and other Christians help Armenia, and with the arms of the Russians and Armenians, the Azerbaijani Turks are slamming the Muslims, and they do not have mercy upon the woman. Witnessing such things why are you silent?"

After that I got sad and sobbing loudly I stated, "If your government is surrounded by the West, where have your million (your nation) been gone?"

They also became politicians and ate bread at a daily rate? How do you accept this sting of history? "Javad Bey wrote so much to my respective ministry that ..." It is good that you write your name to President Demirel, he knows you and respects you.

I will send her a letter. Tomorrow morning, I censored the post, and I went to Bourghmaz Bey. Meanwhile, I sent a copy of the letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to Mr. Velayati. The ambassador sent the letter to Demirel the same day. After several days, the ambassador went to Ankara, calling me back and calling me. When I went to visit, he said: "Demirel asked me and said," Hi, hello to Dr. Javad Bey, and say that we have helped Azerbaijan in every possible way, and then we will do it. But the whole world of Christianity is in front of us and supports Armenia "(Rashedi, Azad, 2016: p. 337-336). During the Qarabagh War, I and my Friends of the Warlich Editorial Board provided telegrams, signed by 46 people and sent to President Ayatollah Khamenei. In the telegram we would have demanded: "announce the Qarabagh week and donate funds to help the Azerbaijani brothers that week, and to be registered to go to the front of the delegation." Because many Iranian Azerbaijani people were ready to help any people in Qarabagh on those days. We did not receive a job from the presidency. We alone, in cooperation with the editorial staff of the magazine Varliq and other interested parties in Azerbaijan, set up a committee for material assistance to the war-torn Qarabagh, in order to sum up and donate them. The donations were handed over by Mr. Hassan Majid Zadeh (Savalan) and it was broadcasted on the site (Rashedi, Azad, 2016: p. 337). This humanitarian moved and the boom of the Azerbaijani nationalists and intellectuals without the support of the Iranian government in the newspapers of the Republic of Azerbaijan reflected a great deal. Dr. Javad Haight is called the activist of the Azerbaijani activist father of the Turkish Turks, for which reason his behavior and actions at that time have had a profound effect on the subsequent activism of the Turkestan nationalist movement in Iran. Also, writing a letter to President Suleiman Demirel on his behalf is somewhat a sign of Tehran's diplomacy in the face of the Qarabagh conflict, and it was also a protest to the performance of the Iranian foreign policy package. Meanwhile, the actions and actions of the academics and the prominent literary and scientific people of Azerbaijan and their pressure on the active mediation and active diplomacy strategy of Tehran after that were influential in Tehran, and it was somehow a leverage of internal pressure on the foreign and domestic foreign policy system.

Azerbaijan's nationalist flow since the Qarabagh war until today, one of its main concerns has been the Armenian occupation of Qarabagh and, in their view, Iran's assistance to Armenia in this direction. Along with the national and legal demands and demands of the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this movement has always raised the issue of Qarabagh. For example, in the polling season, the main gatherings of these activists in the castle of Babak, Kalibar-e-Wabi, from 2000 to 2005, have always been the motto of the "Beyazmi Garden of Beyimgar" (the garden of our soil and will soon be available to us). Not only among Azerbaijani national activists, but also among Azerbaijani public opinion, the Qarabagh crisis is one of the issues that has always been considered.

As in the majority of wedding ceremonies in Azerbaijan, the musical composition of "Anadiyar arzulara harzaman Qarabagh" (the Qarabagh is our mother of dreams) is composed, and people have a respect for this music. Sports fields are other places where the Azerbaijani nationalism movement protested to the occupation of Karabakh and Iran's policies toward the crisis, so that, with the pressure of the fans of the Tabriz tractor, the Armenian player deported (dismissed) by the team's directors. They were bought for the game. This issue has also been drawn into the field of science.

Student publications from the universities of Azerbaijan and Tehran each year commemorate this tragic day on the anniversary of the Khojaly tragedy and criticize the government's passive policies. Even the issue has religious and religious dimensions, and people like the old, nationalist Azeri ayatollah Hojatollah, along with many of their clerical friends, have considered one of their concerns about the Qarabagh issue and criticized Iran's performance in this regard. His and his friends protested in this regard to a degree in Qom that the security forces would use to arrest him. The Qarabagh Arts and Cultural Arts Center of Azerbaijan has been the center of many ethnic groups, religions and civilizations. Where he has been a speaker of the region for many years in art, science and philosophy. But for years, war and hatred and crisis have dominated the area instead of art and science. The Karabakh Muslims, who were the main inhabitants and the majority of the population of the country for about a century ago, are today displaced persons and displaced persons of the Qarabagh, and the Armenians of Qarabagh Qarabagh, who were present as a minority resident in this region, thanks to the Tsarist Have territorial claims to this area. The crisis and war that began and continued from 1991 to 1994 killed and wounded tens of thousands and displaced about one million people from their ancestral home.

While due to the ideological foreign policy and, ultimately, the need for supporting the Shias' of Azerbaijan, the public was expecting the Islamic Republic of Iran's strong support for the Republic of Azerbaijan. The expectations of the international community for the functions of Islamic Republic of Iran's religious ideology in relation to regional and international issues before the Qarabagh crisis existed, as well as the Islamic society and the public opinion of the two Azerbaijani Arabs (Araz) Expected from the Islamic Republic of Iran. But the reality of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran was taken contrary to this expectation and with the emphasis on geopolitical interests. On the basis of this mentality and practice, in general, Iran showed itself to be neutral in terms of the crisis and the sidewalks of the parties, and in the later stages, with a mediating approach, tried to resolve the crisis and push it into a cease-fire. However, the same performance was not achieved due to the lack of consideration of the interests of other actors and the inadequate influence on the countries involved in the crisis, and in some way the ideological legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran was criticized by the Azerbaijani community and Islamic assemblies And the confidence of the public opinion of the Azerbaijani community was severely debarred from Iran due to the occupation of other parts of their territory at the time of mediation.

As a result, the level of relations between Iran and Azerbaijan from 1991 to today on the widespread and negative scale, the Qarabagh crisis and the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been subject to this crisis. So that the negative mindset at that time has become a major factor in dealing with other major issues of disagreement between the two countries, especially Azerbaijan, with a doubt and a negative attitude. Accordingly, and at the risk that the lack of promotion of the friendly and permanent level of relations between the two neighboring countries and the Muslims has created serious problems in the region for both countries and has prevented them from securing their national interests.

We found that in a different approach, in terms of being unbiased, pathologic, realistic, and critical analysis, on the one hand, and on the other hand, with regard to the conditions of the region and the process of global change, taking into account the needs of the two sides and The existing capacities between the two countries and the South Caucasus region, in a forward-looking perspective, would emphasize that if Iran's foreign policy changes on the Qarabagh conflict, with the expansion of bilateral relations and bilateral and regional cooperation, what are the positive revenues for Iran and even Azerbaijan. Accordingly, the theoretical framework we chose has

been based on both sections of the research, so that they are both responsive to the pathological and critical outlook, and to respond to a futuristic analysis based on the principle of change in foreign policy. The Islamic Republic of Iran diverted itself from the center of the war with an impartial approach, in fact, with the lack of support from the parties involved, somehow on the brink of the crisis. But for a country where the crisis is right along its borders, and the parties involved, namely, Azerbaijan and Armenia, are neighbors, the adoption of such a practice would have led to a strong isolation and broader security arrangements. For this reason, with the intensification of the war on the Qarabagh Front, the Iranian authorities tried to persuade the parties to the conflict. This attempt was partly the result of the Tehran summit between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and with the mediation of Tehran in April 1992, with the presence of Armenian President Leon Trotyroshin and the Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan, Yakub Makhmadov, and with the mediation of Hashemi Rafsanjani. The signing of a ceasefire agreement was signed. But just at the time of the Peace Summit in Tehran, the Armenian forces occupied other parts of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, including the city of Shusha, using the opportunity. In fact, the efforts of mediation of the Islamic Republic of Iran were the result of the image and, instead of positive influence, created a gulf and created a negative attitude of the Azerbaijani community from Iran. This was the cause of most of Iran's passivity in the Caucasus region and in some way caused Russia to pivot the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Caucasus and became closer to Armenia. Indeed, the Iranian Qarabagh policy was contrary to the general public. The discourse of the religious ideology of Tehran required a clear and positive support of the Muslims of Azerbaijan in front of the Armenian Christianity, which was not such a function of the foreign policy apparatus of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

This kind of operation extremely exerted influence over the trend and the level of bilateral relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Azerbaijani Republic. The public opinion of the Republic of Azerbaijan condemned Iran to occupy Shosha and Klebger at the time of mediation of Tehran, the delivery of oil and fuel during the war to Armenia, and the non-closure of the land borders with Armenia by Armenia at a point where Armenia's only way of traveling to the outside world Through the borders of Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan closed all their borders to Armenia, among which were the factors that led the government of men and public opinion to the Azerbaijani community to blame Iran for occupying their lands and to accuse them of helping They know Armenia during the war.

Iran also rejects Azerbaijan's claims that it has always defended its territorial integrity and interprets its broad relations with Armenia on the basis of the principle of its neighbors and geopolitical interests and, on the other hand, defines Azerbaijan as a policy of the West and Israel knows. The same charges of cross-border women, which have centered on the Qarabagh conflict, have also had a profound impact on other areas, the Azerbaijani Turkestan nationalism, Iran's national security, the Caspian Sea legal regime, the Azerbaijani regime, Iran's relations with Armenia, and Azerbaijan with Israel and the United States, the conflicting blocks of the two countries, the type of two-state governments and tensions between the two countries that the Qarabagh crisis and the Islamic Republic of Iran's response to this crisis and, consequently, the negative attitude created in the Republic of Azerbaijan, have also had a profound impact on these issues and highlighted the degree of direction between the two countries to a large extent. In addition to the above-mentioned factors, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the Qarabagh conflict and the lack of active change in proximity to the positions of the Republic of Azerbaijan, due to regional and international floating conditions, have other significant economic, security-military, Political, Caspian and Social Caspian for Iran, so that, despite the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran saw the Qarabagh conflict as a potential security threat, and because of its security and geopolitical aspects, it has drawn its Qarabagh policy. Over time, security threats from the north of the country's borders focused on national security. It is much broader and different in its various factors.

Israel was one of the countries that took Azerbaijan in the Qarabagh war and explicitly supported the country and continued to support this day. Unlike the performance of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this function of Israel caused the relations between Azerbaijan and Israel to be strategically and robust. That's why the Jewish

minority living in Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan's neighbors with Iran, its vast oil and gas reserves, has made Israel think more about its influence in Azerbaijan and deepen its relations. The presence and influence of Israel, which the Islamic Republic of Iran defines as one of its greatest enemies, has undermined Iran's national security. Israel is equipping the Azerbaijani Army with its advanced weapons and in terms of security services and espionage, it does not relinquish its assistance to Azerbaijan, which also means the influence of Israel in the military-security structure of Azerbaijan and the blockade of Iran by Israel through the northern borders, which is considered one of the greatest security threats of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, When the Islamic Republic of Iran, via Lebanon and Syria, brought its borders to Israel, Israel, thanks to the support of Azerbaijan in the Qarabagh war through its land, crossed the borders of Iran, and through the Caspian Sea and the Azerbaijani soil, the northern borders Iran's national security is under its control. In 2012, at the height of tensions between Iran and Israel, there was a danger that Israel would attack Iran's arsenal of nuclear weapons through the territory of Azerbaijan. Of course, the security threats that have been created and which are not limited to the presence of Israel, due to the performance of Gharebaki in Iran. The expansion of NATO to the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus region, the increase of US military bases in the territory of Azerbaijan and the country owned by the country, the presence of Turkey in the political, economic and military structure of Azerbaijan are among the other security threats that are in the article of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Qarabagh crisis and its effects on the relations between Iran and Azerbaijan and the consequences of the crisis under the influence of Tehran's foreign policy on this crisis are not limited to the security-military dimension of Iran. Caspian Sea issues and the lack of common and even apposing point of view between the countries of the margin, especially Iran and Azerbaijan, and the abandonment of Iran's Caspian Sea energy projects, the major challenges, and the negative consequences for the economy, security, policy and strategic influence and marine basin. Iran has created. So far, Iran has had the most conflict and tension with Azerbaijan over the Caspian Sea legal regime for geopolitical reasons and having a common border with the Republic of Azerbaijan and the history of tension over Iran's performance towards Qarabagh.

In fact, the Qarabagh crisis has caused the presence of trans-regional powers in the Caspian region, each of which has pushed the level of relations between Iran and Azerbaijan and placed Iran in relative isolation in the Caspian Sea. Another significant consequence of the Qarabagh conflict, and the consequence of Tehran's actions that has led to the Islamic Republic of Iran, has been in the field of economics, which has made Iran lose the largest economy in the South Caucasus region and even the privileged position of Central Asia. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been denied this because of the deep conflict with Azerbaijan, despite all the privileged conditions for acquiring the Azerbaijani economy and the region. According to statistics in 2013, only 2% of exports to the country. While another important country in the region, that is, Turkey, which has less than Iran's economic position with Azerbaijan, has been able to make the largest contribution to the Azerbaijani economy, thanks to the strong support of Azerbaijan in the Qarabagh War, and according to experts in the field of economics and the policy of the Caucasus in the near future will take Russia's foothold in the Azerbaijani economy. Iran has also abandoned the region's huge economic plans for its lack of strong relationship with Azerbaijan, including international energy transit and transfer plans.

Along with the economic outcomes, the political dimension is another issue that, with its attachment to the Qarabagh conflict, also has negative consequences for the Islamic Republic of Iran in this regard. Mutual suspicions, distrust, conflicting blocs, claims of interference in each other's internal affairs, nationalism, etc. are only part of the political conflict between the two countries. In the political sphere, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always tried to create a consensus among Muslim countries against Israel, but it has not succeeded in this, because a number of Muslim countries, including Azerbaijan, are in good relationship with Israel. Besides, the issue of the unification of Azerbaijan (united Azerbaijan), which is currently by the scientific and political circles of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani identity of this Aras (Araz), is another important political consequence for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In addition to regional implications, in Iran's internal and social dimensions, the Qarabaghi of Iran has had important implications. The Islamic Republic of

Iran is a country with a large population of Turks, especially the Azerbaijani Turks, mostly in the northwest of the country, along with the borders of Iran with the Republic Azerbaijan. This large population in no territory has any difference with their races in Azerbaijan, and the joy and grief of the victory and defeat of the Republic of Azerbaijan on this community also have a direct and lasting impact. Therefore, Iran's performance in relation to the Qarabagh crisis, which was accompanied by a lack of cooperation with the Muslim nation and the Shiite religion of Azerbaijan in the face of Christianity, led to the frustration of Azerbaijanis from Tehran, and in some way created a rift between Azerbaijan and Tehran (the gap between the nation and the government). Iran was undoubtedly, the Qarabagh conflict and the opposite policy with Azerbaijanis on both sides of Aras led to the rise and organization of the flow of nationalism in Azerbaijan.

In fact, the main stimulus of Azerbaijani nationalism in Iran is after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the Qarabagh War and the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This issue was not the only priority at that time, but it was one of the main concerns of the nationalists of Azerbaijan at all times that have been dealt with in any given situation, making it an opportunity for a single Azerbaijani plot, a concrete example of it: the motto of the Qarabagh is ours and always It will remain for us (Qarabagh, Bizimdi, Byzim Qarabagh), which is one of the main factors of the Azerbaijani mindset among this nationalist group. Along with the nationalists of Azerbaijan, the level of relations between Iran and Armenia, which is why the Armenians of Iran enjoy very high credits and rights. The rest of the tribes, including Arabs, Turkmens, Baluchis, have always been protesting. The ethnic minorities have objected to the fact that the Armenians, with a population of several hundred thousand, can teach and teach in their own language, but these people are deprived of their rights with a few million people. Also, among the religious group of the country that has swept away its power structure, the issue of Iran's lack of support for the Muslims of Azerbaijan and silence against the killing and displacement of the Shias of the country has been a constant objection and is viewed with some kind of doubt about this.

This increase in ties on both sides of the array has reduced the interest in the culture of the center in Iran, which poses a major political, sociological, psychological and sociological challenge and deeply needs sensitivity in this regard.

The other subject or another issue that has been addressed in this survey is that the policy of impartiality or mediation that the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken in relation to the Qarabagh conflict, regardless of its negative consequences, has been able to supply Iran's national interests Slowly.

To reply to this very question, we have made strides to demonstrate a comprehensive national interest, to determine and clarify the national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and to we answered the second question, in line with these interests. It is really tough to recognize the national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the true sense. Because Iran has discourse and behavioral diversity in its foreign policy. Iran also has revolutionary discourse and supports the revolutionary and anti-imperialist positions of different countries around the world. On the other hand, it has a religious ideology discourse and, based on Islamic principles and guidelines, forms its foreign policy and also has a nationalist discourse, which disclose Iran's foreign policy process. On the other hand, as in other countries, it seeks to pursue its vital interests, aspirations and aspirations in its foreign policy. But the basis of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to prioritize the principles and standards of the Islamic religion.

If national interests are a general concept of the elements that constitute the most vital needs of a country, these elements are: preservation of existence, independence, territorial integrity, military security and economic well-being, and national interests of Iran in relation to the developments in the South Caucasus, and in particular The Qarabagh crisis, based on this definition, will reveal that during the years that have passed since this crisis and is still persisting, in the true sense of Iran, it has failed to meet its national interests. And if national goals and interests are measured by the values and intentions that make a nation practical in the global arena and interact with other players and actors and short-term, medium-term, and long-term, and we are confronted with the fundamental contradictions with this definition and the achievements of Tehran's

foreign policy towards Qarabagh. Due to the dearth of back up for the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Qarabagh conflict, the Islamic Republic of Iran operationally entered the political, economic, social and cultural tensions with the Republic of Azerbaijan and could not close and stabilize with the country with which it would have to have and make best ties.

On the other side of the coin, at that particular time, Tehran's short-term goals, namely the preservation of its own borders and the preservation of the country's independence and territorial integrity and the struggle against autonomous movements, were preserved, but these same issues took a different dimension after a while. This policy has only succeeded in understanding the interests and interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the short term. If we consider the national interest of Iran based on the classification of Dr Seyed Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi in the case of the Qarabagh conflict, which includes defense and security interests - the interests of the international order and the international system, economic interests and ideological interests, based on the achievements, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is about the Qarabagh crisis and also taking account the Iranian national interest in this foreign policy is not acceptable. For example, ideologically, one of the main interests of Iran's ideological interests is the preservation of the Qian of Islam and the Revolutionary Guards. This issue of national interests has not been addressed in the case of the occupation of Qarabagh and the level of relations between Iran and Azerbaijan. So that the Qarabagh area of Islam has come to occupy Christian Armenia and the people of the Republic of Azerbaijan have gotten a negative attitude toward Iran's ideology and macro politics. In general, the Iranian Qarabagh policy, which was adopted about three decades ago and which has continued to exist without change and has led to the expansion of the positive and friendly relations of Iran with Armenia, has been challenged in relations between Iran and Azerbaijan, has not been able to address the economic, cultural, ideological, security and national interests of Iran. In assessing the relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, from 1991 to the present day, and considering different states under different discourses in both countries, we see a rising trend in bilateral relations. But these relations have never reached the expected level of convergence between the two countries. In the meantime, the Qarabagh crisis and the operation of the internal and external policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which did not support the Republic of Azerbaijan against the Christian state of Armenia, were among the factors and factors that significantly influenced the lack of real improvement of relations between the two countries at all times.

In the time of Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hassan Rouhani, during all these years, the negative mentality and attitude that has created the policy of Qarabaghi of the Islamic Republic of Iran among the statesmen, parties and public opinion of the Republic of Azerbaijan which is the main obstacle to positive and undisputed views. To expand bilateral relations. So that the relative improvement of relations in some areas in some areas has been superficial and cross-sectional. As far as strategic, security, transit of goods and energy, regional convergence and other factors have deepened. Accordingly, we believe that, based on the principle of floating foreign policy and the rotation of national priorities and norms of national interests, also on the basis of the emphasis on the principles of foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the practice of them, by changing the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding The Qarabagh crisis and the proximity to the demands and positions of the Republic of Azerbaijan, a practical action to restore the occupied territories of the country, will see the level of bilateral relations very different from what we have today between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In this case, Iran can boost its strategic depth from the one-dimensional Middle East to the South Caucasus and even Central Asia, from the danger of Israel, the United States and even NATO in its northern borders, can diminish its legitimacy to a level, to reform the good mentality created between Azerbaijanis on both sides of Aras and to strengthen its national unity, resolve the issue of the legal regime of the Caspian Sea in cooperation with Azerbaijan, and expand its presence in the energy transfer plans of this region and establish a strategic position Strengthens itself. In contrast to the Republic of Azerbaijan, the different conditions that will arise in the event of this change of Iranian foreign policy will make the best use of it.

It will be based on the resolution of the occupation of the Qarabagh and besides it will enjoy other conditions such as economic, political, geopolitical conditions. In a real sense of a word, this alternation will have different and positive benefits for the two countries. In this research, we will argue that the Islamic Republic of Iran will experience a very different situation in this revolution and will achieve a very good position in all areas. Most Caucasian analysts emphasize that weak Azerbaijan is more in favor of Iran and will better protect its security and interests, but Iran's practice is also a compelling evidence of such a theory. though the point shouldn't be overlooked here is that the Republic of Azerbaijan is no longer a weak country like the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century.

It has had huge boom in the economy, science, military structure and international lobbying in contemporary years. All developments in the southern Caucasus centers around Azerbaijan, and there is no massive economic and even military presence in the vast and extensive parts of Azerbaijan. The country has made its lobbying power at international scope and among the great powers of the world strongly acclaimed and has been able to make a very good situation with its dynamic foreign policy. So, Azerbaijan is no longer a weak nation and, based on this fact, we ought to restrain the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to ties with this country (Abazari et al., 2012: p. 29)

Conclusion

At the end of the article, if we are not to sum up the outcomes and findings of this study, we can summarize that the foreign policy of neutrality or mediation adopted during the Qarabagh War and resumed to remain unchanged even up to now and still today. It has caused a lot of consequences and problems for this country and failed to meet the national interests of Iran, like wise. Iran's Qarabagh policy on Iran-Azerbaijan ties has had other negative results in various fields for the Islamic Republic of Iran, which can be linked to the boost of the political and military presence of Israel and the United States, more particularly Israel, along the northern borders of Iran and the Caspian Sea, Losing huge economic capacity of Azerbaijan, as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia, political tension with Azerbaijan and, consequently, the dearth of political and ideological coherence and political influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, severe criticism of Iran's dual ideological reaction in the absence of the backup of the Muslims of Azerbaijan in the Karabakh war and the destruction of the powerful dimension of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the increase of Turkish nationalism on the two sides of the Arus between Azerbaijanis, in particular, Azerbaijani Iran, and the split of the two-Azerbaijani alliance. Which has set the historic aspect before Iran's diplomacy system and its end result has come to a loss of strategic depth of Iran in the Caucasus. On this regard, in accordance with the environmental floating situations and present ongoing realities, the Islamic Republic of Iran requires a crucial review of Caucasian foreign policy, especially on the Qarabagh crisis and the scope of ties with the Republic of Azerbaijan. Though is this change feasible? And for some time now, measures have been taken to recognize the realities. The writers hold that even if we acknowledge that the remaining of the crisis has been somehow in accordance with the needs of Iran, today conditions are utterly different and the continuation of this crisis is due to the predictions and increase of militarism of the two countries, more particularly Azerbaijan, which in contemporary has allocated years great funds to purchase weapons and equip its army, which will end to a massive military crisis between the two countries of Azerbaijan and Armenia, which can extremely and seriously distort and undermine Iran's national security. As a result, if the Islamic Republic of Iran takes an effective approach to the recovery of the controlled territories of Azerbaijan before all these occurrences, it can turn conflict into an apt opportunity.

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